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ABSTRACT
Ritteman, Thomas Arthur, M.S., Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics,
College of Agriculture, Food Systems, and Natural Resources, North Dakota State
University, May 2010.  Grains, Trains and Aqua-mobiles. Major Professor:   Dr. William
Wilson.
Grain shippers are constantly faced with making merchandising and logistical
decisions while trying to achieve a positive net margin.   They have to decide how much
grain to sell and when the most opportune time to do so occurs.   In addition, decisions
regarding how much freight should be acquired and where grain should be shipped need to
be addressed.   These decisions are met by several sources of risk such as futures spreads,
basis levels, transit times, equipment placements, and farmer deliveries.
The primary objective of this thesis was to develop a model to detemiine both the
optimal amount of grain that should be sold in the pipeline and the optimal amount of
freight that should be hedged by grain shippers through the use of forward shipping
mechanisms.  Certificates of Transportation (COTs) offered by the Burlington Northern
Santa Fe (BNSF) Railway were used to represent forward shipping mechanisms in this
thesis.
A stochastic simulation model of a prototypical grain shipper containing three
country elevators and two export facilities was developed.  A sensitivity analysis was
conducted on merchandising and logistical variables to evaluate different scenarios.   The
analysis revealed that committing to too many shuttle COTS limited the shipper's
flexibility, forced sales to be made in suboptimal periods, and significantly increased the
level of demurrage.  The type of freight ordering strategy implemented by each elevator
ultimately determined the overall sustainability of the firm; shippers need to diversify the
mH
type of freight they commit to because ordering too much long-term freight can result in
bad sales decisions, whereas relying only on short-term freight is costly and inefficient.
Not being able to quickly adapt to volatile market conditions can result in making bad
selling decisions and untimely freight purchases which can hinder the longevity of a flrm.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Problem Statement
The grain industry in the United States has been evolving over the past century.
The development of a formal futures market in the late  1800s has allowed traders to
manage price risk, increase margins, and trade grain more efficiently (Lorton & White,
2006).   The U.S. Government entered the grain industry during the Great Depression and
continued to influence the marketplace until the late  1970s.   It was not until the late  1990s
that the industry shifted from a supply market to a demand-driven market.   Today, the grain
industry is characterized by value added businesses, greater volatility in basis levels and
spreads, and a larger emphasis on logistics (Lorton & White, 2006).
Grain shippers act as an intermediary between producers and end-users, moving
grain from point A to point 8.   For example, the agribusiness giant, Cenex Harvest States
(CHS), moves more than  1  billion bushels of com, soybeans, wheat and other grains
annually to domestic and export customers in more than 60 different countries (CHS Inc.,
2009a).
Grain shippers have the freedom to choose between different modes of
transportation such as truck, rail, barge, or ocean vessels.   Each mode has its own
advantages and disadvantages; shippers make their modal choice based on their own
unique situation.  These four modes of transportation move grain through what is known as
the grain supply chain.
Logistics has been a vital element to the evolution of the grain industry and is thus
the key focus of this research.   Out of the total U.S. com production in the 2007/2008
marketing year, 79% stayed in the country for domestic use,  19% was exported to foreign
markets, and the remaining 2% was kept on-farm for feed usage (USDA, 2009).  Whether
com remains domestic or is used for exports, the product still needs to be transported
throughout the supply chain from its origin to destination.   In addition, transportation rates
ultimately determine a grain merchandiser' s net margin.  Although the transaction returns
from buying and selling grain might be high, transportation costs still need to be accounted
for to determine net margins.  Thus, grain shippers not only need to know how much of
their grain to sell, but also the number of railcars and/or barges to commit to.
The remainder of this chapter briefly examines the grain supply chain and its
participants that ultimately dictate the flow of grain.   In addition, a brief introduction on
merchandising and logistical strategies is included.   Chapter  1  also discusses the primary
and secondary objectives of the research, the procedures implemented to reach the
objectives, and lastly, a brief overview of the remainder of the thesis.
Grain Supply Chain
Throughout the duration of a growing season, producers make decisions on which
crops to plant, the type of pest management practices to utilize and how to market their
grain to provide the greatest possible return.   Small rural communities and famers that
make up those communities are just the beginning to a massive pipeline, or network of
participants that make up the grain supply chain.   In its simplest form, a supply chain
consists of all the functions enabling the production, delivery, and recycling of materials in
an effort to make products and services available to consumers (Wisner, Tan, & Leong,
2008).   Thus, key players in the grain supply chain consist of farmers, country elevators,
merchandisers, processors, feeders and exporters.   Table  1. I  displays each of these key
players and their function in the grain supply chain.   The end-users, or consumers, are
located at the end of this supply chain and ultimately dictate the demand for grain moving
through the pipeline.   This means that grain grown in rural-America needs to somehow end
up on store-shelves, available to consumers in a form that provides them utility.  The
remedy for moving grain through this pipeline is logistics.
Grain logistics consists of all the different modes and processes of shipping
products through the supply chain.  The three primary modes used by grain shippers for
transporting grain to domestic or export markets are rail, truck, and barge (Koo, Tolliver, &
Bitzan,1993).   The optimal mode chosen is that which offers the lowest cost; this depends
on the distance from the origin to the destination.   Chapter 2 will discuss the tradeoffs
among these primary modes of transportation.
The process of moving grain through the pipeline begins as soon as the grain has
left the field.  "Trucks are the first means of transportation, carrying grain to country
elevators, near-by mills, and processing plants, to other farms for feeding purposes, and
also to more distant places to persons engaged in these kinds of businesses" (Schonberg,
1956, p.114).  Typically, once grain has been trucked to a country elevator or some other
initial node in the pipeline, it is then loaded onto railcars for transporting long distances to
feeders, processors, or exporters.
Grain can also be trucked to river elevators.   These grain terminals are strategically
constructed along major rivers that utilize barge transportation (Schonberg,1956).  For
Table 1.1.   Ke ers in the rain su chain
Market player                                                              Player Function
Country Elevators
Procure grain from farmers and then decide to
either store as  inventory or sell and ship  it
Processors
Exporters
Purchase grain directly from farmers or from
country elevators and merchandisers.   They then
blend and process grain to produce a value-
Purchase grain primarily from merchandisers,
but also from some country elevators and then
sell  it overseas to international markets.
example, the CHS grain terminal in Savage, MN is strategically located along the
Minnesota River and is used as a transfer facility equipped with enough track capacity to
accommodate shuttle trains and enough storage capacity (560,000bu) to accommodate local
area producers (Gergen, 2010).  This facility was constructed in  1982 to unload railcars and
trucks for loading barges that mainly run down to the U.S. Gulf for export.   Since its
opening in  1982, roughly  1.5 billion bushels of grain has passed through this facility
(Gergen, 2010).
Even though barge transportation is useful for transporting large quantities of grain,
this mode of transportation is limited to rivers and other major bodies of water.   Thus, the
use of barge transportation is constrained by the fact that shippers not only must have a
I  Large grain companies that operate their own elevator-network and ship grain either domestically or
intemationally are considered merchandisers in this study.
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facility equipped for loading barges, but they must also be located along a major water-
route that accesses a favorable destination (Muxphy & Wood, 2008).
Since grain shippers are constrained in where they can ship by utilizing barges, the
use of railcars, more specifically, shuttle Certificates of Transportation (shuttle COTs) have
become more widespread in the grain industry throughout the 21 St century.   For example, in
the past couple of years there has been an increase in the number of direct railcar wheat
shipments to ports, taking volume away from barges (Wilson, 2009).  A shuttle COT is a
long-term forward shipping mechanism offered by the Burlington Northern Santa Fe
Railway (BNSF).   In short, a shuttle COT can be defined as a 110-car unit train of
dedicated, high capacity equipment and locomotives that malke a consecutive number of
trips among different origin/destination pairs (BNSF Railway Company, 2006).  Other
Class I railroads have also created long-term forward guarantees similar to the shuttle
COTs offered by the BNSF.  Chapter 2 includes a detailed description of shuttle COTs and
their importance in shipping grain.
In summary, a supply chain is a means for products to reach their customers
(Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).   Several service providers such as trucking, rail, barge, and
vessel companies play a key role in the eventual delivery of value-added products to end-
consumers.   Effectively managing a supply chain involves integrating key business
processes regarding the flow of materials from origination to final consumption (Wisner,
Tan, & Leong, 2008).  The concept of supply chain management, as it applies to grain
shipping, is known as managing the pipeline.  It encompasses all functions regarding the
origination of grain at the producer level to selling grain domestically or internationally
(Wilson, Carlson, & Dahl, 2004).  Because grain shippers, or merchandisers play such a
pivotal role in the flow of grain through a supply chain, they are the area of emphasis in
this research.
Merchandisers
The act of merchandising is defined as "the process grain businesses go through to
effectively manage the purchase and sale or use of grain as it occurs in their normal course
of operations" (Lorton & White, 2006, p. 3).   Thus, merchandising is a means of buying
grain from an initial node in the pipeline (e.g. producers, country elevators), waiting for a
favorable moiJe in the basis, and selling it to one of the latter nodes in the pipeline such as
processors or exporters.  Large grain firms that buy from country elevators and other grain
companies are considered merchandisers in this study.   Because merchandisers use
logistics to transport grain from its origination to its terminal market, they are also
considered grain shippers; the two terms will be used interchangeably throughout the
remainder of this thesis.
The grain shipper modeled in this study is a prototypical grain company with rail,
barge, and ocean shipping capabilities; and it operates its own elevator network in the
Upper Midwest. This type of grain shipper was selected for this research in an effort to
model the largest grain companies that currently exist in the industry.   These large grain
companies play an important role in facilitating the flow of grain from its origination at the
producer level to the final consumer.   The largest in the world today include Cargill, CHS,
Bunge, and Archer Daniels Midland (ADM).  They are all involved in some form of
origination, adding value to the commodity, and then shipping and exporting large
quantities of grain.   Contemporary firms are also becoming more vertically integrated with
goal of cutting costs and reducing risk through vertical linkages (Wilson & Dahl,  1999).
Within the past 20 years, the amount of risk a grain shipper faces has become very
significant.   This is due to changes in farmer production practices and merchandising
techniques, forward freight mechanisms, and access to international markets.  This
significant amount of risk has resulted in a need for grain shippers to strategize the way
they conduct business.
Need for Strategy
Grain shippers need to be able to effectively manage their logistical position reports
by utilizing the right amount of forward railroad mechanisms and the optimal number of
barges.   In addition, grain shippers must be able to sell the optimal quantity of grain to
maximize net margins.  In an effort to find the optimal amount of grain to sell and the
optimal amount of freight to acquire, grain shippers encounter sources of risk that impact
their decision-making.   Volatile market conditions and penalties imposed on shipping grain
create a need for strategy, or a plan to follow that would help the firm succeed.   Strategy is
so important to an organization that it ultimately determines its success or failure.  Thus, a
shipper's strategic decisions concerning logistics and merchandising are essential to the
survival of the firm in a competitive environment.
The following sections introduce both merchandising and logistical strategies that
grain shippers can utilize to provide them with the greatest possible return.   Chapter 2 will
describe both sources of strategy in greater detail.
Merchandising Strategies
The most common type of hedge for merchandisers is the "storage hedge." This
involves taking a long cash/short futures position.   Merchandisers hedge their grain by
taking a position in the futures market; this process allows them to eliminate price risk.
However, basis risk is still present and additional hedging strategies and techniques are
discussed in Chapter 2 to demonstrate how to mitigate basis risk.   Basis values are very
important for determining net margins.  Merchandisers use basis levels to make their
buying and selling decisions and regard the price of grain as being irrelevant (Lorton &
White, 2006).
In addition to hedging and basis values, storing grain as inventory is a very
important aspect of merchandising.   Storing grain is an alternative to shipping and
merchandisers can use storage when market conditions are unfavorable.  In addition,
storage acts as a buffer against sources of risk in the supply chain.   Chapter 3 discusses the
importance of inventory in greater deal and introduces the theory behind supply chain
models.
Logistical Strategies
When shipping grain, many forms of risk are present in the grain supply chain.
Sources of risk range from grain delivery patterns of farmers, shipping demand, and the
timing of modal arrivals to tariff rate changes, railcar premiums, and changing basis levels.
When a storage hedge is undertaken, a short freight position is established (Wilson, Priewe,
& Dahl,  1998).   Merchandisers with a short freight position face the risk of rising freight
prices similar to a short futures position being adversely affected by rising grain prices.
In order to manage these sources of risk, grain shippers can utilize the forward
shipping mechanisms that Class I railroads have to offer.   According to Wilson, Priewe and
Dahl (1998), too many long-term guarantees can remove flexibility because of the long
duration of commitment associated with them.  However, too many short-term guarantees
increases the level of risk even though they allow merchandisers to more accurately target
months with favorable prices.  Thus, a mix of long-term and short-term guarantees, as well
as general tariff railcars is optimal.
Table  1.2 provides a brief description of the shipping mechanisms currently offered
by the BNSF Railway.
Table 1.2.  BNSF Railway mechanisms
Rail Mechanism                                                Description
24-car Certificate of Transportation
Short-term guarantee in which shippers can
acquire cars for up to 6 months in advance via
an auction and shippers pay either a premium or
discount to general tariff for guaranteed cars and
service.
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Objectives
The primary objective of this research is to develop a model to determine both the
optimal amount of grain that should be sold in the pipeline and the optimal amount of
freight that should be hedged by grain shippers through the use of forward shipping
mechanisms.   Taken together, these two primary objectives were created in order to
maximize net margin.   Speciflc objectives were:
I.    Define key strategic and uncertain variables facing a grain shipper.
2.    Develop a stochastic simulation model of a prototypical grain exporting
fim.
3.    Evaluate the effects on output after changing key decision variables.
4.    Interpret the results and assess the implications for grain shippers.
Procedures
To reach the primary and secondary objectives listed above, a stochastic simulation
model was developed to determine the optimal amount of freight acquired by a grain
shipper and the optimal quantity of grain to be sold in an effort to maximize net margin.
After stating the problem and defining a prototypical grain shipper, logistical and
merchandising strategies were introduced to combat risk associated with buying, selling,
and shipping grain,  A literature review was conducted to analyze the tradeoffs of the
primary transportation modes for shipping grain.   In addition, a review of the rail industry,
both pre-and-post deregulation is provided.   The literature review also encompassed a
discussion on the forward shipping mechanisms offered by Class I railroads and alternative
supply chain methodologies.   Finally, a detailed outline of strategies available to grain
shippers was examined.   Important data pertaining to the random variables associated with
risk in merchandising and logistical decisions was identified.   Using this data, a
prototypical grain shipper was modeled using a "push" inventory system.   The model was
developed in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet using @Risk stochastic simulation software to
simulate a typical grain shipping environment.  These results were then used to determine
both the optimal amount of freight to acquire and the optimal quantity of grain the shipper
should plan tc sell in the pipeline.
Organization
Chapter 2 of this thesis examines the different modes of transportation in the grain
industry and how they have evolved to a point of offering forward freight mechanisms to
shippers.  A literature review of supply chain theory and the models it encompasses were
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discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 includes a description of the empirical model and
stochastic simulation procedure, provides an explanation of random variables, and presents
the data sources used in the model.   Chapter 5 presents the results of the model and a
sensitivity analysis on key variables.   Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary of the
research with implications for grain shippers.
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CHAPTER 2. EVOLUTION OF THH GRAIN INDUSTRY
Introduction
Over time, the grain industry in the US has passed through several different phases
dating back tc` the late  1800s up until the beginning of the 2 lst century.   The industry has
seen changes ranging from the invention of futures markets and country elevators to an
increased emphasis on international trade and deregulation of the rail industry.   For
example, in  1881  the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGEX), formally known as the
Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, was established to provide a formal cash and futures
market for grain grown in the Upper Midwest (Kenney, 2006).   During this same time
period, several country elevators sprouted up along rail lines to provide farmers with local
cash markets and by the  1960s, unit trains began to encourage point-to-point shipping.
Unit trains allowed for more efficient grain movements and they helped foster the
development of the export system in the US because increases in grain exports created a
demand for shipping to export facilities.
Crops mature at different times of the year around the US and once harvested, some
grain is allocated for export while the rest is used for domestic use.   Thus, the demand for
transport services differs across different geographic regions depending on the types of
crops grown in the area (Bitzan, Vachal, Vanwechel, & Vinje, 2003).   Whether a crop is
grown for export, domestic use, or is carried-over into the following year, it requires
logistics to move it throughout the pipeline.   The following section discusses the increased
importance put on logistics in the years following World War 11 leading up to the present
day grain industry.
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The Grain Industry FOLlowing WWII
In the decades after World War 11, the grain industry has been characterized by an
increased emphasis on exports in the 70s, government intervention and significant grain
surpluses in the 80s, and a trend of consolidation among firms in the 90s.   All of these
stages have shaped the grain industry into what it is today.   However, no time period was
more important than the 70s because an increase in export volumes jump-started the need
for greater capacity within the logistics system and it placed a greater emphasis on grain
transportation.
During the  1970s, one of the prominent features of the grain industry was that
several countries began expanding their imports and because of this world trade grew
dramatically (Wilson & Dahl,1999).   The US sold a total of roughly 82 million tons of
grain to Russia by  1975 (Morgan,1979).   As a result, U.S. agricultural exports generated
about $21.3 billion and grain prices were at their highest since  1917.   However, a growing
world demand for exports, a lack of government-held reserves, and the entry of large
sporadic customers into world grain markets caused the 70s to be a period of increasing
instability (Wilson & Dahl,1999).
Because of the huge jump in export volumes, the logistics system within the grain
supply chain had to increase capacity to accommodate the overwhelming flow of grain.
Therefore, in 1980 the passage of the Staggers Rail Act (SRA) called for deregulation of
the rail industry.   The SRA will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, but it basically
allowed more competition in the industry among rail firms and it gave them more freedom
to set rates and design car allocation mechanisms.
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Overall, the industry in the past 15 years has evolved to become more efficient in
terms of basic market functions and transactions, logistics, and international trade.   Large
grain companies have either acquired or merged with the smaller flrms in an effort to
exploit vertical coordination within the industry (Wilson & Dalil,1999).   This trend in
acquisitions and joint ventures has caused the number of country elevators to dramatically
decrease: the number of elevators in Montana decreased by 40% during the span between
1977 and 1997.   However, firm size has increased in terms of storage capacity.   For
instance, the total industry storage capacity for the 20 largest firms in the US increased
from 45.4 mmt2 in  1985 to 64.4 mmt in  1998  (Wilson & Dahl,1999).
As a result of the acquisitions and mergers that have taken place within the past 15
years, the grain industry is highly competitive and is composed of large grain companies
such as Cargill, Cenex Harvest States (CHS) and Archer Daniels Midland (ADM).   "The
largest U.S. firms have a complement of each type of facility (country elevators,
subterminal, river and port elevators) and are highly integrated throughout the handling
sector" (Wilson & Dahl,1999, p.10).   Grain firms have been integrating into commodity
processing in order to grow in areas related to adding value to commodities. Thus, these
global firms have become vertically integrated in the recent past in order to improve quality
control, mitigate market power of competitors, and to gain greater control over logistics
(Wilson & Dalil,  1999).
For example, CHS not only handles grain, but it also provides agricultural inputs to
producers, handles more than 7 million tons of crop nutrients, processes roughly 90 million
bushels of soybeans into soy-based products, and sells more than 3 billion gallons of
refined fuels (CHS Inc„ 2009a).   CHS also has a strong focus on logistics in that they
2  Million  metric  tons
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manage their own fleet of railcars, operate one of the nation' s largest private truck fleets,
and manage their own ships (CHS Inc., 2009b).   In addition, CHS has looked into the
feasibility of international markets, and as a result, have expanded into other countries.
Thus, CHS is a prime example of traditional grain firms becoming vertically
integrated and more diversified in their operations.   CHS has control over their logistics
and is able to efficiently manage the transportation of their products because they have rail,
barge, and trucking capabilities.  These are the 3 primary modes of transportation and they
can be used together to ship goods from one point to another.
Modes of Transportation
Successful grain shippers always make the best use of their resources in an effort to
achieve the greatest possible net return.  When it comes to grain logistics, or the actual
physical movement of grain from one point to another, the 4 modes of transport that exist
for shippers are rail, truck, barge, and ocean vessel.  Each mode has its own attributes that
provides shippers with different alternatives for transporting commodities.  No matter what
the advantages and disadvantages are for each mode, one of the most important factors
impacting a shipper' s decisions is the transportation cost.   Transportation costs are directly
related to the location of shipper's plants, warehouses, and customers (Muaphy & Wood,
2008).   The different levels of costs incurred by a shipper are a function of the different
rates offered by carriers within each mode of transportation.  The rate structure is different
for each mode of transportation and is worth noting.   Table 2.1  displays the rate structure
for rail, truck, barge, and ocean vessel.   It is important to distinguish between the types of
auctions that take place in rail versus truck transportation.   For rail transportation, the
shipper with the highest bid is selected by the railroad as the wirmer.   However, for truck
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transportation, the shipper becomes the auctioneer and several carriers place bids in an
effort to win contracts and be able to haul that shipper's freight for a specified time period
(Caplice & Sheffi, 2006).   This type of auction is known as a procurement auction and the
lowest total cost carrier is chosen; simply put, the carrier that has the lowest bid is selected
as the wirmer.
Table 2.1.  Rate structure for the 4 key modes of transportation
Mode                                           Description of Rate system
Rates are determined via auction.
Two types of auctions (Caplice & Sheffi, 2006):
( I )  Simple bid:  several carriers submit a per load-mile rate to the
shipper who then chooses the carrier offering the lowest rate.
(2) Combinatorial auction: Utilizes a series of package bids in
which carriers place bids on a combination of specific shipping
routes or regions rather than uindividual  routes.
Ocean Vessel
Rates are #c'go/J.c7/ed between shippers and carriers.
Two types of transactions (Stop ford,1997):
( I ) Freight contract:  shipper purchases trips from the carrier at a
fixed rate.
(2) Time charter:  ship is hired by the day and allows shippers to
Crate and mana e  it themselves.
Other factors influencing a shipper's decision toward one mode or another include
the loading/unloading capabilities of a shipper' s grain facility, speed and flexibility of the
mode, reliability, and lastly, mode capacity.   The remainder of this section describes the 4
modes of transportation available for grain shippers and evaluates the tradeoffs that exist
among them.
16
Rail
Rail transportation has been providing a means of moving grain throughout the
pipeline for over a hundred years.  The rail industry, much like that of truck and barge, has
experienced government regulation and deregulation.   A background of the rail industry
and all of the changes it has been through will be provided later in this chapter.
From a grain shipper's perspective, cost is a function of distance; the longer the
distance between two points, the greater the cost.   Because of this, grain shippers not only
need to compare costs between different routes, but also need to determine whether one
specific mode of transport is better than another or if a combination of modes should be
used.   Figure 2.1  displays the differences in cost associated with the 3 primary modes of
transportation for grain shippers assuming a given origin and destination (Koo, Tolliver, &
Bitzan,1993).
As shown below, the rail transportation cost curve is depicted by RR', and it has a
higher initial fixed cost than truck, but less than barge (WW').   The slope of RR' is less
than that of the cost curve for truck (TT') which means that it has a lower marginal cost
than truck.   Thus, economies of haul are achieved for rail over greater distances because the
high initial fixed cost is spread out over a greater number of miles (Koo, Tolliver, &
Bitzan,1993).
Rail will have the advantage over the other two modes in markets composed of
distance CD because it has the lowest cost associated with distance.   However, in distances
greater than OD barge transportation is optimal.   Thus when comparing the 3 primary
modes of transportation, it is evident from Figure 2. I  that truck is optimal for short
distances (OC) whereas rail and barge are optimal for greater distances (CD and greater).
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Figure 2.I.  Truck, rail and barge cost curves (Koo, Tolliver, & Bitzan,1993).
Similar to the cost structures of the 3 primary modes, rail also stands between truck
and barge in other areas of concern for shippers: rail transportation is faster than barge, but
it is slower than truck (Muxphy & Wood, 2008).
When comparing flexibility, rail is less flexible than trucking because it restricted to
rail lines, but it is more flexible than barge.   In terms of capacity, there are different types
of railcars available for transporting grain such as heavy-axel3 cars and light-axel cars.
Railcars have greater capacity than trucking, but much less than that of barge.   Finally, just
like barge and truck, rail transportation has its issues with reliability.   For example, adverse
3 Heavy-axel cars can be loaded to a gross weight of 286,000 lb whereas light-axel cars can be loaded to a
gross weight of 268,000lbs (BNSF Railway Company, 2009)
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weather conditions, locomotive issues and shortages of crews can cause inconsistent
service levels.
Truck
In the  1950s, the smaller branch lines operated by the railroads were becoming less
reliable and it was difficult for shippers to acquire cars when they were needed most
(Kenney, 2006).   Because of this, trucking emerged as a viable alternative for shipping
grain to terminal markets.   Thus, grain shippers located out in small rural communities
started utilizing truck transportation rather than trying to deal with the unreliable branch
lines.
Truck transportation was made possible because of the Interstate Highway System
which was implemented after World War 11.   "The improved roads that resulted from those
efforts helped foster the development of commercial trucking" (Kenney, 2006, p.  149).
Even today, many grain facilities are strategically located along key interstates to allow
efficient movement of grain between two points.  Movement of grain by truck is normally
conducted by producers when they are transporting grain straight out of the fleld, and this
generally starts the process of moving grain through the pipeline (see Chapter 1).   In
addition, grain is commonly trucked from one country elevator to another, and it can also
be trucked from country or terminal elevators to processors and mills.
Deperiding on the weight of the load, truck shipments can be classified into 2
categories: less-than-truckload (LTL)4 or truckload (TL) traffic (Murphy & Wood, 2008).
Grain shipped by truck falls under the latter category.   TL carriers would consist of farmers
hauling their grain into a country elevator, as well as grain being trucked from country to
4 LTL shipments range from  150-10,000 lb whereas TL shipments are greater than  10,000 lb (Murphy &
Wood, 2008).
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terminal elevators or processors.   Grain shippers should take advantage of the backhaul, or
the return trip from hauling to a destination.   That way, shippers will not only be
continuously hauling grain between two points, but they will also be operating in a cost-
effective manner.
In terms of transportation costs, trucks are not as efficient as rail or barge when
transporting over long distances.   Trucking costs are represented with curve TT' in Figure
2. I  and this curve has the greatest slope in the graph.   Thus, as distance increases, trucking
costs increase at a rate faster than that of barge or rail.  However, when transporting across
short distances, trucking is more cost effective because it has lower fixed costs than the
other 2 modes.   Overall, because trucking has a comparative advantage for short hauls; it
will be the best choice for distance OC in the graph (Koo, Tolliver, & Bitzan,  1993).
Other attributes impacting a grain shipper' s decisions regarding truck transporting
include flexibility, speed, reliability, and capacity.   Trucks have a huge advantage over rail
and barge in that they are very flexible because the only factor stopping a truck from
delivering its goods to customers is a lack of access to roads (Murphy & Wood, 2008).
In terms of speed, truck transportation is faster than that of barge and rail, but it is
influenced by speed limit and hours-of-service (HOS)5 restrictions (Muiphy & Wood,
2008).   Even though speed is an advantage over barge and rail, trucks are at a disadvantage
when it comes to carrying capacity6.   Because of highway weight and size restrictions,
trucks have a smaller carrying capacity than rail or barge.  Another disadvantage of trucks
5 Trucks can only be driven a certain number of hours in a 24-hour period,  and they are  limited a certain
number of hours driven in a one-week period (Murphy & Wood, 2008).
6 Maximum carrying capacity for trucks using the Interstate Highway System is a gross vehicle weight of
80,000 lb (Murphy & Wood, 2008).
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is reliability.   Adverse weather conditions and highway congestion can affect the
consistency of delivery.
Barge
River barge, or simply barge, transportation became popular in the  1950s and 60s
for purposes of moving grain from country and terminal elevators to latter nodes in the
pipeline such as exporters in the U.S. Gulf.   The Mississippi River is one of the main, if not
the most important, waterway for barge transportation in the US.  It connects the Upper
Midwest to the U.S. Gulf and provides shippers access to the numerous export facilities
that exist in that region.
Barge transportation became a viable option for grain shippers around the same
time that trucking emerged as a prevalent mode of transportation.   During this period in the
1950s and 60s, trucks were taking away from rail transportation and a majority of the grain
headed to key markets in the US (Minneapolis, Chicago, etc.) was now being moved by
truck.  Because of this, the shipper would have to pay the railroad an additional sum for
moving grain out of a key market by rail if it was brought there by truck (Kenney, 2006).
Rather than having to pay this additional charge for railcars, shippers instead chose to turn
to barge transportation.   As a result, new grain terminals capable of loading barges began
emerging along the Minnesota and Mississippi Rivers in the 50s and 60s.
Barge transportation is still a huge part of grain logistics.   After the barge industry
was deregulated in  1976, tariff rates became effective immediately and they are still used
today (Wilson, 2009a).   Barges rates are traded as a percentage of tariff and are typically
reported in dollars/ton; they are calculated by multiplying the current barge rate by the
1976 benchmark tariff rate and then dividing by  100.
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The percent of tariff rate can vary, but typically, the rate is based on 100% of the
tariff.   Therefore, the barge rate at  100% tariff is figured by multiplying 1.00 and the
benchmark rate, whereas for 200% of the tariff rate, the barge rate would equal 2.00 times
the benchmark rate, and so on (Marathon, 2010).   For example, at  100% of tariff, the  1976
benchmark rate for the Twin Cities is 6.19 (I.00 x 6.19), and if the southbound rate for
grain moving from the Twin Cities is 450, then the barge rate per ton is $27.867.
When comparing the cost of barge transportation to rail and truck, barge has the
highest initial flxed cost (see Figure 2.1).   However, barges have an advantage over the
other modes for long hauls because they have the lowest unit cost associated with distance:
this low unit cost is portrayed by the flatter slope of curve WW' in Figure 2.1.   Therefore,
even though barge has the highest initial fixed cost, overall costs increase at a very small
rate as distance increases.   In other words, barge transportation can realize economies of
scale similar to that of rail by spreading out large fixed costs over a greater distance (Koo,
Tolliver, & Bitzan,1993).
Besides having an advantage in transporting long distances, barge transportation
also is capable of transporting greater volumes than truck or rail.   One barge has the
capacity of approximately  15 railcars and approximately 60 semi-trailers (Muxphy &
Wood, 2008).   However, barge transportation is limited in terms of speed and reliability.
Barges move much slower than truck or rail transportation, and because of adverse weather
conditions, can be umeliable at times.  For example, droughty conditions can lower water
levels beyond the required depth8 for barges, while icing during the winter months in
northern states can prevent movement (Murphy & Wood, 2008).
:i4h5e°:,:,L9!#°d°e=t£:e8q5u:redforbargetransportationis9feet(Muxphy&Wood,2008)
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Another disadvantage of barge transportation is that it is very inflexible in terms of
where it can operate (Murphy & Wood, 2008).  Major waterways are needed for barge
transportation and even if they are present, shippers have a limited number of destinations
of where they can ship to.   In addition, grain shippers need to have their facilities equipped
with the appropriate loading and unloading equipment to accommodate barges.
Ocean Vessel
Rail, truck and barge transportation make up the inland transportation system in the
US.   These modes utilize roads, railways, and inland waterways in an effort to transport
grain throughout the pipeline (Stopford,1997).  These modes of transportation link grain
shippers to international markets through the use of export ports located in the U.S. Gulf
and the Pacific Northwest (PNW).  At these ports, grain can either be unloaded and placed
into storage at an export facility, or directly loaded onto the vessel from railcars and barges,
depending on specific constraints.
Shipping grain overseas is made possible through the use of ocean vessels.
Maritime or sea shipping has allowed access to new markets which in turn, leads to
economic growth.   Sea trade has allowed traditionally isolated communities to progress
into an integrated global community (Stop ford,1997).
Grain is mainly shipped as a bulk commodity rather than as a containerized unit,
and it is classified under short sea shipping (Stop ford,1997).  This entails shipping grain
within distinct regions from port-to-port.   In terms of cost, grain shipped as a bulk
commodity has its advantages over other products shipped as standardized cargo.   Bulk
shipments consist of large cargo parcels9 that can maximize the capacity of a vessel
(Stop ford,1997).   Thus, bulk shipments have a lower unit cost per ton than non-bulk or
9 A parcel  is defined as "an individual consignment of cargo for shipment" (Stop ford,1997, p.13).
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standardized cargo because grain can occupy the entire carrying capacity of a vessel; this
allows grain shippers to achieve economies of scale and control their costs.
Grain shippers typically charter, or hire, a single voyage from a ship-owner through
the Baltic Exchange'° (Stop ford,1997).   The grain shipper and the ship-owner then
negotiate a freight rate. I I   Ocean freight rates are based off of the Baltic Exchange and
market rates differ among the Gulf and PNW.  According to industry experts, a typical
ocean freight rate for the PNW is anywhere from $25,000-$30,000/day whereas a Gulf rate
is roughly $45,000-$50,000/day (Klein, 2010); there are a greater number of vessels
available in the PNW region, so they are offered at lower rates.
Because grain movements and price and basis levels are seasonal, shippers will
normally just have to hire a single voyage at a time.   Market volatility and weather
conditions affect crop production which makes it difficult for shippers to plan shipping
requirements and sign up for long-term commitments (Stop ford,  1997); compounding these
difficulties is that fact that shippers are subject to non-performance penalties if they are not
utilizing the vessel  in an efficient manner.   These penalties imposed on shippers are
discussed at length later in this chapter.
In conclusion, grain shippers rely on four key modes of transportation for moving
their grain; these include rail, truck, barge, and ocean vessel.   The four modes each have
tradeoffs based on speed, reliability, flexibility, capacity, and cost.   Transportation cost is
the most critical factor in determining which transportation mode(s) to utilize.   Rail and
barge transportation are best suited for long hauls because economies of scale can be
achieved by spreading out their high fixed costs.   On the other hand, truck transportation is
'° The Baltic  Exr,hange  is a maritime market for trading physical and derivative contracts  in ocean
iTa3:::#a:[e°[:h°tfr::et¥acr°emqTo°t:itj:ns#ma:tt[rc[cEtxocnTangelnformationservicesLtd„2o|o).
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best suited for short distances because its costs increase at the fastest rate when increasing
the distance covered.
Finally, ocean vessels allow shippers to access foreign markets and take advantage
of the global demand for grain.  Because grain is a bulk commodity, it can occupy a
vessel' s entire carrying capacity and thus, spread out high fixed costs associated with
operating a vessel.   This allows grain shippers to achieve economies of scale and makes
exporting grain more appealing.   Lastly, the inland transportation system composed of rail,
truck and barge transportation are linked to global markets through export ports and ocean
shipping.
Background of the Rail Industry: Pre & Post Deregulation
Throughout the past 200 years, the railroad industry in the US has evolved into one
of the most important transportation modes in the nation because of its carrying-capacity,
flexibility, numerous capabilities, and speed.   The trucking industry has become more
prominent and widespread in the recent past, but railroads still account for the largest share
of ton miles (Murphy & Wood, 2008).
The railroad industry has always been a very important component of the
agricultural sector in the US.   The very first country elevators were introduced in the late
1800s and were constructed along rail lines.   The rail network allowed country elevators to
be placed in small rural communities and it provided the first means of transportation to
terminal markets in Chicago, Minneapolis and Duluth.  Thus, rail was the first mode of
transportation used for moving grain through the pipeline and it paved the way for other
modes of transportation to emerge in the industry.
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But just as important as the railroads' very existence, are the changes it has
undergone and how these changes have affected agribusiness.  For example, the trucking
and barge industries, rail rates, and merchandising practices have all been affected by
changes within the rail sector.   These changes include deregulation of the industry,
efficiency and productivity gains, car allocation mechanisms, rate differentials over time,
and intermodal competition.  The first major change in the rail industry came with the
passage of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980.
Staggers Rail Act
The presence of the rail industry in the US dates back to the  1800s.   Passengers,
freight, and bulk commodities were transported great distances all over the country.
Because grain is a bulk commodity, the railroads provided a means for shipping it in large
quantities to regions of high demand.   Grain shippers depended on an efficient rail system
to move their bulk shipments to their destinations.   Grain is a low-value, high-volume
commodity when compared to other goods such as coal or primary metals; this means that
the cost of transportation makes up a large portion of the delivered cost of graln (Bitzan,
Vachal, Vanwechel, & Vinje, 2003).    Thus, rail service began providing an important
service to grain shippers and as a result, new rail carriers started emerging in the early
1900s.   By  1920, there were  186 Class I carriers[2 and in total,1,117 railroads in the US
(Tolliver & Bitzan, 2005). Then by  1930, railroad mileage peaked and there was a
combination of several Class I railroads, regional railroads '3, and local railroads'4.
]2 Class I  calTiers are defined as "line-haul freight railroads with 2007 operating revenue in excess of $359.6
#`#:%:;'n(a?:Sa?,Cr`oa:i°sna%£e¥[:rej:aans?fi:::a::i:a°i:r8o);dswithat|east35omi|esand/orrevenueofbetween$40
million and the Class I threshold" (AAR -  Policy and Economics Department, 2008).
[4 Local railroads are defined as "line-haul railroads that operate  less than 350 miles and Cam  less than $40
million per year" (AAR - Policy and Economics Department, 2008).
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During this period of rapid expansion. the rail industry, along with the other
primary modes of transportation, was being heavily regulated by the government in an
effort to protect shippers.  The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was created to
regulate railroads, inland waterways, and the trucking industry (Malioney,1985).   It did so
by regulating rates and preventing monopoly power within each mode by inhibiting
discriminatory pricing practices.   The ICC also regulated mergers among rail firms and
routes traveled (Wilson,1994).
Rate bureaus were prominent in the rail industry up until the  l980s.   Their primary
responsibility was to approve rate and service changes set by individual railroads (Wilson
& Wilson,1998).   Rate increases required an advance notice of 90 days to inform shippers
of the change.  Thus, rates were very stagnant and when changes did actually occur, the 90-
day notice reduced a shipper's risk associated with rate changes (Wilson & Wilson,  1998).
In general, regulation of the industry caused railroads to be inflexible and unable to
adapt to current market conditions.  They needed the approval of rate bureaus to change
their rate and service levels; because of this, price competition among firms was non-
existent (Murphy & Wood, 2008).   In addition, there were significant barriers to entry in
the industry, mergers and acquisitions among firms were very limited, and they didn't have
the freedom to develop unique shipping options and levels of service for shippers.   In other
words, firms weren't able to implement any aspects of strategy into their operation in terms
of pricing, mergers, line abandonment, or differentiated levels of service or product quality.
As a result, railroads started experiencing financial problems because of
competition from the trucking industry and an inability to set rates and abandon
unprofitable rail lines (Fulton & Gray,1998).   In addition, there was a growing consensus
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among not only rail carriers, but Congress as well, for a change toward less regulation and
interference from the government.  The major concerns were centered on a lack of
intermodal transportation, as well as higher costs being incumed by firms and inefflcient
rail movements.  Rail firms were so inflexible in setting their own rates and levels of
service that they couldn't operate efficiently nor respond to changing market conditions.
Ultimately, rail carriers had no ability to grow or expand their operations to achieve higher
levels of profitability.
The creation of the Department of Transportation (DOT)[5 in  1967 and the
National Transportation Policy Statement of 1975 " paved the way for deregulation of all
transportation modes in the US (Mahoney,1985).   In 1976, the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform (4R) Act was passed to allow railroads more flexibility in their
operations.   Finally, after these mild advances in the transportation industry took place, the
Staggers Rail Act (SRA) of 1980 was passed and it significantly changed the industry.
Initially, Staggers allowed railroads to abandon unprofitable branch lines and it
allowed the railroads more freedom in setting their own rates.   More specifically, railroads
could now offer lower rates to shippers for longer hauls.   Rate bureaus no longer played a
role in approving rate changes.   Instead, caITiers had the freedom to quickly change their
rates to match current market conditions.   Rather than the 90-day notice for rate increases,
rail carriers nuw were required to give a 20-day notice for increases and a 1 -day notice for
" The Department of Transportation (DOT) encompassed all modes of transportation and was created with
the  focus of intermodal  competition among shippers being more beneficial than "uni-modal,"  or single-mode
service (Mahoney,1985).
'6 This policy statement was pushed for an act toward deregulation by calling for reduced support and
interference from the  government.   It basically called  for less regulation of rates, freer entry into the industry,
and more intermodal cooperation among transportation providers (Mahoney,1985).
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decreases (Wilson & Wilson,1998).  Thus, railroads had more flexibility to adjust their
rates which in turn created more risk for grain shippers in terms of increasing rail rates.
The SRA also allowed railroads to establish their own trucking services and it gave
them the freedom to merge with one another; this started the trend toward fewer, but large
rail carriers (Mahoney,1985).   In addition, the SRA promoted intermodal competition and
it gave shippers a wider selection of intermodal carrier combinations to choose from.
Lastly, the SRA allowed firms to offer greater levels of service in terms of private contracts
offered to shippers and innovative car allocation mechanisms.
Private Contracts.  Private contracts between shippers and carriers became
prevalent during the  l980s after the passage of Staggers.   Contract rates were very
important in starting a new level of service offered by rail carriers that had been essentially
non-existent before  1980.   These confidential contracts were normally offered at a rate well
below the existing tariff rate, and they were strict in specifying the minimum size for single
shipments, as well as the minimum volumes to be shipped over the entire length of the
contract (MacDonald,1989).   In addition, the carrier had to commit to allocating a certain
number of railcars and the shipper had to commit to a specified loading speed.   Because the
private contracts offered lower rates for predictable high volulne shipments, they typically
favored larger shippers.   Thus, smaller shippers didn't receive the same rates and the
traditional system of equal rates across all types of shippers and ports no longer existed
(MacDonald,1989).   Because of a lack of price transparency associated with confldential
contract rates, shippers couldn't see what rates their competitors were receiving.   Thus, this
created inefficiencies associated with the negotiation and allocation processes.  Not until
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the evolution of forward shipping mechanisms did this problem disappear.  Forward
shipping mechanisms will be covered in detail later in this chapter.
The rail industry was significantly changed with the passing of the Staggers Rail
Act of 1980.   However, the Act didn't pass without its skeptics.   Many industry experts felt
that there was growing monopoly power among railroads and that some form of strict
regulation was still needed to protect shippers (Mahoney,1985).   For example, shippers
with access to only one rail line were forced to accept whatever rates were charged by that
carrier.   The following section provides an overview of some of the previous studies
conducted on the SRA and deregulation of the rail industry, and it highlights their key
flndings.
Impact of Staggers on the Rail Industry
The effects of the Staggers Rail Act have been analyzed and studied many times.
Some of the findings contradict one another, but overall, the effects of the SRA have been
beneficial to shippers and the industry as a whole.   This literature review of deregulation is
important and is fundamental to understanding how the rail industry has evolved into what
currently exists today.
Rate Levels, Productivity and Efficiency of Railroads
Staggers allowed for carriers to set their o\rm rates without the approval of rate
bureaus.   Some industry experts predicted rates to fall while others expected an increase
after deregulation of the industry.   One researcher that contradicts most other findings
regarding changes in rates is Boyer (1987).   He examined movements in railroad rate levels
and analyzed the market share for railroads following deregulation.  Boyer (1987) utilized
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the econometric techniques OLS and GLS '7 and found that rate levels increased
approximately 2% since deregulation.   However, he points out that not enough time had
passed since Staggers to determine the final effects of deregulation, and Bitzan et al. (2003)
noted that Boyer' s results contradict most findings because of a lack of explanatory
variables and a low number of observations.
MacDonald (1989) examined the early effects of rail deregulation on grain
transportation through the use of econometric modeling techniques.  He used the price
spreads between elevators at export ports and inland origin points rather than the actual rate
level in order to get more accurate results.   His main finding indicated there were large rate
declines present in the post-Staggers period.   MacDonald (1989) also found that rates are
inversely related to distance, shipment size, and volume, whereas a positive relationship
exists between rates and the distance from rivers and lake ports.  These findings were very
similar to those derived by Koo et al. (1993) and Bitzan et al. (2003).   In addition, Bitzan et
al. (2003) found that rates for wheat, com and soybeans have declined since Staggers.
Several other studies (too numerous to list) have found decreases in the level of rail
rates since deregulation. For example, MCMullen et al. (1989) used a network flow model
of PNW (Pacific Northwest) wheat transportation that included data from  1977 and  1985.
They found that lower rates under deregulation have decreased the total cost of shipping
wheat from country origins to export ports.   Wilson (1994) used econometric techniques on
34 different commodities spanning over  17 years to find that by  1988, deregulation had
signiflcantly lowered rates for all commodities.   Lastly, Winston (1998) states that real rail
rates have fallen by over 50% since deregulation.
" Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Generalized Least Squares (GLS)
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The decline in rail rates since deregulation was made possible by railroads
becoming more efficient and being able to increase their level of productivity.    Vellturo et
al. (1992) separated the cost savings directly attributable to mergers from those caused by
other changes among carriers permitted by deregulation.  They examined 4 mergers within
the rail industry and compared their cost savings to those obtained by railroads not
involved in mergers.   Their results indicated that mergers were not a prerequisite for
achieving economies of scale and that if railroads increased their average length of haul
and their route miles, they enj oyed efficiency gains through cost savings.
Wilson (1997) examined the cost and productivity gains achieved by rail carriers
over the period  1978-1989.   He found that deregulation resulted in a 40% reduction in costs
and that the initial impact of productivity immediately following Staggers was substantial:
6-7.5% reductions in costs per year.   His findings are very similar to Wilson and Wilson
(1998) in that they found rates and average length of haul to have an inverse relationship,
which is a major source of cost savings.   In addition, both studies found that deregulation
had resulted in an instant decrease in rates and a large improvement in productivity.
Finally, Dennis (2000) took the studies previously conducted on changes in rates
and productivity since Staggers and examined the specific effects of various factors on rail
rates since deregulation.   His econometric analysis analyzed factors such as increases in
bulk shipping, length of haul, shipment size, and cost savings to see which were most
important.  Dennis (2000) found that cost reductions in the form of productivity changes
accounted for about 90% of rate reductions since deregulation, and that overall rates for
agricultural products decreased by 48% since Staggers.
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Unit Trains.  Another form of efficiency gained since the passage of Staggers was
the rapid increase in usage of unit trains. Unit trains changed the rail freight system by
allowing grain shippers to ship huge quantities of grain directly from country elevators to
domestic processors or exporters rather than having to stop at some intermediary point
(Kenney, 2006).   For instance, some of the largest grain fims at the time (e.g. Cargill,
Peavey Co.) had always shipped their grain through Minneapolis at some point in time.
However, with the advent of unit trains, they could take their grain produced in Minnesota,
Montana, and the Dakotas and ship it directly from the country to the processor.
Unit train movements were concentrated on mainline routes and they covered long
distances in route to domestic processors and export ports; this lowered the total costs
incurred by railroads because their fixed costs were spread out over longer distances, and as
a result, their level of efficiency improved (Tolliver & Bitzan, 2005).   In addition, unit
trains allowed railroads to take advantage of economies of scale since the passage of
Staggers, and thus, shippers were rewarded in the form of reduced rates for shipping in
larger quantities (Koo, Tolliver, & Bitzan,1993).  This encouraged grain shippers to mal(e
high volume shipments and started a trend toward high-volume, more efficient movements.
Both Wilson (1997) and Bitzan et al. (2003) found an inverse relationship between unit
train miles and rail rates because per unit costs decrease as train weight grows and loading
efflciencies associated with large train size are realized.
Rationalization and Class I Dominance
The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 allowed railroads to abandon unprofltable branch
lines that were detrimental to their success during government regulation. During the time
period between  1979 and  1992, roughly 33,000 miles of track were abandoned which was
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about  18% of the total Class I and 11 road miles in 1980 (Tolliver & Bitzan, 2005).   This
process of downsizing through abandonment and line closure is known as rationalization.
The pace of abandonment significantly increased after 1980 and as a result, traffic was
concentrated on fewer miles of road; this increased railroad productivity and lead to cost
savings (Wilson & Wilson,1998).
Tolliver and Bitzan (2005) note that the impact of rationalization has not been
uniform across all shippers and regions; instead, they suggest that while some shippers
benefit from cost savings in the form of reduced rates, others have incurred higher
transportation costs because line abandonment has caused them to switch from rail to truck.
As a result of rationalization, mergers, and acquisitions, the number of Class I
railroads has dwindled down from  186 in  1920 to only 7 that currently exist today
(Association of American Railroads, 2008).   During the  1970s and 80s, the number of class
I railroads rapidly decreased due to mergers and acquisitions.   Government regulation
resulted in many inefficient rail movements and high costs that ultimately put railroads in
bad flnancial shape.  Thus, firms had to merge with one another or sell their operation to a
competitor.  For example, the Southern and Norfolk-Western railroads merged to become
the Norfolk-Southern System which is still one of 7 remaining Class I railroads operating
today (Vellturo, Bemdt, Friedlaender, Shaw-Er Wang Chiang, & Showalter,1992).
Between  1929 and  1999, there was a 55% reduction in total Class I rail line, and the
majority of this decline has been due to rationalization (Tolliver & Bitzan, 2005).
However, the 7 Class I railroads account for over 90% of both the rail industry's ton-miles
and total revenue (Muxphy & Wood, 2008).   Thus, the Class I carriers dominate the current
rail industry and some of them are heavily used in grain transportation, such as the
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Burlington Northern Santa Fe, Union Pacific, and Canadian Pacific railroads.  These large
Class I carriers are spread throughout the US, and in some regions, only  I  or 2 of them are
available for shippers to utilize.  This has led shippers to believe that railroads may exercise
monopoly pricing practices because of a lack of competing carriers.
Monopoly Pricing Concerns
Even though 30 years have passed since the Staggers Rail Act was introduced, there
are still concerns among shippers that railroads operating in regions with little or no
competition practice discriminatory pricing.   MacDonald ( 1987) used an econometric
model to analyze the extent of rail competition among carriers for export shipments of
com, wheat, and soybeans since the passage of staggers.  He found that rates increase as
the distance a shipper is from competing water transportation increases, and that rates fall
as competition among railroads in a specific region increases.   These results are very
similar to his findings in a later study: lower rates existed in areas where barge competition
was prevalent, such as regions of the Com Belt (MacDonald,1989).
MacDonald's (1989) result is analogous to the findings of Bitzan et al. (2003): the
amount of market power and the distance of the shipping origin to the nearest water loading
facility both are positively related to rates.  They also found that rate savings were greater
in regions containing intermodal competition.
MCFarland ( 1987) examined whether deregulation has allowed shippers to charge
captive shippers[8 unreasonably high rates.   By employing Tobin's q as a measure of long-
run monopoly profits, he found that railroads do not Cam monopoly profits in the long-run
'8 MCFarland ( 1987) classifies captive shippers as those that are served by only one railroad and can't readily
use other forms of transportation.   In addition, he notes that they typically are not located near a navigable
waterway and normally ship bulk commodities over long distances.
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and that railroad's value of q was much lower than that of non-financial firms.  Lastly, he
concludes that railroads face enough competition sufficient to protect shippers.
Thompson et al. ( 1990) studied the extent of competitive pressures on rate-to-
variable cost (R-VC) ratios of railroads and found there to be inelastic demand and less
competitive pressures on short trips to barge loading facilities.   In addition, interregional
competition affects rates in regions far from inland water transportation, and lastly, market
conditions are less competitive in the Upper Great Plains regions[9 than in others.
Stemming from this particular result, Koo et al. (1993) examined the pricing behavior
existent in North Dakota since it is a captive shipping market.   He found rail rates are
higher as distance from shipping points in ND to water access points increase and that rates
for prominent ND crops such as barley, durum and spring wheat are higher than other
Crops.
Lastly, Miljkovic (2003) used an econometric technique to examine the dynamic
nature of rate adjustments by different railroads across different regions.  He found that as
barge rates increase, merchandisers will substitute rail for barge.   In addition, a lack of
competition in Minnesota causes rates to converge at different speeds for shippers shipping
to the PNW; this is in contrast to rates in Illinois that converge to their desired levels at the
same speed since there are several rail and non-rail (e.g. barge) shipping opportunities for
shippers, and thus, competition among modes.   Finally, he concluded that grain
transportation by rail is far from being perfectly competitive.
Summary
ln conclusion, deregulation has allowed railroads to reduce their costs, and in turn,
offer lower rates to shippers.   More specifically, the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 allowed rail
" Montana and Minnesota are the two states  in this region  studied by Thompson et al.  (1990)
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carriers greater flexibility in pricing and allowed them to differentiate their level of service.
This opened the door for carriers to start offering private contracts and unique forward
shipping mechanisms.
Numerous studies have shown that rate levels for agricultural commodities have
declined since deregulation.   In addition, railroads have been able to offer lower rates
because of cost savings achieved through mergers and acquisitions, more efficient rail
movements, and rationalization.   Lastly, the section on monopoly pricing indicated that
competition among railroads (intramodal) and different modes of transportation
(intermodal) significantly influence rates.   Thus, grain shippers need to incorporate strategy
when making logistical and merchandising decisions.   In order to determine the optimal
logistical strategy, shippers need to have a good understanding of the shipping mechanisms
offered to them by the railroads.   The following section provides an overview on different
forward freight mechanisms available to shippers.
Car Allocation Mechanisms
Since deregulation of the rail industry, railroads have had the freedom to develop
differentiated levels of service for grain shipments.   Staggers allowed the new services
offered to grain shippers to be charged at premium rates.   Thus, railroads could charge
premium rates for premium services which gave them incentive to develop irmovative car
allocation mechanisms (Wilson & Wilson,1998).   The new freight mechanisms acted as
forward commitments to shippers and they allowed carriers to address car availability
problems and inefficient allocation methods that had been troubling grain shippers for
years.
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The car allocation mechanisms developed by the railroads were more efficient than
the primitive private contracts that were being offered in the early  1980s, and they acted as
a source of strategy for gain shippers.  Both short-term and long-ten freight mechanisms
were eventually created to meet the needs of shippers.  The Burlington Northern Railroad
(BN)20 introduced its Certificates of Transportation (COTs) program as the flrst mechanism
that offered guaranteed cars and service to shippers.
Certificates of Transportation (COTs)
Before the introduction of the Certificates of Transportation (COT) program, grain
shippers had to deal with a first-come/first-serve allocation system that often left shippers
with few opportunities to acquire freight when they needed it most, such as during harvest
(Wilson, Priewe, & Dahl,1998).   In addition, there were no car guarantees which meant
even if a shipper was successful in acquiring cars, the railroad couldn't guarantee when
they would arrive at the shipper' s facility or if the full quantity of cars would even be
placed.   Also, car cancellation penalties did not exist; thus shippers could order more cars
than necessary, use what they needed, and then cancel the remaining orders.   Ultimately,
grain shippers had to base their logistical decisions around car availability rather than
market conditions and they had to face a great deal of risk when trying to acquire railcars.
Finally in  1987, the BNSF introduced its COTs program and it was met with a sigh
of relief from graiii shippers.   COTs provide forward service guarantees to shippers.  They
allocate cars through an auction in which shippers place bids for guaranteed railcar
placement (Wilson & Dahl, 2005).   The submitted bids are placed at a premium over a
2° CuITently known as the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) Railway after the merger between the
Burlington Nollhern and the Atchison, Topeka and  Santa Fe  Railway  in  1995  (Miljkovic, 2001).
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minimum bid rate.   Thus, the shipper with the highest bid places the greatest value on the
COT and is the winner of the auction.
In their simplest form, COTs allow shippers to place bids for the guaranteed
forward placement of cars and they allow shippers to lock in rates for forward shipments
before the cars are needed (Wilson & Dahl, 2005).   Thus, the costs incurred with shipping
are locked in, and when combined with fixed prices from contracting and hedging,
merchandisers can calculate their expected net margins several months in advance.
COT Auction.  The auction for COTs takes place every week on Tuesday,
Wednesday and Thursday in which shippers place their bids for different types of COTs
each day on the BNSF website.  The main types of coTs are Monthly Grain Singles,
Monthly Grain Units, Yearlong Grain Singles, and Yearlong Grain Units (BNSF Railway
Company, 2010, Item  10300).   In addition, a Destination Efficiency Train (DET) can be
formed from 4 Monthly and/or Yearlong Grain Units.  Also, Yearlong COTs are signiflcant
because they can be purchased for  I  shipping period per month for 12, 24 or 36 consecutive
months; it is very common for large grain firms to have 2 or 3  yearlong COT commitments.
The different types of coTs are summarized below in Table 2.2.   This thesis utilized
Monthly Grain Units that were composed of 24 cars.  Therefore, COTs are referred to as
"24-car COTs" throughout the remainder of this thesis.
24-car COTs are offered for 3  different shipping periods2`  every month: First Period
(FP), Middle Period (MP) and Last Period (LP).   Thus, shippers can bid on FP, MP or LP
24-car COTs and they will be placed for loading at a shipper's facility in the shipping
period specified by the shipper.   For example, if a shipper bids on a First Period (FP)
2'  First Period:  ls' through  I Oth of the month; Middle Period:  I lth through 20th of the month;  Last Period:  2ls'
through the end of the  month (BNSF  Railway Company, 2010).
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Yearlong Grain Unit, then he expects cars to be delivered during the flrst  10 days of every
month for the entire year.   In addition, shippers can bid on 24-car COTs up to 6 months
forward from when the first shipment will actually take place.
Table2.2.  T es of COTs offered b the BNSF Railwa
Default shipment    Maximum            Number of
Size                                Shipment size     Shipping
24
Can be placed as
25, 26 or 27
24
Can be placed as
25, 26 or 27
48  -combine
two 24-car               I  period                        1  month
units
48 -combine 12, 24 or 36
two 24-car              I  period/month         consecutive
un its                                                                    month s
Table adapted from BNSF COT Rules Book 4090.
The auction differentiates shippers based on their valuation of the shipping
guarantee.   Minimum bids are specified in a per-unit amount that is required for shippers to
purchase a COT; this minimum bid is known as the Base COT Prepay and it is basically a
minimum partial prepayment amount (BNSF Railway Company, 2010, Item  10650).   For
example, the current Base COT Prepay for a Yearlong Grain Unit is $11,520/unit for the
entire year.
Bidders can place their bids at a premium above the Base COT Prepay to increase
the probability that a COT bid will be accepted.  In addition, the Total COT Prepay is the
total prepayment amount that is required to purchase the COT and because it is non-
refundable, it discourages COT cancellations.   The Total COT Prepay is determined by
multiplying the Base COT Prepay and any premiums by the total number of cars.  For
example, if a 24-car Monthly Grain Unit has a Base COT Prepay of $200/car and a $5
premium is included, then the Total COT Prepay for the unit is $4,920 (205 x 24).
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Shippers wishing to take place in the COT auctions and accept the minimum bid
offer or place a bid at a premium above the minimum have to do so by 3 P.M. Central each
day of the auction. If the bid demand exceeds the available cars for Yearlong Grain Units,
first preference is given to bids of the longest duration (i.e., 36, 24, or 12 months), and then
in descending order of bid dollar value until all remaining 24-car COTs are allocated
(BNSF Railway Company, 2010, Item  10400).   For Yearlong Grain Singles, Monthly
Grain Singles and Monthly Grain Units, preference is given to bids in descending order of
dollar value starting with the highest.
Winning bidders are notified the same day as the auction via email, and rates for
monthly 24-car COTs are those effective on the day of the auction or those on the first day
of the shipping period, as declared by the shipper when the bid was placed (BNSF Railway
Company, 2010 Item  10350).   For yearlong 24-car COTs and DETs, the effective rates are
those that exist on the first day of the shipping period.   Tariff rates are specific to each
destination/origin pair, and they must be paid in addition to the Total COT Prepay.   Lastly,
if a shipper owning a Yearlong Grain Unit or Yearlong Grain Single wishes to cancel a
shipment within a particular month, he will be charged $ 160/car for every cancelled
shipment.
COT Guarantee.  In order for the BNSF service guarantee to remain valid, grain
shippers have to provide the BNSF with the loading station (s) no less than  10 days before
the first day of the specified shipping period (BNSF Railway Company, 2010, Item  10450).
If a shipper fails to do so, the BNSF will not guarantee to supply the required number of
cars.   In addition, the shipping facility must be approved by the BNSF (i.e., track capacity)
in order for the guarantee to remain valid.  Lastly, shippers need to specify want dates for
41
their COT units within the specified shipping period even though the BNSF reserves the
right to place the cars at anytime within the shipping period.
In addition to the COT guarantee, a carrier non-performance penalty exists: if the
BNSF fails to deliver the guaranteed equipment by 00:01  A.M. on the  16th day after the
specified want date,22 the shipper is paid $200/car for each car ordered under the COT
program (BNSF Railway Company, 2010, Item  10500).   Thus, the COT guarantee
essentially states the BNSF will deliver cars no later than  15 days after the want date, or
else they are subject to a carrier non-performance penalty.
Secondary Market.  If merchandisers are committed to railcars but do not have the
grain to fill them, they can sell the cars on the secondary market.   Secondary markets allow
merchandisers to sell COT units and shuttle COT trips to other merchandisers who are in
need of cars.  The guaranteed freight can be sold at premiums or discounts to tariff.  For
instance, tariff is considered $0/car so if a COT is offered for $200/car, it is "200 above
tariff."  When freight is sold at a discount, merchandisers are basically "giving away" the
railcars and paying someone to take them; this is acceptable because trip incentives on
shuttle COTs still allow a profit to be made, and selling at a discount prevents a shipper
from forfeiting his prepayment on a 24-car COT unit.
Ultimately, merchandisers are given more flexibility because forward car
guarantees can be transferred to other shippers on the secondary market (Wilson, Priewe, &
Dahl,1998).   Brokers match up buyers and sellers and help with the transaction process.
For example, a broker will tell the freight trader from CHS that Cargill is looking to sell a
shuttle COT trip at 200 over tariff.  CHS can either accept or provide a different offer for
Cargill by working through the broker.   If CHS decides to buy the shuttle COT trip for 200
22 A want date  is the day a shipper prefers the railcars to be placed at the  loading facility.
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over tariff, they can turn around and sell this trip to another firm such as ADM or Gavilon
if they choose to.
In addition, shippers don't have to incur cancellation penalties when they can't
fulflll their forward car agreement.  Regions that are lacking grain to flll a unit-train or
shuttle COT that has already been committed to leaves no choice but to sell it on the
secondary market in order to avoid cancellation penalties; thus, merchandisers can sell
them to other merchandisers and still turn a profit.   Because guaranteed forward freight can
be transferred among shippers via secondary market, shippers can reduce their level of risk,
and this option of transferability granted to shippers increases the value of guaranteed
freight (Wilson & Dahl, 2005).
General Tariff Units and Singles
The general tariff car allocation system offered by the BNSF has existed in the rail
industry long before deregulation took place.   However, it has changed significantly since
both deregulation of the industry and the introduction of 24-car COTs to operate in a more
efflcient manner.   It exists to satisfy the common carriage obligation of the railroad:  smaller
shippers unable to access the shuttle program are still able to acquire small unit and single
cars through general tariff.   For example, shuttle-loading facilities cannot even request
general tariff cars (BNSF Railway Company, 2009b).   Thus, it complements 24-car COTs
and shuttle COTs to provide service to all grain shippers and to avoid discrimination
against smaller shippers.
Rather than the first-come/first-serve car allocation system that existed prior to
1980, cars are allocated through general tariff according to shipper demand and historical
usage provided that car demand does not exceed car supply (Fulton & Gray,1998).   When
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the demand fc`r cars does exceed supply, a random selection process is used in which
shippers can either place requests for a single-car order (up to  15 cars) or one unit order (up
to 48 cars) depending on the size of the shipper's facility (BNSF Railway Company,
2009b).   Shipping facilities have to be deemed appropriate by the BNSF and contain
sufficient track and loading capacity.
Once the number of car requests exceeds the available supply, shippers are assigned
a 9-digit, computer-generated random number that is entered into a lottery system.   The
requests are then prioritized and awarded according to the Lottery Week23 they were
received and by the random number assigned to them (BNSF Railway Company, 2009b).
If a shipper does not receive cars in that Lottery Week, he has to resubmit his car request in
the following week in order for the request to remain prioritized in the database; as a result,
he will ultimately receive cars.
Lastly, orders for single car and unit car requests have to be submitted online
between  12:01  A.M. Monday through  11 :59 P.M. Wednesday of every Lottery Week.
Shippers that successfully acquire cars from the lottery will have their cars placed at their
facility sometime within the following 30 days of the Lottery Week depending on the want
date.  Want dates are chosen by the BNSF within each shipping period of every month.
Shipping periods for general tariff are similar to those available for 24-car COTs in that
they specify delivery within 3 different periods24 of each month.
Shuttle COTs
After the creation of the COTs Program in 1987, several other Class I railroads
created short-term car guarantees.   Similarly, long-term car guarantees were eventually
::i?p#ynede£Sparethefirst3fullweeksofeachmonth(BNSFRailwaycompany,2oogb).
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developed.   Today, the long-term car guarantee prograln of the BNSF has evolved into
what are known as shuttle COTs which are larger than 24-car COTs.
Shuttle COTs were created as an extension of the 24-car COT program and they are
becoming the dominant mechanism used for rail transportation because of their large
carrying capacity, long-hauls, shipping incentives, and transferability on the secondary
market.   According to industry experts, roughly 80-90°/o of the total rail shipment volume
for a single grain firm is comprised of shuttle movements during periods of intense grain
movement (Pope, 2010, Holz, 2010).
Shuttle COTs consist of 104-110 car units that make a specifled number of
consecutive trips within a specified window of time between different origin/destination
combinations.   There are 3 types of shuttle train commitments: 3 month,  1  year, and 2 year
(BNSF Railway Company, 2009, Item  13101).   Shuttle COTs are currently auctioned on
Monday of every week on the BNSF website specific to each shipping period: FP, MP and
LP.   The 3 month shuttle COTs have a minimum bid set at $82,500, whereas for the  1  year
and 2 year shuttle COTs, the base rate is set at $0/car, or "tariff," and bids are made at a
premium to tariff (BNSF Railway Company, 2010, Item  1001).   Lastly, the shipping period
for shuttle COTs determines the placement of cars for the first trip.   Customers choose the
initial want da.te within the specified shipping period only for 1  and 2 year shuttle COTs
(BNSF Railway Company, 2010, Item 2100).  The BNSF will then make "reasonable
efforts" to accommodate the want date.
Shuttle Program.  In order for grain shippers to utilize the BNSF shuttle program,
their shipping facility has to meet the requirements set forth by the BNSF Shuttle Train
Program.  The facility must have adequate track capacity to handle a minimum of 104-110
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cars, the loading (unloading) capacity to load (unload) all  104-110 cars in  15 hours, and a
certified scale system (BNSF Railway Company, 2009, Item  13600).   In addition, the
shipper needs to have Electronic Data Exchange (EDE) capabilities to submit billing
information electronically.   If a shipper fails on more than 1  occurrence throughout the
duration of a shuttle to meet any of these requirements, the BNSF has the right to disqualify
the facility from loading/unloading shuttle COTs.
Shuttle COTs consist of consecutive shipments or "trips" from orgins to
destinations.  The origin for the first shuttle trip must be submitted at least  10 days in
advance of the start-up period or else the shipper will inccur a S loo/car penalty (BNSF
Railway Company, 2009, Item  13600).   Once a shuttle is loaded at its origin and then
reaches its destination to unload, the trip is considered over.   Shippers have the option of
cancelling a shuttle trip, but in doing so, they will inccur a penalty of $400/month/car
(BNSF Railway Company, 2009, Item 13101).
Shippers need to specify the subsequent loading origin for the next trip before the
loaded shuttle reaches its destination on the current trip.   In addition, shippers need to
advise the BNSF on the unloading destination on the current trip before the empty shuttle
reaches its origin.   Failure to notify the BNSF on the origin for the upcoming trip or the
destination for the current trip results in a penalty of $ 100/car inccured by the shipper.
Lastly, if shippers wish to change origins or destinations, they must do so before the shuttle
reaches the nominated geographic region, or else they will incur a penalty of $ 1000/train
(BNSF Railway Company, 2009, Item  13503).
When selecting the subsequent origin/destination for the next trip, shippers needs to
specify a want date for 2-year and  1-year shuttle COTs.   Shuttle COTs are not typically
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placed on the want date; the cars are usually placed a couple days either before or after the
want date.   In addition, the BNSF will notify the shipper within 2-4 hours prior to the acutal
placement at the shipper's facility (BNSF Railway Company, 2009, Item  13600).   Unlike
24-car COTs, shutte COTs cannot be constructively placed given their nature of continuous
movment or else they will be subject to demunage penalties (see next section).   Thus, all
shuttle COTs must be immediately accepted for placement upon arrival at the shipper's
facility and then released as a unit within  15 hours of acutal placement.
Finally, the BNSF`guarantees a minimum of 2.5 trips/month (BNSF Railway
Company, 2009, Item  13600).   However, if 5 trips per conecutive 61-day period carmot be
met, the shipper can cancel the remaining trips without a penalty, or request additional
shuttle trips to make up for the difference.  It' s very advantageous for shippers to make use
of short-hauls in order to get their shuttle COTs moving as fast as possible because each
trip earns an "allowance" and shippers can receive incentive payments (see later section).
Thus, the more trips generated on a shuttle, the greater the revenue earned by the shipper.
Lastly, it is worth noting that being under-committed to shuttle COTs is a problem because
if a grain terminal has reached its total storage capacity, it is missing out on revenue
opportunities.   According to industry experts, shuttle COTs are currently averaging about 3
trips per month (Mack, 2010).   Thus, grain shippers need to consider this when planning
future logistical needs.
Shuttle Rates.  A shuttle rate contains 3 components: a shuttle premium/discount,
the tariff rate and the fuel surcharge.   Shuttle COTs trade at premiums/discounts depending
on the shipping demand for railcars. The tariff rate differs depending on each speciflc
origin/destination pair, and the fuel surcharge is set on a monthly basis to compensate the
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carrier for fuel.   Changes in fuel prices result in changes in the fuel surcharge rather than
carriers having to change their rates with every change in the price of fuel.  Fuel surcharges
are calculated by taking the distance (miles) between the origin and destination and
multiplying it by the monthly fuel surcharge rate.  For instance, suppose the March fuel
surcharge rate is $0.40/mi and because the distance between Jamestown, ND and the PNW
is  I,474 miles, the fuel surcharge cost is $589.60.   In addition, suppose the March shuttle
premium is 200 over tariff and the current tariff rate for a wheat shipment from Jamestown
to the PNW is $4,033/car.   Then, tlie total shuttle rate is $4,822.60/car25.
Shuttle rates contain a high degree of seasonality depending on the demand for
shipping.  The peak shipping demand period for both 24-car COTs and shuttle COTs
occurs from September through December.  Since shippers know that shipping demand is
highest during this period, they can also expect freight rates to be at their highest.   Thus,
acquiring shuitle COTs or 24-car COTs several months forward allows shippers to lock in
lower rates.
Shipper Incentives.  A unique feature of shuttle COTs that separates them from
24-car COTs and general tariff cars is the shipping incentives available to shippers.   These
incentives are in place to encourage efficient loading/unloading and the release of
equipment back to the BNSF.   For every trip, a "shuttle allowance" is paid to the owner of
the shuttle.   Even if a shuttle trip is sold on the secondary market, the original owner of the
shuttle will receive the allowance.   For 2-year shuttle COTs, a shuttle allowance of
$ 150/car/trip is paid to the shuttle owner, whereas a $100/car/trip allowance is paid on  1 -
25 The total rate is found by taking the summation of the shuttle premium, total fuel surcharge, and the tariff
rate: 200+589.60+4033  = 4822.60.
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year shuttle COTs (BNSF Railway Company, 2009, Item 13101).  No shuttle allowances
are paid on the 3-month shuttle COTs.
In addition to shuttle allowances, shippers can also qualify for loading and
unloading efficiency payment programs.  These programs are known as Origin Efficiency
Payments (OEP) and Destination Efficiency Payments (DEP).   Both incentives are used to
promote efficient car utilization and loading/unloading operations at origins and
destinations (BNSF Railay Company, 2009, Item 13500).   The standard OEP is a payment
of $ 100/car to a shipper that loads and releases a shuttle within  15 hours of acutal
placement.   The standard DEP is a payment of Sl OO/car paid to a shipper that unloads and
relases a shuttle within 15 hours of actual placement.  Both types of payments cunently
offered by the BNSF are outlined in Table 2.3.
In order to qualify for OEP and DEP incentives, shipping facilities have to meet the
BNSF Shuttle Train Program requirements as specified earlier in this thesis.  However, not
all shuttle loading/unloading facilities are eligible, and claims to receive the payment must
be submitted to the BNSF no more than 5 business days after the waybill date (BNSF
Railay Company, 2009, Item  13501).
Table 2.3.  BNSF efricienc ments
Time of shuttle Release after Actual     Origin Efficiency             Destination Efficiency
Placement (hrs)                                                Pa ment (OEP)                 Pa ment (DEP)
15                                                                                     $ 100/car
S , ``u,|`:,I                           `
Table adapted from BNSF 4022-M: Items  13500 and  13501.
$ 1 00/car
If a shipper's facility is inaccesible and the BNSF cannot place the cars, they will be
constructively placed short of the loading/unloading facility and the shipper will be
disqualified from receiving an OEP or DEP.   If a shuttle is loaded within 21  hours, but is
not billed and released from the loading facility within that 21  hours of actual placement,
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the shipper can either forfeit the OEP payment or be charged $ 1,000/hr until the cars are
billed and released (BNSF Railay Company, 2009, Item  13500).
Finally, shippers trying to receive an OEP have to submit a "pre-release" at least 4
hours before the shuttle is going to be released, or else the OEP will be failed (BNSF
Railway Company, 2008).  The pre-release cannot be entered less that 4 hours before the
actual release of the shuttle, and the waybill (shipping instructions) must be received by the
BNSF by the actual release time.   For example, suppose a shuttle is actually placed at a
shipper's facility at 6 A.M. for it to be loaded.   If the shipper is trying to get the  10 hour
OEP, then  the shuttle has to be loaded, billed and released to the BNSF by 4 P.M.   Thus,
the pre-release must be entered by  12 P.M. in order for the  10 hour OEP to pass.   A pre-
release simply exists for planning purposes and it lets the BNSF know when the shuttle can
be pulled from the facility and it helps them to set up crews and power (locamotives) in
advance.
If the 4-hoiIT pre-release for a 15-hour or 21 -hour OEP is not met, the OEP will not
be paid to the shipper (BNSF Railway Company, 2008).  However, if the 4-hour pre-
release for a  10-hour OEP is not met, but the shuttle is released from the facility within  15
hours of actual placment, the OEP is reduced to $50/car; otherwise, no OEP is paid.
Demurrage.  Demurrage is a late penalty charged by railroads for inefflcient use of
their equipment.   It is charged on a per-car basis and designed to keep the loading and
unloading of cars as efficient as possible.   Carriers lose out on revenue opportunities and
incur opportunity costs when their equipment sits idle, and then in turn penalize grain
shippers for causing inefficiencies in the pipeline (Wilson, Carlson, & Dahl, 2004).   Both
the barge and ocean vessel industries have their own set of provisions regarding the cost of
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demurrage.   Similar to rail, both of these modes specify "free time" (non-chargeable days)
for loading and unloading.
Grain shippers have to factor the cost of demurrage into their logistical decisions
because it's one of the most significant costs associated with logistics.   To stay consistent
with the discussion of 24-car COTs and shuttle COTs, the demurrage plan employed by the
BNSF Railway is analyzed as it pertains to grain shipments.  The BNSF Demurrage Book
6004-A contains all demurrage provisions set forth by the BNSF for all commodity types,
car types, and loading/unloading procedures.   Therefore, this section first analyzes the
railcar demurrage program employed by the BNSF Railway and then discusses barge and
vessel demurrage.
The demurrage system of the BNSF is comprised of a debit and credit system with
specific provisions assigned to different train sizes, commodity type and cars held for
loading and unloading.  According to the BNSF Demurrage Book 6004-A, cars held for
loading are allowed either 1  or 2 credits per car, depending on the commodity and car type,
for each empty car ordered by the shipper and released to the BNSF once it is loaded.
Shippers acquire  1  debit, or demurrage day26, per car for every 24 hour period until the cars
are loaded and released to the BNSF.   For non-shuttle trains, cars being held for both
loading and unloading incur a demurrage cost of $75/car/day and an excess charge of
$150/car/day is assessed after the third chargeable debit day has passed.   For shuttle COTs,
trains held for both loading and unloading incur a demurrage cost of $75/car/day.   Credits
earned in one month cannot be used to offset debits earned in another month, and shippers
26 A demurrage day, or debit, is a "24 hour period, or fraction thereof' (BNSF Railway Company, 2009a, P.
9).
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having 2 or more facilities cannot combine debits and credits from differing facilities.
Also, credits can only offset debits on the same car in which they were earned.
The actual computation of demurrage is directly related to when cars are considered
"released": whether or not cars are released in a timely fashion dictates when demurrage
charges are assessed.  For both shuttle COTs and non-shuttle trains, the date and time for
when railcars are considered released is when the BNSF receives both forwarding
instructions for the cars and a notice that the cars are available for movement (BNSF
Railway Company, 2009a).
The BNSF Demurrage Book 6004-A notes that demurrage for non-shuttle trains is
calculated differently depending upon whether cars are classified under actual placement27
or constructive placement,28 but cars held for loading and unloading are calculated the
same.  For COT and general tariff cars under constructive placement, the "demurrage
clock" begins after the first 12:01  A.M. after constructive placement notification until the
shipper orders the cars to be spotted, or placed, at the loading/unloading facility.  If cars are
held past the second  12:01  A.M., then demurrage charges are assessed.
Demurrage for COT and general tariff cars that have been actually placed is
calculated as the time from the first 12:01  A.M. after actual placement until the cars are
released with forwarding instructions.  For example, if a COT unit arives at a shipper's
facility at 6 P.M., the demurrage clock starts at  12:01  A.M. and the allocated credit is used
up during the loading day.   If the shipper doesn't have the cars loaded and billed by the
following  12:01  A.M., then he will incur a demurrage penalty of $75/car/day.   If the
27 Actual placement occurs when cars are either placed  in an accessible position  for loading or unloading,  or
!F€opn°sst[rti:T[;gepc[`afi;:din:Xtt::cgurras[nwshhe;£::i.scannotbeactua||yp|acedordeliveredbecauseofanycondition
attributable to the shipper.   These cars are then held on BNSF tracks and a notice will be sent to the shipper
indicating that cars are held and awaiting disposition  instructions.
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shipper loads and bills the car before the first  12:01  A.M„ he would Cam the credit rather
than using it up on the following day while loading the cars (Mack, 2010).   Lastly, it is
worth noting that if cars are placed prior to the want date, the demurrage clock begins on
12:0 I  A.M. of the want date.   Thus, shippers that receive their cars before the want date
and are able to load them are at an advantage.
For shuttle COTs being loaded, demurrage is calculated from the time of actual or
constructive placement at the loading facility until the train is released.   Shippers dictate
how fast they load their cars contingent upon the type of OEP they are anticipating.  The
demurrage clock starts once the cars are placed, and if the shipper fails to load them within
21  hours, a demurrage charge of $75/car is assessed.   Similarly, for shuttle COTs being
unloaded demurrage is calculated from the time of actual or constructive placement of the
train until it is released.   In addition, if a shuttle is constructively placed short of an
unloading facility, the facility is charged $1000thr until it is unloaded and released (BNSF
Railay Company, 2009, Item  13501).   Lastly, if cars are constructively placed at either a
loading or unloading facility, the total hours between the shipper's order for placement and
actual placement are deducted from the total demurrage time.  Table 2.4 summarizes the
demurrage calculations for both shuttle COTs and non-shuttle trains.
Lastly, "free-days" are days in which demurrage is not charged against shuttle
COTs; these days include all the major U.S. holidays.   For loading facilities, demurrage is
not charged on Sundays and if cars are placed on Friday, the first Saturday is non-
chargeable (BNSF Railway Company, 2009a).   However, for unloading facilities, Sundays
are not free-days and Saturdays are always chargeable.  Table 2.5 displays the non-
chargeable days offered by the BNSF for shuttle COTs.   In addition to those free-days
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listed in Table 2.5, 24-car COTs and general tariff cars cannot incur demurrage on Sundays
or the first Saturday after a unit has been placed on Friday.  In addition to free-days,
carriers are penalized for non-performance.  The BNSF pays shippers $75/car for failure to
deliver loaded shuttle COTs to an accessible position at an export facility within 24 hours
of the interchange date or arrival at the facility (BNSF Railway Company, 2009a).
Table 2.4.  BNSF demurrage program
Car Type                 Car Function          Applicable
Credits
Chargeable
Amount
S/car/da
Excess Charge*
(S/car/day)
Held for
No n-sh uttle             unlo adin
Table adapted from BNSF Demurrage Book 6004-A.
Barge Demurrage.  Demunage is also calculated on barges when they are kept
longer than pemitted.  But unlike 24-car COTs or shuttle COTs, grain shippers acquire
barges through the use of contracts which are specfic to each buyer/seller transaction.  For
example, the buyer and seller of a barge are able to dictate several provisions within a
contract such as rates, the number of barges, free-days, and demurrage terms. Thus,
contracts between buyers and sellers are highly differentiated in the items they entail.
Barge freight trading rules are published by the National Grain and Feed
Association 0+GFA) and are used as a basis for all barge contracts (2009).  Essentially,
they are ground rules for buyers and sellers engaging in the purchase and sale of barge
freight.  Buyers and sellers have the freedom to agree on any provisions they flnd
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appropriate as long as they don't alter the terms of the rules set forth by the NGFA.  This
section outlines the barge trade rules employed by the NGFA that affect the calculation of
barge demunage. -
Table 2.5.  BNSF free-days
Date Station Type Start Date Start Time End Date End Time
I
i
++``#ife
•t
!E`               i
i          i         Hii,       i,**
Easter Loadingrunloading satu;day•#i#i 18:00 Monday 06:00
8
11-
K`S    <    +
•:*:
Christmas
Loading Dec. 24 00:01 Dec. 26
pt`      -, -?3s3',a K06:00
Unloading Dec. 24 06:00 Dec. 26 06:00
|a
I-
#a!
RE
Each month
PortVanland, ORcouver,WA
2nd Wed. 15:00 2nd Wed. 24:00
Seattle, WATacoma,WA
2nd Thurs. 15:00 2nd Thurs. 24:00
Table adapted from BNSF Demurrage Book 6004-A.
The first step for shippers to undertake when acquiring a barge begins with brokers
helping to match up buyers with sellers; their primary function is to facilitate the creation
and execution of contracts.  If a trade is not made through a broker, then the buyer and
seller send a written confirmation to each other by the close of the business day29 following
the date of trade.  This process gets the contract specifications in writing and allows both
parties to review them and make any necessary changes.  After the contract has been
29 Defined as Monday-Friday during hours of 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. excluding Saturdays, Sundays and all
legal holidays Ovational Grain and Feed Association, 2009).
55
specified and confirmed by both parties, it cannot be altered without the consent of both the
buyer and seller.
After the negotiation process is over, the buyer has to supply the seller with the
river on which the grain will travel by 4:00 P.M., two business days prior to the contract
placement period.   The buyer must also supply the origin to the seller by the second
business day of the contract period.  The contract placement period depends on whether the
buyer and seller have a weekly, monthly or semi-monthly contract.   For weekly contracts,
the window of placement, or delivery period, starts at 12:01  A.M. on Sunday.   For monthly
contracts, the delivery period starts at  12:0 i  A.M on the first day of the month, whereas for
semi-monthly contracts, it starts at  12:01  A.M. on the first and sixteenth days of the month.
Lastly, the seller cannot supply a barge to the buyer before the last business day preceding
the contract period.
Similar to railcar placement, barges can also be constructively or actually placed.   If
a barge is placed at an origin before commencement of the contract period, it will be
deemed constructively placed at 7:00 A.M. on the first day of the contract period.
However, if the barge is loaded prior to the contract period, placement is effective the same
day the loading commences.   Whether or not the barge is constructively or actually placed,
placement for loading begins on the first 7:00 A.M. after a barge is placed at the loading
facility; the same is true for placement at an unloading facility.
After a shipper has started loading a barge, he needs to be aware of free days and
actual demurrage charges.   According to industry experts, barge contracts typically regard
the first 3 days after placement as free or non-chargeable.   Then, the next 10 days are set at
$200/day, and every day after that is $300/day (Gergen, 2010, Gibson, 2010).   Holidays
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such as Memorial Day or Labor Day are non-chargeable, as well as Sundays as long as they
are in the 3 free-days.   Lastly, it's worth noting that the amount of free time and other
demurrage terms are specified by the contract and thus, are not the same for every
transaction.
After ft barge is loaded and ready to be picked up, the buyer notifies the seller by
telephone.   In order for a barge to be released as of 7:00 A.M., it must be loaded by then
and notice of release must be given by  11 :00 A.M. of that day.   Barges can only be released
on Saturday, Sunday or legal holidays if the buyer notifies the seller no later than the
preceding business day or if the buyer notifies the seller by telephone no later than 11 :00
A.M. on any of those days.   The same release policy exists for unloading barges, except the
consignee, or buyer of the grain at the destination, takes on the role that the buyer (grain
shipper) previously played.
Finally, if a seller or a buyer cannot honor their part of the contract, they have to
notify the other party.   In addition, both parties have to choose to either extend their
existing contract at contract price or fair market value, buyout the defaulted portion of the
contract, or cancel the defaulted portion at fair market value.   Therefore, similar to the rail
industry, contract provisions exist to guard against non-performance of one or more parties
involved in the transaction.
Vessel Demurrage.   In addition to rail and barge demurrage, ocean vessels can also
accrue demurrage charges.  Factors affecting demurrage charges are placement within the
delivery period, futures and basis levels, free days, and unloading capacities.   The 2 main
types of export contracts are free on board (FOB) and cost, insurance, and freight (CIF).
They differ in their terms of sale, but both are still used for exporting grain.  FOB export
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contracts consist of the buyer, or importer, supplying the freight and paying the cost of
insurance on the commodity (Stop ford,1997).   Thus, the buyer supplies the vessel, pays
the freight rate, and takes ownership of the grain as soon as it is loaded.  The seller is
responsible for loading the vessel and paying demunage if it takes lc>nger to load than the
time allowed.   On the other hand, CIF export contracts involve the seller supplying the
vessel, loading it, and paying for insurance and the freight rate (Stop ford,1997).   Thus, this
process involves the seller delivering grain to the buyer's port, and the costs of insurance
and freight are included with the grain purchase price.
According to industry participants, the window of placement for ocean vessels is
normally  10 days (Klein, 2010).  Thus, vessels can be placed on any day within this  10-day
window.   In addition, futures and basis levels are continuously changing and they
determine the ultimate price that grain will be sold for.   Thus, futures markets in a "carry"
(deferred price is greater than nearby) or an "inversion" (deferred price is less than nearby)
affect shipping decisions.  This can act as a source of risk for grain shippers when operating
under a FOB system.   Recall under FOB that buyers of the grain are responsible for
acquiring vessels and delivering them to export facilities.   Therefore, when a carry exists in
the market, sellers want vessels to be placed at the end of the  10-day window in order to
tat:e advantage of the carry and receive a higher price when they sell their grain.  However,
the buyer wants to purchase the grain at the lowest possible cost so they will place the
vessel at the beginning of the  lo-day period.   This situation can be risky for the seller
(grain shipper\ because if the buyer places the vessel at the beginning of the window but
the seller doesn't have enough grain at the export facility to load it, he will incur demurrage
charges.   When an inverse market exists, the exact opposite is the case: buyers want to
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place the vessel at the end of the period whereas the seller would prefer it to be placed on
Day  1  of the  I 0-day period.
Vessel demurrage is a function of a "loading rate guarantee" set forth by the seller
of the grain.  This guarantee states how many metric tons of grain the seller will load per
day.  If the entire vessel isn't loaded and released within the guaranteed number of days,
the shipper will be charged demurrage (Klein, 2010).   Demunage rates are stated in S/day
and are typically the same as the market rate for acquiring a vessel.   If the vessel is loaded
and released before the guaranteed number of days is used up, despatch is paid to the
shipper.   Despatch is the opposite of demurrage in that it is an incentive payment awarded
to the shipper.  Despatch amounts are also stated in S/day and are typically half of the
demurrage rate.   Consider the following example: if a shipper guarantees to load a
60,000MT3° vessel in 6 days, he has to load  lo,000MT per day.   If the shipper finishes
loading on Day 7, he will be charged demurrage, but if he finishes loading on Day 5, he
will be awarded despatch.
Lastly, it is worth noting that vessel demurrage is similar to that of rail and barge
because it cannot be charged on certain days.   The North American Grain Association
specifies that Saturdays, Sundays and certain holidays are exempt from demurrage charges
for an FOB export contract (2000).   In addition, their FOB contract contains certain
provisions, such as commodity type, parties involved, and loading rate, that must be
specified between the buyer and seller before the shipment takes place.
Conclusion
In conclusion, 24~car COTs and shuttle COTs allow shippers to bid for guaranteed
railcar service and acquire railcars several months before they are needed.   Thus,
30 MT = metric ton
59
merchandisers can plan ahead several months and base their car needs on expected harvest
numbers and future grain shipments rather than having to place several orders for fear of
car shortages.   In addition, general tariff cars exist for smaller shippers not capable of
loading shuttle COTs or acquiring enough grain to load large unit-trains.   Thus, the 3
alternatives for shippers offered by the BNSF (i.e., shuttle COTs, 24-car COTs and general
tariff) complement each other nicely and allow merchandisers the freedom to make
decisions based on their needs.  The forward car guarantees offered by the BNSF are
summarized in Table 2.6.
Forward car guarantees have allowed grain shippers to strategically integrate
logistics and merchandising decisions into the same decision-making process (Wilson,
Priewe, & Dahl,1998).   In addition, the secondary market is available for grain shippers to
purchase or sell pre-ordered freight based on their needs.  For instance, if a shipper doesn't
have enough grain to fill an entire shuttle, he can sell it on the secondary market to another
shipper and avoid cancellation penalties and demurrage charges.
Demurrage charges are imposed as a means of keeping movement within the grain
supply chain as efficient as possible.   It is imposed not only on railcars, but also on
shipping barges and vessels.   Therefore, shippers need to implement strategy in their
logistical decisions through the use of forward freight mechanisms.  This in turn allows
shippers to avoid demunage costs, cancellation penalties, and most importantly, reduce
their exposure to risk.
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Table 2.6.  BNSF forward frei ht mechanisms
General Tariff               24-car coTs                   Shuttle coTs
e of Guarantee         None
Total Cost to
Shippers Tariff rate + FSC
Short-term
Total COT Prepay +
PremiumDiscount +
Tariff rate + FSC
PremiumDiscount
+ Tariff rate + FSC
Railroad Non-
performance Penalty
None
Percent of Total Fleet
(BNSF Railway                 8%
2010a)
$200/car
75%
Shipper can cancel
remaining trips or
request additional
trips to make up
the difference
Source: BNSF periodic tariff filings.
Strategies for Grain Shippers
Grain shippers need to make merchandising and logistical decisions a priority in
their normal course of business operations.  Both types of decisions should be integrated
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into a formal plan of strategy that seeks to find the optimal scenario.  Today, there are
several forward shipping mechanisms offered by the railroads and several contracts and
methods for buying and selling grain.   Thus, grain shippers have a slew of alternatives
available to aid them in their decision process.   The only problem that remains is to decide
which mechanisms to utilize in order to reach maximum profltability.
Once merchandisers buy grain from producers or other merchandisers, they need to
decide if they should store it as inventory, and if so, how much can be stored relative to
capacity and cost constraints.   If the market conditions are favorable, merchandisers then
need to make a sale to some market participant further down the pipeline.   However, the
question that remains is how much grain should be sold in order to maximize net margin.
In addition, merchandisers need to acquire freight if they recognize future shipping
opportunities will be available to them.  Thus, if the decision to make a sale has already
been made, then merchandisers need rail and/or barge transportation available to them in a
timely fashion.
Ultimately, grain shippers need to know the optimal amount of grain to sell and the
optimal amount of freight to acquire in order to maximize net margin.  In other words, the
element of strategy comes into play as merchandisers try to balance future logistical needs
with the timely purchase and sale of grain.  Compounding difficulties is the element of risk
and shippers will incur high costs if favorable opportunities are missed.
Prototypical Grain Shipper
The grain shipper modeled in this research was a prototypical or standard grain
exporting firm that operates its own elevator network similar to that of Cargill or CHS.   In
addition, it has rail and barge capabilities and manages its own aggregate freight position
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along with an aggregate commodity position.   This multi-elevator grain firm buys and sells
grain to and from other firms within the pipeline and decides which export market is most
profitable to ship to, all while accruing demurrage and despatch on railcars, barges, and
vessels.
The grain exporting firm represented in this thesis was modeled to represent the
typical grain companies that currently exist in the industry (e.g. Cargill, ADM, etc.).   Thus,
a vertically integrated firm that aims at maximizing aggregate profit was modeled.  More
specifically, this particular firm looks at maximizing total net margins for the entire
elevator network rather than each separate elevator within the company working
individually in its own interest.  Even with coordinating the merchandising and logistical
decisions for the entire company and the large number of grain contracts and shipping
mechanisms available, shippers still face a lot of risk in their day-to-day business decisions.
The sources of risk present in the industry are numerous, and they force merchandisers to
always be thinking ahead.
Sources of Risk
Risk is present throughout the grain supply chain.   During the 2008 crop year,
volatile grain markets led to large price swings in many fain commodities such as wheat,
corn and soybeans.   Country elevators were particularly hurt by the volatile markets
because they incurred large margin calls on their hedged positions, and as a result, had to
liquidate their futures position (MCKenzie & Kunda, 2009).  Thus, futures price spreads
can be very volatile and thus, act as a source of risk.   In addition, basis levels at export
facilities also are large sources of risk.  Basis levels are very important because they are the
determining factor in choosing which export market to ship to.
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Before merchandisers start hedging, they first have to predict how much grain is
going to be delivered to them by farmers.  Predicting cash and forward-contracted grain
purchases is a huge source of risk.  Merchandisers need to have a good idea of how much
grain will be delivered to them at harvest in order to plan their logistical needs and future
grain sales.  If they plan for a huge crop by committing to a lot of freight and the crop size
ends up being the opposite, they will be faced either with cancellation penalties or hefty
demurrage costs.
Merchandisers not only have to deal with volatile grain prices and future grain
purchases, but they must also be able to deal with disruptions in the supply chain.  For
instance, changes in transit times will affect modal arrival at the grain shipper's location.  If
a grain shipper specifies a want date for rail cars, there is good chance that the cars will be
2 or 3 days late and the actual car placement will take place after the want date.  Thus,
transit time and modal arrival are sources of risk because they are hard to predict and aren't
100% dependable.  If a merchandiser has a full grain terminal and carmot take in anymore
grain from producers, he is missing out on revenue opportunities until the freight arrives.
Thus, merchandisers are forced to depend on freight showing up on time and when transit
time is affected by weather, disaster, or internal railroad issues, they have to change their
plans.
Lastly, changes in tariff rates and car premiums associated with acquiring short-
term and long-term guarantees are sources of risk because they affect total costs.   Thus,
when freight becomes more expensive, total costs increase.   All of the previous risk factors
listed affect the level of shipping demand.   Shipping demand ultimately determines when it
is profltable to ship grain by comparing futures price spreads with costs such as storage,
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tariff rates, and car premiums.   Thus, shipping demand can be considered a source of risk
and it should be carefully estimated by merchandisers.  Even though merchandisers face a
lot of risk in their decision making regarding the optimal quantities of grain to sell and
freight to acquire, they can implement different strategies to mitigate a lot of the risk.
Logistical and Merchandising Strategy
The flrst type of strategy covered in this section will be concerned with logistical
decisions.   Earlier in this chapter, the current railroad mechanisms offered by the BNSF
were discussed in great deal; the other Class I railroads that ship a lot of bulk commodities
such as grain (e.g. UP and CP) currently offer forward shipping mechanisms similar to
those offered by the BNSF.  Thus, grain shippers have several forward mechanisms
available to them for shipping their grain to domestic customers and export ports.   In
addition, barge transportation provides another viable option for shipping grain along major
water routes to nodes in the pipeline.   The problem that many merchandisers face is how
much freight to acquire for shipping their grain in an effort to maximize net margin.  This
can be any combination of short-term shipping guarantees, long-term shipping guarantees,
and barges.
The issue of determining the optimal amount of freight to acquire along with the
optimal amount of grain to sell in the pipeline has been examined by few researchers.  The
studies that most closely represent this thesis are:  Wilson, Priewe and Dahl (1998) and
Wilson, Carlson and Dahl (2004).   The next section reviews these studies and the logistical
strategies found by the researchers to be most beneficial to shippers.   In addition, these
studies are compared and contrasted with this thesis.
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Related Studies
Wilson, Priewe and Dahl ( 1998) examined the portfolio of rail shipping alternatives
available to grain shippers in an effort to find the optimal combination of grain sales and
shipping strategies that maximizes net payoffs.  The researchers focus only on rail
transportation, and thus, analyze rail logistic strategies containing different periods of
forward commitment.   Wilson et al. (1998) model a single-origin elevator that has the
choice of shipping grain to either Minneapolis or Portland and is faced by several sources
of risk such as shipping demand, car premiums, and basis levels.  They use the supply
chain methodologies distribution requirements planning (DRP) and material requirements
plarming (MRP) to develop a dynamic stochastic simulation model to simulate the
inventory management and logistical decisions a typical grain shipper is faced with.
Their stochastic model included several random variables such as car premiums,
basis levels, and car placements.   In addition, several nomandom variables were included:
train size, car capacity, and storage car capacity.   Shipping strategies defined in the study
were general tariff, short-term guarantees, and long-term guarantees.  Key data was
collected from several industry experts, BNSF' s website, and the North Dakota
Agricultural Statistics Service.
Wilson et al. (1998) found that maximum profit was reached with a strategy of no
long-term guarantees, but risk is reduced with a longer-term guarantee strategy of 4-5 trains
per month.   In addition, profits and the level of risk increased with less use of long-term
guarantees and more short-term guarantees.  Also, a long-term intensive strategy removes
flexibility and leads to more cancellation penalties.   Finally, risk associated with farmer
sales caused the greatest disruption in shipping demand.
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Wilson, Carlson and Dahl (2004) analyzed the effects of random factors, such as
demand and transit times, on logistical costs within the grain supply chain.   They
specifically looked at how these sources of risk affect the cost of demurrage incurred by a
shipper who has rail, barge, and ocean vessel shipping capabilities.  A grain supply chain
model was developed to examine the impacts of several sources of risk on logistical costs
within the grain supply chain for a single-origin shipper.   More specifically, they utilized a
stochastic simulation model to examine the impacts of several random variables on the
marginal cost of exporting grain.
Wilson et al. (2004) modeled a grain supply chain with a single inland river
terminal that loads railcars and barges to deliver grain to the U.S. Gulf.  The model
encompasses several sources of risk, such as transit time and vessel arrivals, and it
considers grain sales, inventories, and grain unloads all with a focus on minimizing total
cost within the supply chain.   Random variables included in the study included shipping
demand, modal arrivals, and other sources of risk, while strategic variables included
general tariff cars and long-term and short-term forward shipping guarantees.  In addition,
past railcar placement was examined through the use of anticipatory and na.1.ve strategies on
total cost.
Data was obtained from the USDA, National Grain and Feed Association, and
industry experts.  They found demurrage to have the greatest amount of cost variability out
of any of the cost components, and when export demand was increased, both demurrage
and other shipping costs increased at an increasing rate.   In addition, taking an anticipatory
strategy when considering car placement reduced demurrage, and total demurTage costs
were minimized when freight was ordered 6-weeks forward.
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Logistical Strategy
Overall, both Wilson, Priewe and Dalil (1998) and Wilson, Carlson and Dahl (2004)
found that the shipping strategy chosen depended on the risk preferences of the grain
shipper.  In addition, the forward car guarantees, both long-term and short-term, act as
sources of strategy for grain shippers to reduce their level of exposure to risk.  For
example, merchandisers that buy cash grain from farmers or other merchandisers acquire
not only a long cash position for their grain, but also establish a short freight position
(Wilson, Priewe, & Dahl,1998).   Thus, shippers will end up buying freight at some point in
the future, and therefore are susceptible to increases in rates.   Forward car guarantees (e.g.
24-car COTs, shuttle COTs) can lock in rates several months prior to shipping and can
minimize risk associated with increasing rates. However, even if the perfect freight-
ordering strategy is chosen, not all risk can be mitigated; several disruptions can occur in
the grain supply chain (as described previously in this chapter) such as modal arrival and
transit time.  Disruptions in the supply chain are out of a merchandiser's control, and as a
result, they need to adjust their strategies when disruptions occur.   The biggest concern for
shippers when disruptions occur is how to deal with the cost of demurrage.
Since Wilson et al. (2004) found demurrage to be the most important cost factor,
they recommend shippers should order freight forward 6-weeks forward rather than
ordering freight through general tariff, or periods of high-car demand such as harvest.
Some combination of short-term and long-term guarantees should be utilized to minimize
demurrage, and the more accurate shippers can predict farmer sales patterns, the more they
will be able to reduce the risk in shipping demand,
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Too many long-term car guarantees can force shipments in suboptimal shipping
periods rather than relying on market spreads to determine shipping needs (Wilson, Priewe,
& Dahl,1998).   In addition, a short-term intensive strategy (0 long-term car guarantees)
can lead to the highest amount of profit, but will also incur the greatest amount of risk.
Thus, a mix of short-term and long-term car guarantees should be used with general tariff
cars to minimize risk and total costs while still being able to achieve a good return.
In addition, past railcar placement performance should be considered when ordering
cars to make sure they arrive when they are most needed.  Barge transportation should be
included in the mix of viable transportation alternatives because they are cost effective for
shipping long distances over major water-routes.   Lastly, Wilson et al. (2004) found ocean
vessels accounted for the greatest portion of total demurrage costs so barges and railcars
need to be placed and unloaded at the export facility in an efflcient manner.
Conclusion
This thesis differs from Wilson et al. (1998) and Wilson et al. (2004) in that it
models a multi-elevator firm with the capability to ship grain by rail and barge to more than
one export market.   Wilson et al. (1998) modeled a single country elevator origin with no
barge capabilities and they did not include demurrage costs in their analysis.  Wilson et al.
(2004) modeled a supply chain consisting of only one single-shipping origin and one export
destination in an effort to minimize total cost.   However, this thesis looked to maximize
profit by not only choosing the optimal mix of forward guarantees, but also the optimal
quantity of grain to sell.    Finally, the methodology in this thesis differs from the 2 studies
examined:  Wilson et al. (1998) used a stochastic simulation model based on MRP and DRP
techniques while Tvvilson et al. (2004) used a stochastic simulation model based on MRP.
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This thesis used a stochastic simulation technique based on a "push" inventory system in
which grain was "pushed" through the supply chain whenever favorable sales opportunities
occurred.  Ultimately, the goal of this research was to build upon these two studies and
contribute to the grain transportation industry.
Merchandising Strategy
In its simplest terms, merchandising encompasses the timely purchase and sale of
grain both at the local level and regional level.   The large grain flrms that exist today are
mainly buying grain from their own elevator network and other independent country
elevators, with some buying taking place from other merchandisers and local producers.
They then have the option of selling the grain immediately, or storing that grain as
inventory and waiting to sell it at a more favorable time.   Thus, merchandisers (i.e., large
grain flrms) need to be able to organize the purchase and sale of grain at particular prices
and then coordinate this with logistics.
It is important for merchandisers to understand the relationship between the local
cash price and the futures price.  Futures prices are determined through a futures exchange,
whereas local cash_ prices are set by elevator managers.   Cash prices are impacted by local
crop conditions.   For instance, the quality of the local crop is determined by protein levels,
test weight, yield, and disease factors.  If these factors are adversely affected by weather or
growing conditions, there will be a shortage of bushels in the region forcing merchandisers
to offer a high price, and vice versa.   In addition, local cash prices are influenced by
transportation costs and storage costs incurred by the merchandiser.   On the other hand, the
futures price is impacted by the world supply and demand conditions, hedge funds, and
index funds (Chafin & Hoepner, 2002).
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Futures contracts are offered for several different contract months looking forward
and these months represent the value of grain at different future points in time (Lorton &
White, 2006).  For instance, com futures contracts are offered only for certain months
rather than every calendar month.  Thus, there is a com futures price for December, March
and May, but not November, January or February.  The difference between the futures
price for different contract months is known as the spread.  When the nearby month is
trading at a higher price than the deferred price, there is an inverted market; this encourages
immediate selling.  When the deferred month is trading at a higher price than the nearby
month, there is a carry in the market; this encourages storage.   Storing grain as inventory is
part of merchandising and it is a viable alternative to selling as long as storage costs can be
recouped later when favorable market conditions occur.  The importance of inventory
management is discussed at length in Chapter 3.
Contracting.  Compounding difficulties for merchandisers is the daily price risk
that is realized when a grain position is taken.  Price risk is characterized by grain prices
that are constantly changing.   Managing price risk has become even more important lately
because of volatile grain markets.   Recent volatility in grain prices can be attributed to the
presence of index funds and large private investors taking on enormous positions in the
futures markets`   But ultimately, a rapid decline in the stocks/use ratio3' has been the most
important factor causing the volatility (Wilson W. , Grain Contracting Strategies to Induce
Delivery and Performance in Volatile Grain Markets, 2009c).   This volatility can be
reduced through contracting.  Contracting is a means of strategy that can be utilized by
merchandisers to reduce the chance of unexpected future events.
This ratio denotes the percentage of how much grain  is actually used out of the total grain stocks that are
carried over from the marketing year.
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Grain buyers offer contracts as a means of mitigating risk and because of the rising
volatility in grain prices, contracting has become even more important.  Risk is shared
among buyers and sellers when they enter into a cash contract, but entering into a futures
contract allows risk to be transferred to a third party (Wilson, 2009c).   Futures contracts are
standardized and are specific in price, quality, quantity, and delivery whereas cash
contracts between merchandisers and producers are specific to each transaction; details on
delivery and quantity are specific to each contract, and they offer premiums and discounts
relative to quality which ultimately affects the price received by the producer.   Types of
cash contracts that involve risk being shared between the merchandiser and producer
include forward cctntracts, delayed pricing contracts, and deferred pricing contracts.
Contracts involving the use of the futures market include futures contracts, basis contracts,
and hedge-to-arrive contracts.
Hedging.  Managing price risk is done through hedging grain in the futures market.
Hedging is a strategy that allows merchandisers to lock in a price, establish a basis, and
eliminate price risk.   The act of placing a hedge involves taking an opposite and equal
reaction in the futures market: buying cash grain is hedged by selling futures, and selling
cash grain is hedged by buying futures (Lorton & White, 2006).   For instance, if a
merchandiser has a long cash position, a short futures position of roughly the same quantity
of bushels should be taken.   This hedge will eliminate price risk, or the risk of declining
grain prices, and should be terminated once an offsetting cash sale can be made which in
turn results in liquidating (buying) the futures position.
Merchandisers can take on several different types of hedges.  The most common is
a storage hedge in which grain is owned by the merchandiser and as a result, a long cash
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position is hedged with a short futures position.  The merchandiser then waits for favorable
market conditions to sell the cash grain and liquidate the futures position.   Other hedging
strategies are noted in the following section.
Basis.   Even though price risk is eliminated by hedging, basis risk is still present
and it is characterized by unfavorable moves in the basis.  The basis is the difference
between the cash and future price.  In a survey conducted by Kliethermes, Parcell and
Franken (2009), understanding the basis was deemed the most important skill set for a
merchandiser to posses.   Thus, a good understanding of the basis is invaluable for being a
successful merchandiser.
The basis is constantly changing to attract grain in and out of the marketplace.  As
of late, volatility in the basis in several markets has been just as prevalent as the volatility
in futures prices (Wilson W. , 2009c).   Figure 2.2 displays the volatility in the Mirmeapolis
basis for hard red spring wheat.  As one can see, the Minneapolis basis contained the most
variability in 2008 and has since been very sporadic in 2009.   The basis levels at terminal
markets (Minneapolis) and at export ports (U.S. Gulf) relative to transportation costs
ultimately determine which market to ship to.   Both transportation costs and basis levels
change over time, and arbitrage opportunities can be realized by shipping to one market
versus another.  Evaluating different markets and taking advantage of arbitrage
opportunities when shipping grain is very valuable to a merchandiser's success.
Factors affecting the basis include the cost of transportation, time, availability of
supplies and demand in the region, futures spreads, and quality (Lorton & White, 2006).
The basis differs among different locations because of transportation costs (rail, truck and
barge costs).   The cost of shipping from an interior location to an export facility is factored
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into the basis and is the reason why many basis levels at terminal or export markets are
trading at a premium to futures: they are providing some compensation for the transport of
grain.   Time also affects basis because during harvest the basis is typically at its lowest
point, but over time it appreciates.   Thus, a strategy for grain shippers is to buy cash and
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Figure 2.2.  Minneapolis basis for HRS wheat (Wilson W. , 2009c).
sell futures, let the basis appreciate until it is greater than storage costs, and finally liquidate
the position.
Basis is also affected by the supply and demand of a region; if a region has a large
supply of grain after harvest, the basis will trade at a discount to futures.   However, if a
region has a limited supply of grain after harvest. then there is a high demand for bushels
and the basis trades at a premium to futures.   In addition, basis values are driven upward
when there is a carry in the market because of excess supply, whereas an inverse market
characterized by tight grain supplies tends to guide the basis downward.   Lastly, quality
affects basis because basis levels are quoted in standard units (typically based on protein),
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and deviations from the standard quotes are subject to discounts and premiums; these
deviations affect price which in turn affect basis levels.
The basis can be used as a means of strategy for merchandisers.  Even though basis
risk is still present when merchandisers are  100% hedged, it is still manageable.   Lorton
and White (2006) outline 2 different sets of strategies for merchandisers to utilize: taking a
"long-the-basis" position or a "short-the-basis" position.   Both of these strategies
emphasize the concept of placing time between the purchase and sale of grain in order to
allow for favorable basis movement.   A long-the-basis position involves buying cash grain
and hedging it in futures when the basis is low, carrying the grain over time, and then
selling cash grain and liquidating futures once the basis has appreciated enough to cover
storage costs.   Lorton and White (2006) note that this strategy can be accomplished through
a storage hedge, which was discussed earlier, or by making forward purchases.
Short-the-basis entails merchandisers to sell what they don't yet own.   Thus, they
sell cash grain to be delivered in the future and hedge with buying futures.   Then, the cash
grain is purchased later when a lower basis is available, the long futures position is
liquidated, and the cash grain is delivered.   Lorton and White (2006) note that this strategy
can be done by either making forward sales or through price later grain (i.e„ delayed
pricing).   Table 2.7 below provides a summary of the 4 hedging methods previously
discussed.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the grain industry has been constantly evolving since World War 11.
Grain supply chains from then differ significantly than those found in the industry today.
For example, the methods for shipping grain from one point to another have become
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focused on efficiency, reliability and speed.  The 4 predominant modes of transportation
currently available to grain shippers include truck, barge, rail, and ocean vessel.  Each of
these is different in terns of capabilities and rate structures.
Table 2.7.  Basis hedging strategies
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As a result of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, rail firms have constantly been
creating and refining car allocation mechanisms for grain shippers.  Each Class I railroad
now has their own system of car mechanisms.  The BNSF Railway and their car programs
were utilized in this thesis.  These include 24-car COTs, shuttle COTs and general tariff
Cars.
32 The revenue received from the sale can be used or left alone to generate interest.
33 Weak basis occurs when basis is trading at a depreciating relative to futures.
34 Strong basis occurs when basis is appreciating relative to futures.
35Farmerispaidcurrentcashpricebuthasbeenchargedwith"delayedprice"servicechargesovertime.
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Grain shippers that acquire 24-car COTs or shuttle COTs are given a lot of
flexibility because these instruments have a high degree of liquidity; they are transferable
on informal secondary markets since they aren't specified to a fixed/origin destination pair
unlike general tariff cars.   In addition, 24-car COTs and shuttle COTs are sold at premium
levels on the primary market, whereas they can trade at premiums or discounts to tariff on
the secondary market.
Risk is present throughout the grain supply chain and the only way mitigate it is to
implement strategy in the decision-making process.   Types of risk include farmer
deliveries, basis and futures spreads, transit times, and mode placement.  To combat this
risk, merchandising strategies such as hedging and contracting need to be employed.   In
addition, logistical strategies involve committing to forward freight guarantees and utilizing
a combination of available transportation modes.
Finally, two studies exist that are most closely related to this thesis:  Wilson, Priewe
and Dahl (1998) and Wilson, Carlson and Dalil (2004).   This thesis differs in comparison to
those in that it modeled a prototypical grain shipper (e.g. Cargill, CHS) that currently exists
in today's grain industry.   Therefore, the current predominant car mechanisms and current
industry norms were modeled.   In addition, 3 elevator origins and 2 destination markets
were simulated through the use of stochastic simulation and a pull inventory system.
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CHAPTER 3. THEORY 0F SUPPLY CHAIN MODELS
Introduction
The grain supply chain is only one of many that function to transform raw materials
into end-products that provide consumers utility.  The process of integrating and
coordinating all the key functions involved in a supply chain is known as supply chain
management.  Greater emphasis has been placed on supply chain management within the
past decade to ensure the efficient movement of goods at the lowest cost possible and with
little or no disruption in supply.  As a result, firms within the supply chain have benefitted
from working together and have been able to offer greater levels of customer service.
An important component of successful supply chain management is effectively
managing inventory.   One industry that depends heavily on inventory management is the
grain industry.   Storing grain as inventory is an everyday occurrence for grain shippers and
it is a viable alternative to shipping.   In addition, grain shippers need to balance carrying
too much costly inventory from not having enough on hand and being susceptible to
stockouts.   Several methods exist for detemining the optimal quantity of inventory to carry
on hand.
This chapter discusses the motives behind supply chain management and the factors
that affect it.   In addition, relevant supply chain models pertaining to carrying inventory
and scheduling operations are reviewed.   Lastly, the concept of demand forecasting and its
relevance to this thesis are examined.
Supply Chain Management
A basic supply chain consists of a series of fims performing business functions in
an effort to make products and services available to consumers (Wisner, Tan, & Leong,
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2008).   These general functions include organization, production, delivery, storage, and
logistics; these functions are performed to transform goods from raw materials to finished
products.   All of these activities are driven around the ultimate goal of making products and
services available to consumers.   Firms throughout a supply chain have key responsibilities
that contribute to the overall supply chain.   Core competencies firms are involved in are
displayed in Table 3.1.   Firms focus on doing these tasks well in order to be successful`
Table 3.1.   Core com etencies of a su chain
This encompasses all activities  involved with
Demand Fol.ecasting                                             predicting the demand for a product in a future
Materials Handling
I  I(HUR€m   [[t and  S il
Transportation Management
This occurs when a participant within a supply
chain moves a product from one warehouse or
storaQ[e  facil to another.
This  involves managing all  logistical activities
associated with moving goods from one point to
another in an efficient manner throughout the
If these key functions are coordinated among business participants in a supply
chain, all firms stand to benefit rather than just one or two.   To be successful, flrms need to
cooperate with one another and integrate key business processes regarding the flow of
materials from origination to consumption (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).   This process of
collaboration among participants in a supply chain is known as supply chain management.
Supply chain management (SCM) is a means for participants to effectively plan and
manage key business functions in an effort to get products where they need to be in a
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timely fashion and at the lowest possible cost.  Thus, effective supply chain management is
a function of efficient logistics.
Transporting products among nodes in a supply chain in a timely fashion allows
firms to adequately meet the needs of the end consumer in the form of high levels of
customer service and lower prices.   Therefore, the overall goal of supply chain
management is to transport products along the supply chain in a timely fashion and at the
lowest possible cost in order to serve the needs of the customer.  The following subsections
review the motives and initiatives for adopting supply chain management, and later, factors
affecting supply chain management will be discussed.
Motives.  Motives for firms to practice supply chain management include
improving operating efficiencies, producing higher quality products and being able to
provide higher levels of customer service to consumers (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).   In
addition, firms can lower their transportation, purchasing, and inventory costs, focus on
core capabilities rather than having to perform several external tasks, and share risk
associated with having to predict demand and manage inventory.   Lastly, because supply
chains have adapted from traditional factory driven "push" systems to customer-focused
"pull" systems, the concept of supply chain management is even more relevant today
because it seeks to satisfy customer needs (Murphy & Wood, 2008).
Initiatives.  Firms wishing to introduce the concept of supply chain management
need to be willing to work together.   Cooperation among supply chain participants is
critical for supply chain management to work.  Therefore, firms need to share information
with one another such as demand forecasts, production plans, new products, new
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technology, delivery dates, and many other things that affect a firm's purchasing,
production and distribution plans (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).
In order for this type of information to be shared, participants need to be able to
trust one another and be willing to communicate.   In addition, firms need to adapt their
corporate culture and make a commitment toward supply chain management rather than
confoming to their single-minded individual interests (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).
Then, once long-term relationships are established among participants, the supply chain
will be able to function like a single vertically integrated firm and participants will receive
competitive benefits in the form of reduced costs and lower risk.  Cost savings will then in
turn allow greater investment in research and production activities to produce better quality
products.
Lastly, firms in a supply chain that initiate supply chain management will develop
long-term strategic relationships with one another rather than traditional unfavorable short-
term relationships (Murphy & Wood, 2008).   Then, participants in the supply chain will be
able to gain a competitive advantage over other supply chains through strategic and
cooperative supplier-buyer-customer relationships (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).   In the
end, firms that decide to initiate supply chain management achieve competitive advantages
and develop beneficial long-term relationships.
Factors Affecting Supply Chain Management
Firms employing supply chain management gain a significant advantage over flrms
choosing not to do so.  However, several factors still affect supply chain management and
the firms benefitting from it.   These include several sources of risk, the optimal
transportation mode chosen by firms, goverrment restrictions, and inventory management.
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Risk.  No factor affects supply chain management greater than risk.  Firms that
benefit from employing supply chain management still confront risk in their every-day
business operations.   Risks associated with customer demand patterns, transit time and
product lead times, fluctuating costs, and the timing of sales all can be detrimental to the
success of a company.
Customer demand is rarely ever constant because consumer's tastes and preferences
are always changing.   Retailers at the end of supply chains need to predict consumer
demand for end products with a high degree of accuracy because over-producing can lead
to significant increases in inventory costs, while under-producing can lead to stockouts, or
shortages of goods and unsatisfied customers.   In addition, the wholesalers, distributors and
manufacturers located farther up the supply chain need to rely on demand estimates for
end-products because they produce and handle the components and materials used to make
the finished good.   Thus, if customer demand predictions are inaccurate at the retail level,
then demand predictions for the parts and subcomponents at nodes higher up in the supply
chain will also be inaccurate; this "chain-reaction" is known as the bull-whip effect.
The bullwhip effect is a problem within the supply chain caused by increased levels
of safety stock and erratic demand patterns being passed up the supply chain to more
distant suppliers (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).   It is characterized by independent
planning and a lack of coordination among supply chain participants, and it begins when a
retailer at the end of the supply chain starts incurring erratic customer demand.   As a result,
this participant starts ordering more from the wholesaler and increases its safety stock.   In
turn, the wholesaler has to order more and increase its level of safety stock to continue
supplying the retailer.  This "domino-effect" is then passed onto the distributor, then the
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manufacturer and so on up the supply chain.  The bullwhip effect is caused by a lack of
coordination and flms being uncertain on how much inventory to order and when to
reorder it.
In addition to risky consumer demand patterns, supply chain management is
affected by lead time and transit time variability because these risks affect all firms within a
supply chain.   Lead time for a product encompasses all the processes associated with
producing, developing and packaging an item before it is shipped to the customer.
Therefore, when lead times for a product begin to vary, all of the functions within a supply
chain before and after the production and packaging of goods is affected.  This can alter
short-term plans associated with inventory, transportation and customer sales.  The timing
of customer sales can also act as a source of risk because missed revenue opportunities can
financially "hand-cuff ' a firm.  For example, if merchandisers don't sell grain when a
favorable basis is present, their net return will be smaller even though it could have been
avoided.
Variation in transit time, or the time it takes a good to be transported from one point
to another, can increase costs, affect other members in the supply chain, and decrease
customer service levels.   Transit time of goods is a very important factor for firms relying
on fast, efflcient delivery because failing to provide that service increases the chance of
losing customers.   Lastly, fluctuating costs can result in lost revenue and they affect a
firm' s budget and planning process.
Transportation Modes.  The optimal transportation mode for a firm not only
depends on minimizing costs associate with shipping goods and acquiring the mode, but
also the quality of service provided.   The level of service provided by transportation mode
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depends on the speed, reliability and flexibility of the mode.   These attributes for different
transportation modes were discussed in detail in Chapter 2.  There is a tradeoff among
modes involving customer service and cost., firms can spend more on choosing a mode, say
truck instead of rail, to get the goods to arrive at their destination faster.   In contrast, a firm
may spend less on choosing a transportation mode, but this will slow down transit time and
increase the risk of unreliable service; this in turn slows down the movement of goods and
customers won't be able to access their goods as fast as they'd like.
The choice of an optimal transportation mode affects supply chain management
because firms must cooperate and strategically choose which transportation modes and
routes to utilize when trying to reach their ultimate goal: minimize cost or provide great
customer service.   The location of nodes relative to one another in a supply chain also
influences the choice of a mode.   Participants need to coordinate their routes along different
nodes in the pipeline and construction of new facilities to achieve a competitive advantage
over other firms.
Government Restrictions.  Firms employing supply chain management are
affected by government regulations pertaining to shipping restrictions and environmental
concerns.   Firms need to follow certain regulations related to producing, shipping,
packaging, and recycling of products (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).   Especially today,
greater emphasis is put on controlling potentially hazardous activity.   For example, a lot of
countries now restrict the inbound shipments of hazardous materials.   Thus, participants
within a supply chain need to have the same understanding of ethics, or how they conduct
business.   If one company in a supply chain is caught doing something unethical, then
consumers will portray that firm negatively; this in turn affects the rest of flrms in the
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supply chain and thus, how the overall supply chain performs as a whole.   Therefore,
supply chain management even encompasses business ethics and how well firms within a
supply chain portray themselves to consumers because their image affects the entire supply
chain.
Inventory Management
Inventory is held by firms to satisfy product demand.   It is a key component
required for most firms to function because it allows firms to produce goods in a timely
manner and meet customer needs.   Items are typically held in one period and carried into
the next so as to act as a buffer against any shortages.   For exainple, graln stocks that aren't
processed, exported. or used as feed are held in inventory and carried over to the next year.
It then has to be rationed out accordingly over the next several months until the following
harvest.
Supply chain management is affected by several factors pertaining to inventory-
related decisions.   These include costs associated with canying inventory, the decision of
how much inventory to carry on-hand, or even the type of inventory management strategy
to employ.   These issues will be discussed in the following sections.
Types of Inventory.  Inventory that is carried on-hand by firms to satisfy normal
demand patterns is classified as base stock (Muxphy & Wood, 2008).   Traditionally,
inventory is stored from one period to the next and is drawn from warehouses when it is
required to meet customer needs.  Alternative strategic approaches related to carrying
inventory are more customer-driven rather than factory-driven.   Firms utilizing these
alternative approaches are employing "just-in-time" (JIT) and vendor-managed-inventory
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(VMI) approaches to eliminate the higher costs associated with carrying too much
inventory.   Both of these approaches are discussed later in this section.
In addition to base stock, inventory that is carried to protect firms against
uncertainties associated with product lead time, transit time and customer demand is known
as safety stock (Murphy & Wood, 2008).   Safety stock is carried in addition to base stock
to avoid stockouts or shortages of goods.   For example, consider a manufacturing firm that
carries 150 units of base stock to satisfy demand.   In addition to the  150 units, it will also
carry 25 units of safety stock just in case the original  150 is depleted before more inventory
arrives.
JIT and VMI.  Rather than the traditional method of carrying large amounts of
inventory on-hand, firms have tuned to more efficient methods to manage their inventory.
These strategic alternatives include the "just-in-time" (JIT) approach and the vendor-
managed inventory (VMI) approach which both seek to cut inventory levels and the costs
associated with them.   The JIT approach minimizes inventory by either reducing or
eliminating safety stock and by having the required amount of materials arrive at the exact
time they are needed for production (Murphy & Wood, 2008).  JIT is characterized by
smaller and more frequent orders; thus, suppliers need to be located close to manufacturers,
capable of handling a higher number of orders and deliver non-defective products because
of little or no safety stock available on hand.   As a result, collaboration among supply chain
participants is essential for JIT to be effective.
Whereas the JIT approach is controlled by the buying firm, the vendor-managed
inventory (VMI) approach is controlled by the supplier.   Suppliers are responsible for
replenishing buyers' orders rather than the traditional method of a buyer contacting the
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supplier when products are needed.   Thus, suppliers need to have access to the buyer's
sales and inventory data in order for VMI to work (Muxphy & Wood, 2008).  Thus,
manufacturers and other buyers in the supply chain (e.g. distributors, retailers) need to
allow suppliers control over their inventory and must be able to trust their supplier with
their confidential information.  VMI benefits both parties by reducing inventory and
stockouts, as well as cutting costs.
Inventory Costs.  No matter if a firm carries base stock and safety stock, orjust
one of the two, inventory is a significant cost.   Costs associated with inventory are greatest
once value has been added to a product through manufacturing or processing (Murphy &
Wood, 2008).  Thus, finished goods are more expensive to hold in inventory than raw
materials.
The costs associated with holding inventory from one period to the next are known
as carrying costs.   Carrying costs encompass all the expenses associated with storage,
handling, and insurance.   Thus, when a high level of inventory is carried and when
inventory turnover is low, carrying costs for firms are high, and vice versa.   In order to
reduce carrying costs and induce a higher turnover rate, firms need to be willing to incur a
greater risk of stockouts by lowering their inventory levels (Murphy & Wood, 2008).
However, if stockouts do occur they are costly and can be more expensive than the carrying
costs associated with carrying too much inventory.   In addition, firms run the risk of losing
customers if customers demand a product that isn't immediately available; this is the
biggest risk associated with incurring a stockout.
A tradeoff exists among higher levels of inventory and carrying costs: carrying high
amounts of inventory provides greater levels of customer service but also incurs higher
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carrying costs and wastes resources, whereas holding a low level of inventory can reduce
carrying costs but at the same time increases the risk of a stockout.   Firms need to consider
the opportunity cost of carrying a great deal of inventory and the return on investment on
the funds tied up in that inventory; if a greater return can be achieved somewhere else on
the money invested in the inventory, then inventory levels need to be reduced and the time
and money associated with carrying a lot of inventory needs to be re-invested (Murphy &
Wood, 2008).   This tradeoff among higher levels of inventory and carrying costs presents
one of the most challenging tasks to firms: how much inventory should be carried?
Methods exist to combat decisions of when and how much inventory to order.
Whether firms are employing a just-in-time approach, vendor-managed inventory approach
or a traditional factory-driven approach, they can utilize inventory management models and
resource planning techniques to limit risk.   These methods can in turn prevent inventory
problems, such as stockouts and rising costs, and are discussed in the following section.
Supply Chain Models
Different types of supply chain models exist to aid firms in their decision-making
process.   Some models focus on finding the optimal amount of inventory to be ordered and
when it should it should be ordered, while others pertain to scheduling operations and
forecasting demand.  All of these different supply chain models involve the efficient
production and movement of goods to meet demand requirements, all while trying to
minimize costs.
Participants in a supply chain face several sources of risk, such as unreliable transit
times, fluctuating inventory costs, and volatile consumer demand patterns.   However,
supply chain models work to mitigate sources of risk by implementing elements of
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strategy.   The following subsection discusses inventory models and their importance to
controlling inventory costs.   Then, resource planning techniques are examined, and finally,
the concept of demand forecasting is described.
Inventory Management Models
Firms that rely mainly on a traditional inventory system characterized by holding
inventory over time and carrying safety stock as a buffer against shortages are greatly
impacted by the bullwhip effect and the tradeoff between customer service and carrying
costs.   Thus, models concerned with ordering inventory and minimizing total inventory
costs are particularly beneficial to these types of flrms.   These models typically fall under
two types:  fixed order quantity models and statistical order quantity models.
Fixed Order Quantity.  Fixed order quantity models, such as the economic order
quantity model, assume that demand, product lead time, and other parameters are held
constant over time (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).  These fixed parameters then generate an
optimal order quantity that minimizes total costs for a firm.   In addition, under a fixed order
quantity system, fixed amounts of inventory are ordered even though the time interval may
fluctuate with when the orders are placed (Murphy & Wood, 2008).  For example, a
manufacturing firm will always place an order for 200 ball-bearings, but the time interval
between the placements of orders will fluctuate; sometimes it may be a 4-day interval,
while other times it may a 7-day interval.
The first issue for firms to address when managing their inventory is associated
with when products should be ordered.  To combat this problem, firms can utilize a reorder
point (ROP) method.  Reorder points indicate to firms when a new order must be placed.
Once a certain level of inventory is reached, a reorder, or trigger point, indicates to a flrm
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that more inventory needs to be ordered to avoid a stockout (Murphy & Wood, 2008).    A
reorder point can be calculated by multiplying the average daily demand by the order lead
time.  Also, if the firm carries safety stock, then it can simply be added to this calculation to
determine the reorder point.  For example, suppose a manufacturing firm has an average
demand of 50 units per day and the current order lead time is 4 days.   In addition, this firm
carries 25 units of safety stock.   Their reorder point (ROP) is reached at 225 units36; thus,
when inventory reaches 225 units, the firm needs to place an order.
After determining when an order should be placed, firms still need to decide how
much inventory needs to be ordered.   This particular problem can be addressed by utilizing
the economic order quantity (EOQ) model.   This model seeks to find the optimal order size
that minimizes total inventory costs (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).   The two main
inventory costs included in this model are carrying costs of holding the inventory and the
order costs associated with placing an order.  A tradeoff exists between these two costs:
holding a low level of inventory keeps carrying costs low, but forces firms to place
frequent orders which raise ordering costs.   Conversely, if a high level of inventory is held,
then order costs are low because orders don't have to be placed as often, but carrying the
greater quantity of inventory is expensive.  Thus, the EOQ model finds the order quantity
that minimizes these two costs.
Similar to the ROP method, the EOQ model assumes that demand and order lead
time are fixed and constant (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).   In addition, entire orders are
delivered at one time (no partial shipments), stockouts are not allowed, and price, carrying
costs and ordering costs are held fixed.   Calculus can be applied to the total annual
36 (5ox4) + 25  = 225
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inventory cost formula to determine the EOQ.  The total annual inventory cost formula is
the summation of annual purchase costs, annual holding costs and annual ordering costs.
It is represented below in Equation 3.1  (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).
TAJC=APC+AHC+AOC=(RxC)+(:xkxc)+(%xS)         (3.1)
where:
TAIC   = total annual inventory cost
APC     = annual purchase cost
AHC    = annual holding cost
AOC    = annual ordering cost
R          = annual demand
C           = purchase cost per unit
S            = cost ofplacing one order
k            = carrying cost
Q           = order quantity
By taking the first derivative of Equation 3 .1  with respect to Q and then setting it
equal to zero, the optimal Q or economic order quantity (EOQ) formula is obtained.  Thus,
the EOQ model determines the minimum value of TAIC (total annual inventory cost).  The
EOQ is shown below in Equation 3 .2.
EOQ-_iffasikc (3.2)
Figure 3 .1  provides a graphical representation of the underlying result of the EOQ
model (Murphy & Wood, 2008).   The economic order quantity is located where ordering
costs and carrying costs are minimized; this point is denoted as Q* in Figure 3.1.   Because
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annual ordering costs and annual carrying costs are at their lowest levels at Q*, it is the
optimal order quantity that minimizes total annual inventory cost (TAIC).
Figure 3.1. Economic order quantity (Murphy & Wood, 2008).
The EOQ model can be used in conjunction with the ROP method to determine the
optimal order size for a firm when ordering inventory, and when firms should place an
order to replenish their inventory and avoid a stockout.   Firms that employ both of these
methods will be able to have greater control over their inventory.   However, both the EOQ
and ROP techniques assume that demand and lead time are constant which may be
uurealistic in most cases.
Statistical Order Quantity.  Fixed order quantity models make the assumption that
demand and lead time are constant.   However, this is rarely ever the case because customer
demand fluctuates depending on tastes and preferences, the price and quantity of substitute
goods, and among other things, the income levels of consumers.   In addition, disruptions in
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a supply chain can lead to uncertain delivery lead times.   Thus, models for managing
inventory need to be more realistic and able to handle volatile market conditions.
The statistical reorder quantity model can be employed by firms wanting to allow
demand and lead time to vary (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).   The statistical reorder point
method can be used when both customer demand and lead time vary, or if just one of them
is allowed to vary.   Its objective is to find the reorder point and level of safety stock that
guarantee inventory will be sufficient to cover demand.   It assumes that unknown variables
(customer demand, lead time, or both) can be represented by a normal distribution and
utilizes a Z-table containing probability values that correspond to a certain number of
standard deviations away from the mean.  For example, if a manager wants to attain a 95%
probability that inventory will cover demand, the statistical reorder point method can be
used to determine the reorder point and the required safety stock that would reduce
stockouts to 5%.   The calculations for determining these objectives are beyond the scope of
this thesis, and the statistical reorder point method is introduced simply to give readers
proof that an alternative to the EOQ model exists.
Operations Planiiing Techniques
When firms in a supply chain are faced with having to decide how much of a good
to produce, they need to accurately determine the demand of that specific good.   In addition
to forecasting demand, firms need to make sure they are efficiently utilizing the capacity of
their facilities to meet customer demand.  Once again, this leads back to the issue of
inventory management., there are significant costs to carrying too much inventory, whereas
carrying too little inventory can be detrimental to customer service capabilities.
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The concept of inventory management is captured under the notion of operations
planning which simply refers to the planning process that firms undertake to make sure
they can produce goods and components to meet customer demand and efflciently utilize
their plant's capacity (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).  Inventory requirements for finished
goods and the components used in producing finished goods are plamed out ahead of time
and are used in conjunction with demand forecasts to efficiently monitor production and
employ resources.  Operations plaming techniques can be separated into 3 different types
based on their duration: long-range, medium-range, and short-range.  Long-range plans
involve major chaliges to a fim's capacity such as expanding, purchasing capital, or
constructing a new facility.  Medium-range plans are typically more detailed than long-
range plans and are characterized by small-scale capacity changes, whereas short-range
operations plarming are the most detailed in that they specify certain items and the exact
quantities of those items to be produced.  Specific types of each of these 3 categories are
listed below in Table in 3.2 (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).
Table 3.2. 0 erations lannin techni
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Operating plans that are classified as long-range plans are typically very broad in
that they cover all products in a single facility (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).   Table 3.2
shows that the aggregate production plan (APP) is a long-range plan and this particular
method can be addressed by several different strategies such as adjusting capacity to meet
demand patterns by altering the size of the work force, fluctuating inventory levels and
backlogs to meet demand, or a mixture of both.  APP is great for planning purposes
because firms can devise their production plans  1  or 2 years looking forward.   Medium-
range plans, such as the master production schedule (MPS), use the APP as a point of
departure to calculate the exact quantity of final products to produce within a certain period
of time to meet demand.   Thus, the MPS is more detailed than the APP because it pertains
to small-scale changes in capacity and it calculates the exact quantity of finished goods that
need to be produced.
Lastly, the MPS is the basis for short-range plans such as the material requirements
planning (MRP) technique.   According to Wisner et al., this short-range materials plan is "a
system of converting the end items from the master production schedule into a set of time-
phased component and part requirements" (2008, p.175).   This plan is the most detailed
out of the 3 types because it not only specifies which parts and components need to be
made, but also the exact quantities of those items.
Out of the 3 types of operations planning techniques listed in Table 3.2, material
requirements planning (MRP) is the most closely related to this research and therefore, is
discussed in greater detail in the following section.   In addition, distribution requirements
planning (DRP) is an extension of MRP and is relevant to aggregating demand and
inventory across different firms.   Thus, a section on DRP is also included.
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MRP.  Material requirements planning (MRP) has been used by for many years,
especially by manufacturing firms that produce parts and components to create finished
goods.   Both Ballbu (1992) and Wisner et al. (2008) give exalnples of manufacturing firms
that use MRP in scheduling the production of components used to construct end-items in
order to meet demand.  Both of their examples carry the same overall theme in that MRP
determines the required raw materials used to manufacture finished goods.  More
specifically, MRP takes the end items from the master production schedule (MPS) to
calculate the exact quantity, want dates and planned order releases for components and
materials used to make final products (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).   It accounts for on-
hand inventory, levels of safety stock, production times and lead times when calculating the
raw material I equirements.
MRP calculates the requirements for dependent demand items, which are
subassemblies, components, or raw materials whose demand depends on the independent
demand of finished goods (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).   The reason why MRP is closely
related to this thesis is because grain is a dependent demand item since its demand depends
on that of finished goods such as flour, cooking oils, or other types of consumer products.
MRP assumes the demand for raw materials is known with a high degree of certainty
because the demand patterns for raw materials and components are derived from end-
product demand (Ballou,1992).   Thus, once the demand of the end-product is known, the
requirements for the raw materials and sub-components can be calculated since the parent-
component relationship is known beforehand.
As a result of the demand for raw materials being dependent on finished goods,
demand patterns can be very "lumpy" or bunched together for materials and components
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(Ballou,1992).   These lumpy demand patterns create variability in inventory requirements
and in order to compensate for the variability, high amounts of inventory must be kept on
hand.  MRP works to reduce unnecessary inventory and keep carry costs as low as possible.
Wisner et al. describes how MRP determines the net requirements of the final product and
then "offsets the net requirements with appropriate lead times to ensure orders are released
on time for fabricating higher-level components" (2008, p.189).   As a result, MRP can cut
inventory carrying costs by scheduling the flow of materials to meet end-item requirements
when the demand for these end-items is known.
According to Wisner et al. (2008), the actual MRP process can begin once the
requirements for the final product are obtained from the master production schedule (MPS).
This flrst step is critical in order for MRP to work.   The following step uses this
information from the MPS to calculate the requirements of the components directly used to
make the final products.   This step is then repeated until having worked down the entire list
of materials until the requirements for the lowest-level of components have been
calculated.   The major disadvantage of MRP is that it can't calculate the net requirements
for these lowest-level components very far into the planning horizon because they are
lagged so many periods after the final product (high-level) demand.  On the other hand,
MRP methodology is great for planning purposes in that firms can generate information
pertaining to production, inventory, net requirements, and product order quantities several
weeks forward.
DRP.  Distribution requirements planning (DRP) is an extension of MRP and it
determines the aggregate net requirements of finished goods that need to be produced and
transported in a timely fashion to meet consumer demand (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).
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These aggregate requirements are then used to make adjustments to the master production
schedule (MPS).   Basically, DRP allows the method of MRP to be used in the entire
distribution channel because it combines the planned shipments for a good from several
warehouses and generates the gross requirements for that good which are needed to meet
demand (Ballou,1992).   Thus, DRP isn't only for end-items since it can continue back up
the supply chain until the first node, or point of origination is reached.
DRP is different from MRP in that it ties the distribution system to the
manufacturing system (Wisner, Tan, & Leong, 2008).   In addition, DRP is driven by
customer demand of the finished goods, whereas MRP is based off of the master
production schedule (MPS) to compute the net requirements of materials and components.
Also, MRP results in the production of finished goods at the manufacturing site while DRP
allows for the timely movement of end-items from different distribution centers into  1
central warehouse.   This central warehouse then contains the aggregate gross requirements
for each independent good generated across all the distribution centers.
The beneflts of employing DRP methodology include reducing finished-goods
inventory levels and the costs associated with them.  For example, rather than using a
traditional "pull" inventory system, DRP can coordinate the timely flow of goods with
production requirements.  Thus, minimal inventory is carried on hand when the amount and
timing of the end-product are known (Ballou,1992).   Also, independent items from
multiple warehouses can be managed collectively.   Lastly, DRP shows future demand
requirements for end items similar to that of MRP which allows firms to plan ahead and it
gives them more flexibility to respond to changes.
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The process of DRP begins with forecasting demand of an end-item several periods
forward for each warehouse.  These demand requirements are gathered from customer
orders, future promotions, and the actual predicted demand of the good (Ballou,  1992).
Next, the gross requirements for the end-item from each warehouse are combined into  1
central inventory requirement.
Wisner et al. (2008) use an example of a manufacturing firm that produces all-
terrain-vehicles (ATVs) at 2 different distribution centers in the US: Las Vegas and East
Lansing (p.196).  Neither of the distribution centers has to maintain safety stock, and there
is a product lead time of 2 weeks at the Las Vegas distribution center whereas the East
Lansing distribution center has a lead time of 1  week.   This example is illustrated in Figure
3.2.   The gross requirements for the fim's ATVs are located in the Central Supply
Warehouse in Figure 3.2.   These gross requirements were generated from the planned order
releases contained in both the Las Vegas and East Lansing distribution centers.   A planned
order release is simply a product order that is submitted to the materials and component
manufacturer when on-hand inventory runs low.   For instance, in week  1  Las Vegas places
an order for 6 ATVs while East Lansing has an order for  12.   Thus, the aggregate gross
requirement for ATVs at the Central Supply Warehouse in week  1  is  18 (12+6).   In week 4
the Central Supply Warehouse has a gross requirement of 4 ATVs, but it appears that only
2 are held in inventory.   However, because there is a 2 week lead time at the Central
Supply Warehouse, the planned order release of 4 units in week 2 is delivered in week 4 to
meet the demlnd requirements.   Lastly, it is worth noting that Figure 3.2 is only a simple
representation of DRP and that an actual DRP system would forecast the gross
requirements 8-10 weeks forward rather than just 4.   Thus, when it appears that demand is
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going to increase in a future time period, a firm can order more ATVs and offset this
demand with the appropriate lead time to ensure the ATVs will arrive at the distribution
centers on time.
Figure 3.2. DRP operations planning
Table adaDted from Wisner et al. r2008`.
Demand Forecasting
Both MRP and DRP rely heavily on the fact that end-product demand is assumed to
be known with a high level of certainty.  However, in most circumstances, predicting
demand is no easy task for supply chain participants.  The demand for a retailer's final
product affects the demand for all the materials and components that go into producing that
flnal product.  Thus, when firms are able to pinpoint their future demand requirements, they
will have a competitive advantage over other fims in the supply chain.
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Accurate demand forecasting in a supply chain results in matching supply with
demand (Murphy & Wood, 2008).  If firms are over-supplied, they are carrying too much
costly inventory, but if they are under-supplied, they run the risk of losing customers
because of poor customer service.  Therefore, being able to forecast future demand is
invaluable to a flrm's success.
Murphy and Wood (2008) list three different methods used to predict future
demand; these include judgmental models, time series models, and cause-and-effect
models.   Judgmental models involve using a best judgment or intuition when forecasting
demand because of a lack of historical data`  This type is normally characterized by surveys
and is used mainly when a new product is introduced.  On the other hand, time series
models use past demand data to predict future demand.   This is done by utilizing a simple
moving average in which each past time period is assigned the same weight, or through the
use of a weighted moving average in which more weight is put on the most recent data.
The last type, cause-and-effect, is characterized by econometric analysis because it
involves simple and multiple regression techniques.   This econometric analysis looks at the
relationship b3tween a dependent variable and several independent variables.
Forecasting Shipping I)emand.  Shipping demand is a source of risk for grain
shippers in this thesis.   Thus, the concept of demand forecasting is relevant because it
allows merchandisers more flexibility in their planning horizon and they are able to more
run their operations more effectively after reducing the risks associated with shipping
demand.  As stated in Chapter 2, shipping demand in this research determines whether it's
more profitable to ship or to store grain as inventory.   This decision is based on the
comparison of futures price spreads with costs associated with storage and transportation.
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For example, the basis levels at export facilities and grain futures prices are sources of
revenue, whereas carrying costs, car premiums/discounts, and tariff rates are all sources of
costs.
Thus, rather than forecasting the demand for a product, this thesis forecasted
shipping demand associated with shipping grain through the pipeline.   This entailed having
to forecast futures prices and basis levels, the costs incurred by a merchandiser, and the
amount of grain farmers will contract versus the bushels they will deliver in the spot
market.  These issues and how they were addressed are discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 4.
Conclusion
A supply chain is made up of several firms operating to make products and services
available to consumers.   Some of the basic functions performed by supply chain
participants include production, delivery and logistics.   In addition, firms have key
responsibilities such as demand forecasting and inventory management.  Coordinating
these core business functions among participants to get products where they need to be in a
timely fashion at the lowest possible cost to meet customer demand is known as supply
chain management.
Motives for firms to employ supply chain management were discussed, and some of
the main motives include lowering costs, sharing risks, and increasing customer service,   In
order for these benefits to be attained, firms need to trust one another, and once they start
cooperating, they can achieve a competitive advantage over other firms.  However, even
though supply chain management provides several benefits, it is still impacted by
government policy, sources of risk, logistics, and inventory management.   Risks associated
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with product lead time, transit time and customer demand can adversely affect firms.   In
addition, the ilassic tradeoff in inventory management is concerned with carrying costs and
customer service; greater levels of inventory increase customer service but also incur a
greater cost, whereas less inventory decreases cost but reduces customer service.   Luckily,
this tradeoff can be solved and the risk present in supply chains can be mitigated by
employing certain techniques.
These techniques include the reorder point method, the EOQ model and the
statistical reorder method.   In addition, MRP and DRP were introduced to combat the task
of resource plarming.   Lastly, demand forecasting techniques were introduced because they
are invaluable to a firm's success and the concept was applied to this thesis.
In conclusion, the concept of supply chain management can be applied to the grain
industry because it is a classic example of a supply chain.  Participants within the grain
pipeline perform several of the core responsibilities that were introduced earlier in this
chapter such as inventory management, demand forecasting, and transportation
management.   In addition, the supply chain models introduced in this chapter can be used
by merchandisers to help with inventory management and operations planning.   Lastly,
grain firms in the grain pipeline face the same risks and have to address the same issues
that firms in basic manufacturing supply chains have to face.   Thus, the concepts of supply
chain management can be used to model a prototypical grain shipper.
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CHAPTER 4. STOCHASTIC MODEL OF A
PROTOTYPICAL GRAIN SHIPPHR
Introduction
The focus of this chapter is to explain the stochastic model used to analyze a
prototypical grain shipper in this thesis.   The stochastic model is composed of 3 different
inland elevator locations that originate grain from area farmers.   Depending on the elevator
facility, rail and/or barge transportation are available for shipping grain to either the U. S.
Gulf or Pacific Northwest (PNW) for export, contingent upon the most viable option.
This chapter is organized to explain the development of the stochastic model of a
prototypical grain exporting firm.   It is organized into 4 primary sections.   The first section
presents the empirical model specification and a description of the variables, logic, and
setup of the model used to simulate the merchandising and logistical decisions of a large
grain firm.   The next section provides a discussion on the simulation modeling software
used in this thesis to incorporate risk and decision analysis.   The third section presents the
data sources and finally, the fourth section presents the base case of the model and the
sensitivity analysis conducted on the base case.
Model Overview
A model of a prototypical grain shipper composed of 3 different elevator locations
was created to analyze merchandising and logistical decisions involved in the management
of an individual grain supply chain.   The model was designed in 2 steps.  The flrst involved
developing the basic framework in Microsoft Excel as a means of formulating the costs and
revenue associated with making logistical and merchandising decisions.   This spreadsheet
was the foundation to the rest of the model.   The second step incorporated this spreadsheet
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into @Risk which is a simulation software package used as an "add-on" to Microsoft Excel
(Palisade Corporation, 2002).   Using @Risk allows certain variables to be stochastic, or
random, which incorporates risk into the model.   Allowing certain variables to vary over
time rather thin remaining fixed provides a more realistic modeling approach.   The
following section discusses the logic or science behind the model.
A prototypical grain shipper in today' s grain industry is composed of several
different points of origination, all capable of shipping grain to export markets.  This
required formulating a model with multiple country elevator locations, each with their own
specific characteristics.   In addition, multiple destination points for export were specified in
the model to allow for the possibility of arbitrage opportunities.
Three country elevators and 2 export markets were specified in the model.  The
country elevators include a River-terminal facility located in southern Minnesota, a Shuttle-
loading facility located in western Minnesota, and a Small-shipper located in southeast
North Dakota.   Each origin is specific in its own loading capabilities, storage capacity and
freight ordering strategies.   Table 4.1  displays the characteristics of each country elevator
and the restrictions placed on each.  Also, the 2 export markets included are the Pacific
Northwest (PNW) and the U.S. Gulf, and each market differs in its forward basis offered
for grain and provides shippers with two alternatives.   Each export facility is restricted by
the model in what it is capable of doing (e.g., loading and unloading capacities) and these
are shown in Table 4.2.   The data sources used to derive the information in Table 4.1  and
Table 4.2 are discussed later in this chapter.
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Table 4.1. Count elevator facilities
Table 4.2. Grain export facilities
(All units shown in metric tons)
PNW                                Gulf
Storage Capacity
Soybeans were chosen as the commodity to be used in the thesis because it is one of
the few major commodities that is shipped to either the PNW or U.S. Gulf for export (Pope,
2010).  Com and winter wheat, on the other hand, typically only ship to the Gulf for export
whereas spring wheat typically ships to the eastern part of the US.  Therefore, soybeans
were chosen as the commodity to be modeled.
Model Specification
The decisions a grain shipper makes regarding the purchase and sale of grain, and
those pertaining to the acquisition of freight act as the foundation to the model.  Thus, the
model is designed to simulate shipping decisions for the prototypical shipper.  The
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logistical and merchandising decisions implemented by a merchandiser are directly
correlated; all decisions made concerning freight are a function of merchandising decisions.
Grain shippers estimate how much grain will be delivered by producers during any given
month of the year.   Then based on those deliveries, they plan when to sell their grain by
expected movement in the local and terminal basis levels.  After they develop a marketing
strategy, they plan their freight ordering decisions several months forward based on sales
and capacity constraints.   Thus, logistical decisions are a direct function of merchandising
decisions.   Because of the large number of factors that go into both types of decisions, it is
simplest to separate the two and calculate one at a time.
Since decisions regarding the purchase and sale of grain are made first, a
merchandising module was developed first in Microsoft Excel.   Based on the logic from
that module, a logistics module was created in Microsoft Excel.   Both modules were then
incorporated into @Risk to introduce randomness in certain key variables.   This entire
process is presented in order from start to finish by first analyzing the buying and selling
decisions of a merchandiser.
To summarize, the following sections present the merchandising module and the
logistics module.   Each section contains a description of key variables specific to each
model, and the purpose of both modules is explained.   These sections are then followed by
a discussion of the processes used in both modules.
Merchandising Module
It is imperative for merchandisers to plan ahead in terms of farmer deliveries, basis
and futures spreads, and costs incuITed at the facility.   Therefore, a modeling framework
that could account for these key variables was required to accurately simulate a
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merchandiser's buying and selling decision-making process.   Such a module was based
around a main payoff function in addition to several freight-based calculations that factored
in the basis levels less shipping costs to both destination markets.   Overall, the
merchandising module seeks to answer half of the primary objective of this thesis: what is
the optimal quantity of grain that should be sold in the pipeline?
The basic foundation of the merchandising module included the 3 country elevators.
After grain is purchased from producers, expected sales throughout the marketing year are
forecasted based on expected basis levels and futures spreads.   Also, movement in the
terminal basis levels at the PNW and the U.S. Gulf determined the optimal times to sell
grain and indicated to which market to ship.  The merchandising analysis was conducted on
a weekly basis and grain is stored until favorable market conditions or capacity constraints
determined when to sell.
The merchandising portion of the model maximizes net payoff.  This is based on
revenue deriv3d from sales and costs incurred from procurement, storage, handling, and
transportation.  The net payoff function determines the demand for shipping and the model
assumes that each elevator maximizes the payoff function every week by choosing to sell
to the market in which the basis is most favorable.   Therefore, weekly shipping demand is
determined by evaluating the following for each week:
WNPNet =  Maxr_GM  -(CC  + HC  + DC  + PSC)|
91Ven
where
(4.1)
PSC  = Max(Basispnw -Mm(T[,pnw)),(BasISusg -Mm(Ti,usg))]            (4.2)
WNPNet = Weekly net payoff
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GM = Gross margin
CC = Cost of carry
HC = Handling cost
DC = Hedge cost
PSC = Preferred shipping cost from choosing among the maximum net
payoff to each market
Basisusg = U.S.  Gulf basis
T ,`usg= shipping cost for origin i to market U.S. Gulf
Basispnw = Pacific Northwest basis
T I,pnw= shipping cost for origin i to market PNW
Equation 4. I  was evaluated every week when grain was bought from farmers and
delivered to the elevator.  For instance. if grain was bought on the first week of the year,
the module would evaluate the net payoff function for each of the remaining 51 weeks of
the year and it would determine which week the grain should be sold in; this selling
decision was based on whichever week maximized the net payoff function.   Ultimately, all
of the planned sales throughout the course of the marketing year were based off this
function for each elevator.  The week that corresponded to the payoff derived from
Equation 4.1  was chosen as the most profitable opportunity to make the sale based on when
the grain was bought.
The following sections discuss the random and non-random variables contained
within Equation 4.1  and those that affect it.  The data sources used to generate these
random and non-random variables are discussed in a separate section later in this chapter.
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Random Variables
Stochastic or random variables are those that are allowed to vary in the model and
they introduce risk into the decision-making process.   Several variables were treated as
being random.   The following subsections discuss the random variables that affect the
weekly net payoff function (Equation 4.1 ).
Spot vs. Forward Purchases.  The first step that initiates the merchandising
process for any grain shipper involves the purchase or procurement of grain from local area
producers.   Giain can be bought from farmers in a variety of different ways and the two
methods of buying grain in the merchandising module were spot purchases and forward
purchases.   Spot purchases include those in which grain is bought on the cash or spot
market from farmers when no form of a contract is included in the transaction.  This type of
buying strategy creates risk for merchandisers because they have to base storage and
shipping decisions soley on their best estimate of how much grain will be delivered
througthout the year.   For instance, if favorable marketing conditions occur right at harvest,
farmers will deliver a high volume of bushels on the spot market.  However, if favorable
marketing conditions occur well ahead of harvest, then farmers will forward contract a lot
of their grain and merchandisers won't buy as much on the spot market.
The other buying strategy evaluated was in the form of forward purchases involving
the use of contracts.   Forward contracts still utilize the cash market and are specific to each
farmer relative to quantity, price and grade.   Thus, unlike futures contracts which are
standardized for all buyers and sellers, forward contracts are differentiated.   Lastly, forward
purchases of grain are typically made by merchandisers before the crop is ready to be
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harvested.   Therefore, there is less risk with this type of purchase because bushels are
bought in advance and are known with certainty.
The fact that grower deliveries are random forces merchandisers to forecast aliead
several months to try and estimate what percentage of total deliveries will be on the spot
market and how many will be forward contracted.  The percentage of forward contracted
soybeans used in the base case of the model was 46%.  The remaining 54% was purchased
on the spot market.
[n addition, the percentage of soybeans marketed by month differs over the course
of a marketing year.   The percentages incorporated into the merchandising module are
shown below in Table 4.3  (National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2009).   Averaged
percentages and standard deviations for each month were calculated and converted to
weekly amounts.  The weekly averages were then multiplied by the total yearly volume
handled to get the amount of bushels received each week.  This amount was multiplied by
the forward purchase weight (46%) and the remainder was bought on the cash market.
Finally, a lognormal distribution was used to introduce randomness in the amount of spot
purchases by ulsing the mean and standard deviation values for each week.  This process
was used for all 3 country elevators in order to introduce randomness into the amount of
bushels delivered on the spot market.
Hedging.  Another source of randomness incorporated into the merchandising
module includes futures prices.   The model assumed that whenever grain was purchased, it
was immediately hedged in the futures market.   Thus once cash grain was bought, it was
sold in the futures market; this type of hedge is known as a storage hedge.37  This hedging
37 See Chapter 2  for a discussion of hedging strategies.
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strategy allows grain to be stored as inventory until favorable market conditions dictate a
sale should be made.
Table 4.3. Percent of soybeans marketed in Minnesota by month
Ovunbers shorn are in percentages)
Month 2004-05                       2005-06                       2006-07                       2007-08
October                        19
December                    10
Table adapted from Armual
2009).
Statistical Bulletin (National Agricultural Statistics Service,
Hedging grain requires the use of a futures market.  Soybean futures prices from
2000-2010 were fitted to a distribution using BestFit.  As a result, a lognormal distribution
was estimated.  This distrbution was used to determine the futures price in the first week,
and then a normal distribution was created to generate a value that represented the change
in price for each successive week.  For example, the lognormal distribution generated a
price for Week 1, and the normal distribution generated a price change that was added to
the price from Weekl to derive the soybean price in Week 2.  Lastly, the model assumed
that no spreads were executed.  Rather, each elevator hedged its grain in the week
corresponding to the payoff derived in Equation 4.1.
Basis Levels.  As stated previously in Chapter 2, the basis (cash less futures) is
what merchandisers analyze when deciding to sell their grain.  Changes in the basis
determine when to sell.  Therefore, for each week the model evaluated basis movements
and calculated a gross margin which is simply the "buy basis" less the "sell basis."  The
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gross margin is denoted as GM in Equation 4.1.   A buy basis is established when grain is
bought from farmers and a sell basis is the result of a sale to either the PNW or the Gulf.
The merchandising module assumed a storage hedge was initiated when grain was
purchased and it evaluated the gross margin (GM) from changes in the basis for each
deferred week.   As seen in Equation 4.1, the difference between the gross margin and all
costs determine the weekly net payoff (WNP).   Essentially, Equation 4.1  chooses the
market/week in which to sell to/in that will maximize net payoff.
For instance, if grain was bought in Week  17, then the model calculated the buy
basis and potential sell basis in Week 17 to determine the gross margin and if the grain
should be immeditately sold.   It also did this for all the remaining 35 weeks of the year to
determine if grain should be stored.   If it determined grain should be stored and not sold
until Week 51, then the elevator would incur storage charges from Week  17 to Week 51.
This process conducted in Week  17 was repeated for all the remaining 51  weeks of the
year.  Therefore, once the expected spot and forward purchases were entered for all 52
weeks, the merchandising module for all 3 elevators immediately calculated when the grain
received in each week should be sold by evaluating Equation 4.1  for every successive
week.
The spot and deferred soybean basis values for the Gulf and PNW are denoted in
Equation 4.2 as Basisusgand Basispnw, respectively.   Both of these basis values are classifled
as being a sell basis because they represent the markets where grain is sold.   Equation 4.2
chooses which market to ship to by comparing the difference between the basis at each port
and the minimum transportation cost (shuttle, barge, etc.) to each port.   The merchandising
module chooses to ship to either the Gulf or the PNW depending on which of the two has
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the greatest difference between the basis offered there and the transportation cost to get
there.
The lc`cal basis, or buy basis, offered at each of the 3 country elevator locations is
important because it determines the cash price that is paid to farmers for their grain.   It is
part of the calculation for determing the gross margin (GM) in Equation 4.1.   The local
basis at each elevator was determined by evaluating the returns generated from shipping to
both ports.  The difference between the basis level at each port and the transportation cost
to each port were derived.  The greater of the two returns was chosen and then a "target
margin" was subtracted from this value to derive the local basis, or buy basis, value.  A
target margin is the gross amount the merchandiser hopes to make on every sale and it is
large enough io account for several elevator related costs (e.g., handling, hedge, interest)
and logistical costs.   Deducting these costs from the gross margin results in the net realized
margin.
Shipping Demand.  Grain buying. futures price spreads, and basis levels ultimately
determine when grain needs to be shipped.   Because these three variables are all random,
then shipping demand is also random.   Shipping demand is comprised of "plarmed sales"
and "unplanned sales" in the merchandising module.   Planned sales are determined by
Equation 4.1  in that they are the grain sales made when the basis is most favorable and they
are comprised of the existing grain that is being stored as inventory.   In addition, planned
sales are those in which the merchandiser expects to make when creating a marketing plan
at the beginning of the year.   However, plarmed sales outlined at the begirming of the year
are not 100% accurate because they won't perfectly predict when sales will be made;
farmer deliveries and freight placements ultimately dictate when grain is actually sold and
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can alter expectations.  These sources of uncertainty in farmer deliveries and freight
placement cause shipping demand to be a huge source of risk for shippers.
The second aspect encompassed in the shipping demand variable is an unplanned
sale.  Unplamed sales occur when existing on-hand inventory in the elevator is growing
too large and will eventually exhaust the storage capacity of the elevator.   Therefore, a
reorder point for freight is set 100,000 bushels below storage capacity in order to
compensate for the undependable placement of freight.   If the reorder point was set equal to
storage capacity, then freight wouldn't be ordered until the terminal was full and it
wouldn't be able to take in additional grain and would miss key revenue opportunities.
Lastly, because forecasted shipping demand is based on expected basis levels,
expected futures prices and expected farmer deliveries, there is a chance it might
overestimate or underestimate what actually occurs.   Freight placements at each elevator
won't always be on schedule which can be inconvenient for shippers.   The shipping
demand for each week is composed of plalmed sales and unplamed sales from the
following week.  Thus, shipping demand is always looking forward one week to allow for
the timely purchase and placement of freight and any unexpected changes in farmer
deliveries.   For instance, the forecasted shipping demand in Week 34 is actually the
planned and unplanned sales that are going to take place in Week 35.   This allows for
freight to be ordered in advance and have a reasonable chance of being placed sometime
within that following week for shipment.
In conclusion, Table 4.4 summarizes the random variables used in the merchanding
module and their distributions.   Each of the distributions used were generated using BestFit
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which is an application available in @Risk.  BestFit will be discussed in greater detail later
in this chapter.
Table 4.4. Stochastic variables used in merchandisin module
Random Variable Variable Distribution Distribution Criterion
Soybean Futures prices                Lognormal and Normal
Lognormal(3.47, 3.74) and
Normal(0, 30) with a mean
of $7.27 and a Std of $3.63
Gulf Basis                                         Lognormal (0.11, 0.05) with a mean of
$0.46 and a Std of $0.05
Non-random Variables
Fixed or non-random variables in Equations 4.1 and 4.2 are those that are assumed
to stay constant in the merchandising module.  These include the costs associated with the
grain at the elevator, costs associated with the actual shipment of grain, and the quantity of
forward purchased grain.  The following subsections will describe these in greater detail.
Forward Purchases.  Forward purchases refer to grain bought prior to harvest
through the use of some type of contract mechanism; since they are bought in advance,
they are known with certainty and are non-random.  Note that earlier in this chapter; the
base case assumes that 46% of total grain deliveries were a result of forward contracting.
Elevator Costs.  The costs incurred by each of the 3 country elevators in the model
include storage, handling and hedging costs, and are denoted as CC, HC and DC in
Equation 4.1, respectively.  These costs are assumed to be non-random or fixed in the
model.  The storage cost, or cost of carry, is a cost incurred when grain is stored as
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inventory by an elevator.   Therefore, it is a very significant cost when storage hedging is
being utilized.  The cost of carry formula used in the model was adapted from Lorton and
White (2006) and is denoted as follows:
CC=0PXRX£2 (4.3)
where
CC = Cost of cany
OP = Estimated opportunity price
R = Interest rate
1^/ = Number of weeks stored
Equation 4.3 was used throughout the merchandising module and as the number of
weeks stored increases, the cost of carry also increases.   Lastly, it is worth noting that an
interest rate was selected and the estimated opportunity price (OP) is simply the cash grain
price at the time of its purchase.
The handling cost (HC) from Equation 4.1  is the cost of moving or handling a
bushel of grain when loading it into a barge or railcar.   It is the per bushel cost of
physically handling the grain at the elevator.   The hedging cost (DC) is the per bushel cost
incurred by the merchandiser for hedging grain in the futures market.  This cost covers fees
and other miscellaneous expenses that have to be paid to a broker or a futures exchange
every time a futures position is established.
Transportation Costs.  Equation 4.1  contains a preferred shipping cost (PSC)
variable which is simply the cost associated with the selected destination market.   This cost
is included in the weekly net payoff formula because often times the transportation cost
dictates whether or not a sale should be made and grain should be shipped.   Equation 4`2
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indicates that the preferred shipping cost (PSC) is determined by the basis values at the
PNW and the U.S. Gulf and the transportation cost to each market.   Therefore, PSC is a
random variable because the basis values are random.  However, the transportation costs to
each port (T,,pnw and T,,usg) are non-random, so they are included in this section.   The
transportation cost to either the PNW or the U.S. Gulf is simply determined by taking the
minimum of all transportation options to each destination.   For example, the River-terminal
elevator facility can utilize barges, shuttle COTs and 24-car COTs when shipping to the
Gulf.   The T,,usg  for the river-terminal facility is the minimum cost of each of those three
available transportation options to the Gulf.   The actual cost values for each of these modes
will be disucssed later in this chapter.
Logistics Module
The second step a merchandiser faces is focused around the transportation of grain
to a specific destination.   The two major questions regarding logistics are concerned with
when freight Should be ordered, and how much should be ordered.   The last half of the
primary objective of this thesis is answered by the logistics module in that it seeks to
determine how much freight to order for each week looking forward from the current week.
Determining how much freight to order and when it should be ordered both directly
correspond to the merchandising module because it determines shipping demand.   The
logistics module determines how much freight to order when it is needed and in the right
quantity to satisfy shipping demand.   The logistics module was developed to handle three
different ordering strategies, one for each of the 3 country elevators modeled in this thesis.
The following section discusses the logistical aspects at the country elevator level and then
later, a section will discuss logistics at the export facility level.
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Terminal Elevator Logistics
The logistical process starts at the elevator-terminal and ends at the export-facility.
The merchandising module creates shipping demand to dictate when freight needs to be
ordered and in what quantity.   All 3 country elevators contained a specific freight-ordering
strategy based on their shipping capabilities (see Table 4.I).
Freight-ordering Strategy.  The freight-ordering strategies used in the base case of
the model are displayed in Table 4.5.   The model assumes that all types of freight are
ordered once a week, but can arrive anytime within a week.   In addition, shuttle COTs can
be ordered on any day within a week, but all other modes have to be ordered on the flrst
day of a week.  Thus, even though the merchandising module was evaluated on a weekly-
basis, the logistics module was evaluated on a daily basis to account for railcar and barge
placements anytime within a week.   Also, assuming all 4 modes can be ordered, shuttle
COTs are ordered flrst because they are the most efflcient mode in terms of capacity, speed
and cost per bushel.   Once shuttle COTs are ordered, barges are also ordered if shipping
demand consists of enough bushels.  Then if there is a need for more freight, 24-car COTs
are ordered, and finally, general tariff cars are ordered last if any bushels remain to be
shipped.
As shown in Table 4.5, the Small-shipper facility cannot ship shuttle COTs because
its track capacity is too small, and because the River-terminal and Shuttle-loader are both
shuttle-loading facilities, they are restricted from ordering general tariff cars (BNSF
Railway Company, 2009b).   In addition, the Shuttle-loader and Smaller-shipper do not
have access to a water-route so they cannot ship barges`   Lastly, shuttle-loading facilities
typically only load shuttle COTs rather than 24-car COTs because they are more efflcient
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and can ship greater volumes.  Therefore, the Shuttle-loader only utilizes 24-car COTs if
needed.
± Freight-°rdeEv:I:=|¥al±Eesc::Ler|oader          Smali=Fi==r
Shuttle-loader                  Small-shipper
Random                            N/A                                   N/A
*Not Applicable
Table 4.5 denotes some modes are random while others are fixed.  A random freight
ordering strategy simply means that the specific mode is ordered as needed and that the
quantity needing to be shipped dictates how many will be ordered.  The amount ordered
varies over the course of the year and is random since it depends on shipping demand.
Loading capacities and track-sizes restrict the amount that can be loaded in a week.  A
flxed strategy refers to a specific quantity of freight being ordered only once in duration of
the year.  For exanple, since the freight-ordering strategy for the Shuttle-Loader is flxed at
3 total shuttle COTs, they are ordered just at one point in the year.  The reason for this is
because of a snuttle COT's continuous nature; once ordered, they continue to cycle back to
the elevator throughout the remainder of the mechanism duration.  If shipping demand
increases to a quantity greater than that of 3 shuttle COTs, the River-elevator can order as
many 24-car COTs as needed because they expire after 1 trip to the destination.  Lastly, it
is worth noting the model assumes that 24-car COTs are monthly grain units meaning they
expire after 1 trip.  Also, general tariff orders are 15 cars each and the duration of all shuttle
COTs is  1 year.
Freight placement.  The arrival of railcars or barges at any of the 3 country
elevators depends on the window of placement specified in the model for each shipping
120
mechanism.  '1`he window of placement refers to the time frame that freight can be placed at
the elevator.  Distributions were created to introduce rando]rmess into the placement of
freight at each elevator and are given in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6. Frei Iacement distributions
Mode                                                    D istribution
Barge Discrete(1, 2, 0.9, 0.1)
90% of barge orders arrive 1
week after the order date
while 10% arrive 2 weeks
after the order date
Table 4.6 indicates that start-up shuttle COTs arrive exactly 10 days after they are
ordered, and placement at the elevator from when it cycles back from the export facility
depends on the transit time distribution (see subsequent section).  The model assumes 10
days because the BNSF specifies that the first shuttle COT order must be placed at least 10
days in advance of the start-up period (BNSF Railway Company, 2009, Item 13600).  In
practice, the first shuttle COT order arrives on the first day of the specified shipping period;
thus, no randomness exists for the placement of the first shuttle COT trip at the origin.
However, after a shuttle COT is unloaded at the export facility and starts the next trip to the
new origin, it will arrive roughly 3 or 4 days later than the want date at the new origin.
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This source of randomness is captured in the model with a transit time distribution for the
retun trip to the origin.
A triangular distribution was used to represent the placement of 24-car COTs at the
elevator facilities.  The BNSF COT guarantee states that car placement for 24-car COTs
can be anytime within a 15-day window following the want date, and if they are placed
anytime after the 15th day they have to pay the shipper a non-perfomance penalty (BNSF
Railway Company, 2010, Item  10500).   Therefore, the triangular distribution allows cars to
be placed anytime within  18 days after the want date, with the most likely being closer to 3
days.
The BNSF has 30 days to place general tariff cars after the want date, and if they
are not placed within 30 days then they have the right to cancel the order without penalty
(BNSF Railway Company, 2009b).  Therefore, they have an equal chance of being placed
1, 2, 3 or 4 weeks after the want date (Pope, 2010).   Lastly, according to industry
participants, barges have a 90% chance of being placed  I  week after the order date and a
10% chance of placement after 2 weeks.  Therefore, a discrete distribution was used for
barge placement.
Once freight is placed at any one of the elevators, it can only be loaded if the
loading capacity for the week or the track capacity has not been exceeded.  Railcars and
barges can be loaded simultaneously, but certain rail mechanisms take loading priority over
one another:  shuttle COTs load first, 24-car COTs second, and general tariff cars load last.
If the model determines that freight cannot be loaded the same day it is placed, it is
held until the following day.   The model then repeats the calculation by accounting for
freight that has already been held from the previous period and loads these first.   The
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calculation for determining what is available to load is simply the prior day's arrivals less
the number of units loaded in that prior day plus the current day's new arrivals.  Once
freight is completely loaded (no partial loads), it is shipped to the export facility that was
determined in the merchandising module.  The model assumes that the destination market
for shuttle COTs is specifled 3 days prior to it being shipped because specifying the
destination prior to 3 days before it was shipped (e.g., 4 or 5) restricts the shipper's ability
to take advantage of favorable basis opportunities; whereas specifying it 1  or 2 days before
it is shipped results in the shipper being penalized by the BNSF.   For 24-car COTs and
general tariff cars, the destination is specified on the day the unit is billed and shipped
(Pope, 2010).   Lastly, barges don't have the option of shipping to either market because
they can only physically ship to the U.S. Gulf.
Demurrage.  Demurrage guidelines for each mode of transportation were specifled
in Chapter 2.   If freight is held longer than specified by the carrier, then demurrage charges
are incurred at the shipper's facility.   If the model determines that freight cannot be
immediately loaded and has to wait until the following day, the model calculates
demurrage charges.   For example, if the loading capacity for a facility has been exceeded
for the day, or the track capacity is exceeded, then freight needs to be held until it can be
loaded.   This causes the elevator to incur demurrage on this idle freight.  Demurrage at any
of the 3 elevator facilities can be assessed on shuttle COTs, 24-car COTs, general tariff
cars, or barges, depending on the ordering strategy being employed.   Table 4.7 displays the
demurrage costs for each of these 4 modes of transportation.
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Table 4.7. Demurra e costs
Mode                                                                      Initial Rate Excessive Rate
24-car COT
Barge
$0.02foushel/car/da
$0.004foushel for 4-10 d
U ,S-. G
PEN "'  .
$0.04foushel/car/da
ays            $0.006foushel for > 10 days
*Not applicable
* *Begins after 3rd chargeable demurrage day
OHPs.  When shippers load their shuttle COTs within a certain time frame after
being placed at their elevator, they qualify for an Origin Efficiency Payment (OEP)38.
They exist to encourage efficient loading of equipment at a shipper's facility.  Since this is
an intra-day variable and the logistical module was evaluated on a daily basis, a random
distribution had to be created to determine how often they are awarded to shippers.
The logistical module assumes that shippers are awarded an OEP on a random
basis.  A discrete uniform distribution was created to introduce risk into the variable.  The
distribution states that shippers have an equal chance of being awarded a 10-hour OEP, a
15-hour OEP, a 21 -hour OEP, or failing the OEP and receiving nothing.  If a shuttle is
loaded the same day it arrives at an elevator, it has an equal chance of receiving any one of
the three payoffs or nothing.
Transit Time.  Transit time from each elevator facility to either destination was
specifled as b Sing random in the model.  Therefore, they were based on distributions
created using information from industry experts.  These distributions are located below in
Table 4.8.
38 See Chapter 2 for discussion of oEPs.
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Table 4.8. Transit time distributions
24-car COTs/General
Tariff Discrete Uniform({7, 10, 13, 16, 19})
Both mechanisms
have an equal chance
of being placed 7, 10,
13, 16, or 19 days
Table 4.8 indicates when loaded freight will arrive at either the PNW or the Gulf
after being shipped from Eastern North Dakota/Western Mimesota.  According to industry
participants, shuttle transit time is most likely 4 days when shipping from this region to
either destination.  In addition, industry experts stated that both 24-car COTs and general
tariff will arrive at either of the 2 destinations within 1-2.5 weeks after being shipped
(Pope, 2010).  Lastly, the discrete distribution was based around the fact that barges
shipped from Southwestern Mirmesota typically have a transit time of 1 1 days to reach the
U.S. Gulf (Marathon, 2010).  In addition, a transit time of 10 days was 5% likely to occur,
12 days was given a 20% chance of occurring, and 13 days had a 5% chance of occuring.
Export-Facility Logistics
Once grain reaches either the PNW or the Gulf, it is unloaded into the port's facility
and then eventually loaded onto an ocean vessel.  Each export facility differs in terms of its
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begiming inventory, storage capacity, and unloading/loading capacity (see Table 4.2).
However, the same unloading process occurs at each facility, and the following subsections
will discuss this process.
Mode Arrivals.  Transit time distributions determine when loaded freight arrives at
its destination.  Each export facility maintains a level of beginning inventory to guard
against shortages of grain or any blending problems.   In addition, each has a specified
unloading capacity per day and a total storage capacity.  Therefore, if an export facility
reaches its storage capacity or exhausts its unloading capacity for the day, it will remain at
the facility and possibly incur demurrage charges until it is unloaded (see previous
demurrage section for these values).
Assuming that storage capacity or the daily unloading rate has not been reached, all
available freight will be unloaded into the facility.   The calculation for determining what
freight is available to unload is similar to the loading calculation at the country elevator in
that it observes how many units arrived on the previous day less how many were unloaded
that day, and adds any new arrivals on the current day.   In addition, if grain is
simultaneously being unloaded into a facility and then loaded onto a vessel, the model
continues to allow grain to be unloaded until the storage capacity of the facility is reached.
Therefore, all the space in the facility is utilized and none of it is wasted.   Lastly, different
rail units are assigned different unloading priorities at the export facilities: shuttle COTs
have unloading priority over 24-car COTs which in-turn have priority over general tariff
cars.  At the U.S. Gulf, barge and rail can be unloaded simultaneously.
Vessel Placements.  The logistical module assumes that vessel contracts are free on
board (FOB).   Therefore, the buyer is responsible for acquiring the vessel, placing it, and
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paying the freight rate and insurance on the commodity.   The seller is only responsible for
loading the vessel and paying demurrage charges if it is held longer than the time allowed.
Vessels orders are a function of grain that is loaded and shipped from a country
elevator.   Once freight is shipped from a country elevator, a lag period occurs until the
vessel is actually ordered; this lag period differs among modes.   On average, shuttle COTs
arrive at either export facility 4 days after departure, barges  1 I  days after departure, and 24-
car COTs/general tariff are  13 days after departure.   On the fourth day after a shuttle COT
is shipped from a country elevator, the order for a vessel is submitted and the first day of
the placement period for a vessel occurs simultaneously.   For barges, the lag period is  1 I
days after a barge is shipped from an elevator until the window of placement for a vessel
begins.   For 24-car COTs and general tariff cars, the lag period is  13 days after departing
from a country elevator until the actual window of placement for a vessel begins.
Under a FOB contract, vessels can be placed by the buyer anytime within a I 0-day
window (Klein, 2010).   Therefore, the actual placement of a vessel is not chosen by the
seller or merchandiser.   This can create problems for merchandisers because when vessels
don't arrive when they are expected to, they can incur costly demurrage charges.
The model assumes that vessel placement is random and will differ over time.  A
unifomi distribution was created to introduce risk into the model because vessels have a
10-day shipping window in which they can be placed anytime (Klein, 2010).   Ocean
vessels have an equal chance of being placed on any of the  10 days within the window.
Only  1  vessel at a time can be loaded at either facility.  As soon as the vessel arrives, grain
is loaded onto it until the daily loading rate capacity is reached.  After that point, the vessel
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departs if it is full; otherwise it will remain idle at the port until waiting to be filled and
could possibly incur demurrage.
Vessel Demurrage/Despatch.  Vessel demurrage rates are equivalent to the
current market rate (see Chapter 2).  The model assumes that the demunage rate for vessels
in the PNW is $25,000/day and $45,000/day in the Gulf.  Also, demurrage rates are based
off a guaranteed load rate per day specified by the shipper.  The model assumes a 5-day
guaranteed load rate for vessels.   Therefore, the guaranteed load rate at the Gulf is  11,000
metric tons/day whereas it is  13,000 metric tons/day at the PNW.   These load rates are also
assumed to be the load rate capacity per day for each respective port.
Lastly, despatch is paid to the shipper if a vessel is loaded in a time period shorter
than the guaranteed load rate per day.   Despatch is typically half the demurrage rate (Klein,
2010).   Therefore, the model assumes a despatch payment of $12,500/day at the PNW and
$22,500/day at the Gulf.
DEPs.   Shippers that can unload their shuttle COTs within  15 hours of being placed
at either export facility qualify for Destination Efficiency Payments (DEPs)39.   These are
available to encourage shippers to unload their freight in an efflcient manner.   Similar to
OEPs, this is an intra-day variable.   Therefore, a random distribution had to be created to
determine how often they are awarded to shippers.
The logistical module assumes that shippers are awarded a DEP on a random basis.
Therefore, a discrete distribution was created to introduce risk in this variable.   According
to the distribution, shippers that unload their shuttle within 24 hours of placement at a
facility have a  75% chance of achieving a 15-hour DEP if unloading took place within  15
39 See Chapter 2  for discussion of DEPS.
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hours and a 25% chance of failing the DEP if unloading took greater than  15 hours within
the 24-hour period.
Hmpty Shuttle COTs.  Once shuttle COTs are unloaded at either export facility,
they are then shipped back to the elevator facility where they were ordered from.   The
model assumes that it takes the same length of time for a shuttle to return to its origin as it
did to reach its destination.  The same transit time distribution is used for shuttle COTs
returning to their country-elevators.   This introduces randomness into shuttle COTs
returning from an export facility.  Recall, the distribution used was a discrete distribution in
which a probability of 30% is assigned to a transit time of 3 days, a probability of 60%
assigned to 4 days of transit, and a probability of 10% assigned to a 5 day transit.   Once a
shuttle arrives back at its country elevator, the loading process starts over again.
Merchandising and Logistical Assumptions
Several assumptions regarding both merchandising and logistics were made in both
modules and are addressed here in this section.   These assumptions are regarded as fixed in
the model bet,ause in practice they are constant over time, or else they seldom change over
the course of one year; if they do change, their presence is not large enough to signiflcantly
impact the analysis.
Recall the merchandising module assumes that all grain purchases are hedged in the
futures market.  Also, the logistics module assumes that railcars and barges are ordered,
loaded and unloaded in a specified order (see previous sections).   Lastly, vessel contracts
between the buyer and seller are assumed to be free on board (FOB).
Table 4.9 displays the 24-car COT, general tariff and shuttle COT rates used by
each of the 3  country elevators.  These tariff rates are used to calculate the total freight
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costs in the model.  The assumed origin and destination pair for each elevator location is
also included in Table 4.9.  These origins are specific to the region where each of these
elevators is found.  Table 4.10 displays the secondary variables which were assumed to be
constant in the model.
Table 4.10 also indicates that the shuttle COT and 24-car COT premiums are flxed.
The reason they are considered fixed is because when either mechanism is purchased, the
premium is "locked-in" or fixed over the remaining duration of the mechanism.  They are
known with c,3rtainty once they are purchased.  Also, the base COT prepay in Table 4.10 is
assumed to be fixed because this variable is simply the prepay amount required to purchase
a 24-car COT.  In addition, it is paid whenever a 24-car COT is purchased and is held flxed
by the BNSF.  Lastly, Table 4.10 indicates the barge tariff rate to be 331.  This is the
assumed southbound rate for grain moving from the Twin Cities, and the model also
assumes that the barge rate it at 100% tariff.  Therefore, the barge rate in the model is
$20.49/ton40.
Table 4.9. Rail tariff rates in lo istics module
40(331*6.19)/100=20.49
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Table 4.10. ` ariables assumed to be fixed
Variable                                                                             Value
Premiums
Shuttle -$225/car
COT - $25/car
SI]uttli-(`O`[` `]`riii.\IIti``ani`(.                                                  S I ll(I
Base COT
Earff9#:##ate
::`;,.::I:..`:``;:.`;,'`.,|,u,
Target Margin
COTs only)                     $4,800/unit
$0.01/bushel
$0.3 5/bushel -River-terminal
$0.30/bushel -Shuttle-loader
Shuttle Size
General Tariff Size
Ilo cars
I.I  \.:''``                                                   ,
I 5  cars
8{lr.fl[!a{!lal,l§.i,lil ,,,.;i:t5,!!,!'i!n`!E§.S]scan            -.illill.-.            I.I.--n.I
Stochastic Simulation Procedure
The prototypical grain shipper was modeled utilizing a stochastic simulation
procedure.   Stochastic simulation is a modeling technique that represents "real-life" events
by incorporating uncertainty into the model (Palisade Corporation, 2002).   Analytical
models are different in that they involve mathematical equations that contain input values
derived from their expected values.   Simulation models introduce randomness into
uncertain variables by representing them with a range of possible values rather than an
expected value.
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The stochastic simulation software used in the model was @Risk which is an "add-
on" to Microsoft Excel (Palisade Corporation, 2002).   This software package incorporated
randomness into certain input variables such as farmer deliveries, transit times, and car
placements.   The following sections discuss @Risk and how it utilizes BestFit to create
probability distributions.
@Risk
Risk analysis can be adapted to several different situations by flrms considering
events with uncertain outcomes.  For example, the decision whether to enter a new market
or introduce a new product that contains a great deal of uncertainty can be modeled using
risk analysis.   Risk analysis essentially determines how often certain events will occur
through the use of Monte Carlo simulation (Palisade Coxporation, 2010).   Monte Carlo
simulation is performed by @Risk to model uncertain variables.  A probability distribution
is created for these variables, which is simply a range of possible values that can have
different outcomes of occurring.  Every time a model is simulated in @Risk, random
samples are drawn from the input probability distributions and the resulting outcome and
its probability of occurring is recorded.   Therefore, the stochastic simulation procedure
utilized by @Risk differs from analytical models and "bootstrapping" techniques because it
performs Monte Carlo simulation whereas analytical models depend on expected values
and bootstrapping is econometric based.
BestFit
BestFit is a function contained within @Risk and it is used to fit data sets to a
statistical distribution.   Several distribution types exist, such as normal, discrete, or
triangular distributions.   It essentially chooses the statistical distribution that fits the data
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the best (Jankauskas & MCLafferty,1996).   The distributions created by BestFit are used to
represent uncertain variables within a model.   It generates basic statistics for each
distribution that can be compared to the actual statistics of the inputs.   These statistics then
are used to measure how well the distribution fits the data sets of the inputs and ultimately,
it indicates how confident one can be in knowing that the data was produced by the random
distribution,
Data Sources
The data obtained for the merchandising and logistical modules were obtained from
numerous sources.   This section provides a review of the key variables used in both
modules and the sources that were used to obtain data on those key variables.  Table 4.11
provides a summary of these.
Soybean futures price data from 2000-2010 were obtained from the Chicago Board
of Trade (CBOT) and incorporated into the merchandising module to evaluate hedging
decisions.  The spot and deferred soybean basis values for the PNW and Gulf were the
daily bids/offers obtained from a multinational grain trading company.   A barge rate for
southbound shipments from the Twin Cities was obtained from the Grain Transportation
Report on April  15, 2010 (Agricultural Marketing Service, 2010).
Barge data relative to placements, transit time and typical demurrage charges were
obtained from industry experts (Gergen, 2010, Marathon, 2010).   Rail placement data was
also obtained from industry experts (Mack, 2010, Pope. 2010).  In addition, rail transit time
to the U.S. Gulf and PNW was obtained from industry experts (Holz, 2010, Pope, 2010).
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Table 4.11. Summa of data sources
Rail Demurrage
Vessel
Export Facility Capabilities
BNSF Demurrage Book 6004-A as of
October 2, 2009
Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
Administration
Data regarding forward and spot farmer soybean deliveries were obtained from a
2005 survey conducted by the USDA's Economic Research Service.  This data revealed
that roughly 46% of soybeans were contracted in Mimesota in 2005, while the remainder
was sold on the cash market or kept for on-farm use.
Rail rates were obtained from the BNSF Rate Book 4022-M as of March 1, 2009
and rail demurrage charges were taken from the BNSF Demurage Book 6004-A from
October 2, 2009.  Vessel placement and demurrage/despatch data were obtained from
industry experts (Klein, 2010).  Lastly, elevator capabilities such as loading/unloading
capacities were given by industry experts (Stein, 2010, Gergen, 2010).  Information
regarding the capabilities of U.S. Gulf and PNW export facilities was obtained from the
;i;::s|:i::p;|aijue:::e:n¥:idaatr::::i:i:::a;::e;:s;fr:ir:::::oi:a:i::r:goi;,¥mF:1ikip¥areli¥tK::Fit:h|ioo;1:;p2r6||:0|o
45 Elevator capability data were obtained from Kevin Stein in April 2010.
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2009 Directory of Export Elevators (Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
Administration, 2009).
Base Case and Sensitivities
A base case was first created to model logistical and merchandising decisions a
grain shipper is faced with.   The base case parameters are displayed below in Table 4.12
for each of the 3 elevator locations.  These parameters were applied to each elevator in the
model, and results were extracted.   Some of the variables in Table 4.12 are stochastic,
whereas the others are important enough to significantly impact the analysis when changed.
The base case will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Table 4.12. Base case settin
Variable River-Terminal                Sh u ttle-Loader                 Small-S hi
Barges are random
Logistical strategy          24-car coTs are
random
Hedging Strategy
1FP,1  Mp and  I  LP          24-carcoTs are
shuttle
24-car COTs are
random
random
B:     .,S!       ``!`.,..        `::g:i':   .   :.:€S: ,.... `.i   r.     ..i.
All elevators are assumed to be  100% hedged.
Change  in futures price is assumed to follow normal distribution with
0 mean and 30 cent standard deviation
Sensitivities
A sem itivity analysis was conducted on the base case by changing certain random
and non-random variables to analyze their impact on the results.   Five sensitivities were
chosen to be modeled for each of the 3 country elevators.  These allowed for further
evaluation of key logistical and merchandising relationships, as well as certain cost impacts
throughout the supply chain.   The sensitivities were conducted as follows:
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1.    Shipping strategies for all 3 country elevators were changed to include
different combinations of freight mechanisms.
2.    The percentage of spot purchases was changed to introduce more
uncertainty in grower deliveries.
3.    The distribution of ocean vessel placement was altered to introduce
alternative placement times.
4.    The intermonth spread for both the PNW and U.S. Gulf basis were changed
to encourage the merchandisers to either sell or store grain.
5.    The distribution of car placements was changed to introduce more
uncertainty in the placement of rail freight.
Sensitivities were chosen to be conducted on these stochastic variables because they
induce the greatest amount of risk for shippers.   The sensitivity analysis is explained in
greater detail in Chapter 5.  In addition, results from the base case and all sensitivities are
also discussed in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5. slMULATION RnsuLTs AND sENslTlvlTIEs
Introduction
The merchandising and logistical modules were combined, and the resulting model
was simulated in @Risk.  A base case was simulated first, and then sensitivities were
conducted on the base case.   This chapter presents the base case and sensitivity results
derived from the simulation scenarios.   The following section presents the results generated
in the base case for each of the 3 country elevators.  The second section presents
sensitivities conducted on specific merchandising variables, and the third section presents
sensitivities conducted on key logistical variables.   The fourth and final section provides a
summary of the results.
Base Case Results
A base case was created to analyze merchandising and logistical decisions of all 3
country elevators owned by the grain exporting firm.  The prototypical shipper modeled in
this thesis is a large grain exporting firm. Thus, the terms "prototypical shipper" and "firm"
will be used interchangeably throughout this chapter.  Key random and non-random
variables representing current industry conditions were included in the model to represent
the grain firm (see Chapter 4).  Random variables included in the model were transit times,
freight placements, spot deliveries by farmers, and basis spreads.   Several fixed variables
such as transportation rates, car capacities and fixed elevator costs were treated as non-
random.
The expected values of the random and non-random variables were included in the
base case to generate a representation of normal operating conditions found at each of the
country elevators and export ports.  Table 4.12 in Chapter 4 presented a summary of the
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key base case settings.  Not only was the base case used to simulate normal operating
conditions, but it was also used as a benchmark for evaluating each of the sensitivities.
The model provided output for key variables from the 3 country elevators and the 2
export ports.   These variables are summarized in Table 5.1.  Net margin is an important
aspect of rurming a business, and it is monitored by merchandisers throughout a given year
because it ultimately determines whether an elevator is making money.  Net margin
depends on revenue generated from sales, efficiency payments, carrier non-performance
penalties, and vessel despatch.   In addition, several cost components such as storage,
transportation, handling, and the cost of buying grain from producers impact the net margin
calculation.
The model generated a distribution for average net margins for each of the 3
elevators on an annual basis.   Base case results indicate that the River-terminal generated
an average ariiiual net margin of roughly $6.5 million whereas the Shuttle-loader and
Small-shipper generated net margins of about $ 1.6 million and $261  thousand,
respectively.   Therefore, the total annual net margin for the prototypical shipper was about
$11.8 million on average.
The coefficient of variation46 for net margin was  1.32 for the Shuttle-loader, which
was the highest of all the elevators.   Thus, the Shuttle-loader had the greatest risk
associated with generating a positive net margin each year.   One of the main reasons the
Shuttle-loader was the riskiest in the base case is because its logistical strategy was flxed at
3  shuttle COTs per year; this means that it had to fill three,  110-car unit trains every 1.5-2
weeks no matter if there was enough grain to fill all 330 cars or there wasn't.   If there
wasn't enough track space or enough grain at the elevator, then the railcars would sit idle
46 Coefficient of  Variation =  Standard deviation/mean
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and incur demurrage charges.  In addition, shuttle COTs are the only mode that includes a
return trip in which the transit time back to the elevator is random.  Thus, all 3 shuttle
COTs might retun to the elevator at once or may arrive later than expected.
Table 5.1. Base case results
Mean                    Std
$0.59                    $0.09
Net Marginfou
Total Armual
Profit
Total Barge
Orders
Inventory
Tunover
---  ``                ,           1               ,        |`,Y
GTs Unloaded
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$6,537,154 $982,218
184                                  11
Mean           x"`h``v'~             std                t`v„hTffi€6>€+.>xpts35©5©Mean
$0.06                 $0.08
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$2,131,108 $261,543           $290
00
10
Table  5.1. (continued)
U.S. Gulf port
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$726,852 $46,594
00
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The second key reason the Shuttle-loader was riskiest is because since it has the
largest storage capacity and handles the most grain out of the 3 elevators, it has to buy the
most grain on the spot market out of all three.47  This results in the Shuttle-loader having
the greatest exposure to risk in terms of farmer deliveries.  Finally, it is also worth noting
the coefficient of variation for the Small-Shipper was also greater than 1 because it relies
only on 24-car COTs in the base case.
The standard deviations of net margin for the Shuttle-loader and the Small-shipper
were both larger than their means.  Beside the reasons stated above, the high degree of
variability in net margins for the Shuttle-1oader was caused by the large variability in
shuttle COT demurrage costs. For the Small-shipper, the high degree of variability in net
margins was mostly caused by the lead time for car placement.  The Small-shipper can
orderjust 24-car COTs and general tariff units.  Because there is a great deal of
47RecallfromChapter4that54%oftotalgrainpurchasesaremadeonthespotmarketinthebasecase.
140
randomness in the placement of these 2 types, the Small-shipper incurs the greatest risk in
the placement of railcars; the other elevators mainly depend on shuttle COTs which contain
the least variability in placement.   Other key sources of risk affecting the net margin in the
base case for the 3 elevators was the percentage change in futures prices, transit time to
both ports, and the basis offered at each port.   Even though the prototypical hedger is
always assumed to be  100% hedged, the change in futures over time will affect the cash
price that is received for a grain sale.    For instance, the cash price received on grain that
has been stored and hedged for 10 weeks will be the sum of the current futures price and
the sell basis.   Lastly, the transit time to either port was based on a random distribution and
it differed for each mode of transportation (see Chapter 4).
The cumulative distribution functions of annual net margin for the Shuttle-loader,
Small-shipper, and River-terminal are shown in Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2, and Figure 5.3
respectively.   Figure 5.1  indicates there is about a  15% chance that average net margins
will be negative for the Shuttle-loader.   In addition, there is a 50% chance that average net
margins will be less than $ 1.9 million per year and a 10% chance it will be greater than
$3.8 million per year.
According to Figure 5.2, there is roughly a  10% chance that average net margins
will be negative for the Small-shipper.   In addition, there is a 50% chance that average net
margins will be less than $0.3 million per year and a  10% chance it will be greater than
$0.5 million per year.
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Figure 5.I. Average annual net margin for Shuttle-Ioader, base case
Finally, after examining Figure 5.3  it is evident that the River-terminal has the least
variability or risk associated with net margin for any of the 3 elevators.   It has no chance of
generating negative returns and a 50% chance of earning $6.5 million per year.   Lastly, it is
worth noting the River-terminal has a 10% chance that net margin will be greater than $7.7
million per year.
When considering the prototypical shipper's 3 elevators, the River-terminal has the
potential for the greatest profit and is the least risky of the three.   The Shuttle-loader is the
most risky in terms of net margin and the Small-shipper generates the least amount of net
margin, but is not as risky as the Shuttle-loader.  In other words, the Shuttle-loader was the
biggest liability to the overall firm in the base case because it had the greatest chance of a
negative net margin.
Figure 5.4 displays the number of bushels shipped each week via 24-car COTs by
the Small-shipper.   Because this elevator is not capable of shipping shuttle COTs, they are
forced to order freight on a "needs basis" rather than being forced to fill a shuttle COT.
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Freight loadings are equivalent to actual grain sales because when grain is sold, freight is
acquired and loaded to move the grain.   Therefore, the level of 24-car COT loads is a
function of grain sold in the pipeline.
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Figure 5.2. Average annual net margin for Small-shipper, base case
Figure 5.3. Average annual net margin for River-terminal, base case
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Figure 5.4 indicates that an increase in grain sales for the Small-shipper occurred in
the weeks leading up to Week 40, and then continued to fluctuate at a high level throughout
the remainder of the year.   Grain sales were expected to rise sharply around Week 40
because soybean harvest in the Upper Midwest starts in late September/early October.
Therefore, an increase in both grain buying and grain sales took place around harvest.
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Figure 5.4. 24-car COT loadings for Small-shipper, base case
The Shuttle-loader ships shuttle COTs which means it ships regularly scheduled
quantities of grain every 8-10 days.   In doing so, its grain sales follow this pattern very
closely because without selling grain, shuttle COTs wouldn't be fllled and would incur
demurrage.   In addition to shuttle COTs, the Shuttle-loader also ships 24-car COTs
whenever needed.
The loadings for the Shuttle-loader are shown in Figure 5.5.   An increase in grain
sales for the Shuttle-loader occurred in the weeks leading up to Week 40, and then
continued to fluctuate at a high level throughout the remainder of the year.   Again, grain
144
sales were expected to rise sharply around Week 40 because of soybean harvest.   Lastly,
the number of 24-car COT loads is significant at the beginning of the year because the 3
shuttle COTs were ordered then but hadn't arrived yet.  Thus, 24-car COTs were needed to
ship grain in the first 4 weeks of the year since the shuttle COTs weren't running yet and
favorable selling opportunities required freight for shipping.  After Week 4, the number of
24-car COT loads starts a steady decline until it reaches zero around Week  17 because after
all 3 shuttle COTs were running and the quantity of stored grain had been depleted,
additional shipping capacity was not necessary.
I,400,000
1.200,000
I,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
-200,000
1'11
-'1|i=I
5          10        15       20       25       30       35       40       45       50
Week
-.+24-carcoTLoads
''''''''t'I-Shuttle COT  Loads
Figure 5.5. Shuttle COT and 24-car COT loadings for Shuttle-Ioader, base case
The River-Terminal loads barges in much same the way the Small-shipper loads 24-
car COTs because they are ordered at random or on a "needs basis."  In addition, they also
load 24-car COTs in the base case.   The River-terminal's barge and 24-car COT loadings
are found in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6 indicates that the majority of the River-terminal sales were shipped via
barge.   As in the previous 2 cases, an increase in grain sales for the River-terminal occurred
in the weeks leading up to Week 40 and then continued to fluctuate at a high level
throughout the remainder of the year.   These again were the result of soybean harvest.   The
River-terminal relies on 24-car COTs when shipping demand exhausts barge capacities, but
barge transportation still remains the key mode of grain transportation for this elevator.
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Figure 5.6. Barge and 24-car COT loadings for River-terminal, base case
Merchandisers monitor certain cost components, farmer deliveries, and available
loading/unloading time.   Table 5.1  contains important output generated for each elevator
owned by the firm.  The model determines available storage capacity, and if it is exceeded,
grain cannot be received until space becomes available.  Actual deliveries are also showri in
Table 5.1.   The Shuttle-loader took in the greatest amount of bushels.   This is indicative of
its storage capacity and total bushels handled per year.   Overall, the entire firm shipped an
average of roughly 41  million bushels of soybeans for the entire year.
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The total yearly volume handled per year for each elevator was discussed in
Chapter 4 (see Table 4.12).   This is an important statistic because the greater the volume
handled, the greater the quantity of grain moving through the pipeline.  Therefore, if a
merchandiser is making  10 cents per bushel, he will generate even greater revenue by
increasing volume.   This statistic can be determined by the level of inventory turnover per
year.   The level of turnover, or number of times storage capacity is shipped during the year,
is greatest for the River-terminal because it acts as more of a transfer facility rather than a
storage facility.   The level of inventory turnover is also displayed in Table 5.1
Table 5.1  indicates that 26% of total grain handled was shipped to the U.S. Gulf.   In
addition, 99% of the twenty-six percent that was moved to the Gulf was shipped by the
River-Terminal.   In addition, 60 shuttle COT trips were generated by the Shuttle-loader.
The minimum number of shuttle COT trips guaranteed by the BNSF is 30 per year for one
shuttle COT (BNSF Railway Company , 2006).  Therefore, the number of shuttle COT
trips should be closer 90 trips rather than only 60 in the base case.  Also, a total of forty,
24-car COTs were ordered by the Small-shipper in the base case.
Table 5. I  indicates that eighty-eight 24-car COTs were ordered across all 3
elevators.   Also,  184 barges were ordered by the firm throughout the year.  No general
tariff units wore ordered by the entire firm because they were not included in the base case.
The Small-shipper had the highest average storage cost per bushel for the year; this
is expected because they are not committed to any shuttle COTs and therefore, aren't
required to fill one every 8-10 days.   The annual net margin per bushel for each elevator
was generated by dividing total armual net margin by the total grain shipped.  The net
margin is simply the gross margin less all fixed elevator costs such as transportation,
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handling and hedging.   The Shuttle-loader generated an average net margin of $0.06foushel
on every sale, whereas the River-terminal and Small-shipper earned $0.59foushel and
$0.07foushel, respectively.   The River-terminal generated the highest average net
margin/bushel because it utilized the cheapest mode of transportation (i.e., barge) in terms
of cost and demurrage for the bulk of its grain shipments.  It also had the highest target
margin ($0.35/bu) of any of the three grain elevators48.   Finally, Figure 5.7 displays the
cumulative distribution functions for average net margin for the 3 elevators.
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Figure 5.7. Annual net margin for all elevator locations in base case
Figure 5 .7 indicates that the River-Terminal has very little variability associated
with its annual net margin, whereas the other 2 locations risk more of earning a negative
net margin in the base case.   This suggests that the base case is not the optimal strategy for
either the Small-shipper or the Shuttle-loader.   The sensitivity conducted on the freight
48  See  Table 4.10  in  Chapter 4.
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ordering strategy later in this chapter will reveal the optimal strategy to maximize net
margin.
Other base case results indicate that the Shuttle-loader loaded the most vessels (11)
during the year.   In total, the prototypical shipper ordered 17 vessels during the year and
loaded and shipped  16 of them.   The Shuttle-loader also generated about $406 thousand in
revenue from Destination Efficiency Payments (DEPs) because it was the only elevator to
ship shuttle COTs in the base case.  Vessel despatch proved to be a significant source of
revenue for the River-Terminal because they generated roughly $730 thousand throughout
the course of the year.
Demurrage charges for each of the 3 elevators are located in Table 5.2.  Demurrage
charges are a significant cost for a grain shipper because they imply that freight was either
sitting idle or loaded/unloaded inefficiently.   The firm incurred about $7 million in
dem\irrage charges in the base case.  Over half of the total armual demurrage at the elevator
level was incurred by the Shuttle-loader; this elevator had a logistical strategy comprised of
3  shuttle COTs which generated only 60 total shuttle COT trips for the year.   Recall from
earlier that the BNSF guarantees at least 30 trips per year for one shuttle COT.   Therefore,
this logistical strategy resulted in one of the three shuttle COTs sitting idle a majority of the
year and incurring demurrage because not enough grain was available to completely fill it.
Table 5.2 indicates that the majority of the 24-car COT demurrage was incuned at
the elevators rather than the export facilities, especially for the Shuttle-loader.   The reason
for this is because loading priority at each of the elevators states that shuttle-COTs are
unloaded first, and then barges, and finally, 24-car COTs.   Thus, 24-car COTs incur
demurrage until track space and a crew is available to start loading them.   The standard
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deviation of 24-car COT demurrage for the River-teminal is about six times greater than
its mean.   The reason for this is because barges take loading priority over 24-car COTs,
which is similar to shuttle COTs taking priority over them at the Shuttle-loader.  Also, after
24-car COTs are ordered, they may not be placed for as long as  18 days; therefore, their
placement is more variable than that of shuttle COTs and barges.  As a result, the amount
of 24-car COT demurrage is highly variable because it depends on how many barges are
ordered and when they are loaded.   This is evident for the Small-shipper which has a
coefficient of variation of 9.05 which means they are exposed to a great deal of variability
in demurrage charges in comparison to the average demurrage that is expected.
Total Demurrage at Elevators
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Vessel demurrage for the River-terminal proved to be significant because it
accounted for about 8°/o of their annual total costs.   Factors most affecting vessel
demurrage for the River-terminal are shown in Figure 5.8.   Soybean futures price and the
Gulf soybean basis had tlie largest effect on vessel demurrage at the U.S. Gulf.   For
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instance, every $ 1  increase in futures will increase vessel demurrage at the Gulf
$0.13/bushel for the River-terminal.   Futures price and basis have a large impact on vessel
demurrage for the River-terminal because if futures and the Gulf basis appreciate to
favorable levels, this will induce shipping to the U.S. Gulf.  Then once freight is loaded and
shipped at the River-terminal, vessels are ordered.  Therefore, if more grain is being
shipped to the U`S Gulf, more vessels are ordered and the chance of vessel demurrage
significantly increases because it depends on transit time (random variable) to the U.S.
Gulf
Lastly, the level of spot purchases is a random variable and can create a lot of
uncertainty in freight ordering decisions for a merchandiser.   Once more grain is delivered
on the spot market; additional freight has to be ordered for shipping from the River-
terminal to the U.S. Gulf; this causes more vessels to be ordered to the U.S. Gulf.   Similar
to before, vessel demurrage depends on transit time.   Thus, as the level of spot purchases
increases, the amount of vessel demurrage at the U.S. Gulf for the River-terminal increases.
Figure 5.9 displays the total demurrage cost by mode for the prototypical shipper.
Vessel demurrage accounted for about 27% of total demurrage costs whereas shuttle COTs
accounted for roughly 720/o.  Twenty-four car COTs accounted for about 1 % of total
demurrage, and barges accounted for less than  1% of total demurrage cost.   Shuttle COTs
had the highest amount of demurrage because the Shuttle-loader had ordered 3  shuttles in
the base case and they only generated 60 trips.   Recall,  I  shuttle COT is guaranteed to
generate 30 trips per year.  Thus, the number of shuttle COT trips is too small which means
railcars are sitting idle at the Shuttle-loader since there is not enough grain to fill 3 shuttle
COTs throughout the duration of a year`
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Sensitivity on Merchandising Variables
Sensitivities were conducted on the random merchandising variables that are
present in model.  Changing these key variables force merchandisers to alter their buying
and selling decisions.  Ultimately because grain logistics depends on merchandising, the
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two are highly correlated.  Therefore, merchandising decisions not only have an effect on
how grain is bought and sold, but also how freight is ordered.
Market CarryHnversion
When the futures market is in a "full carry," the prices of the deferred months are
greater than the prices of the nearby months.  When a futures market is "inverted", the
price of the nearby month is greater than that of the deferred months.  The same is also true
for the basis because it also reflects a carry or an inverse.  An inverted market encourages
merchandisers to sell for nearby shipment whereas when a carry exists, merchandisers are
encouraged to store their grain and sell for deferred shipment.
This tradeoff among shipping and selling was evaluated by changing the nomal
distribution used to generate the change in the futures price.   In addition, a normal
distribution was added to the basis distributions for both the U.S. Gulf and PNW basis to
generate a weekly change.  The mean and standard deviation for the basis values were 2
and 30 for the carry and -2 and 30 for the inverse, respectively.   This normal distribution
was added to the lognormal basis distribution in Week 0 to generate the change in basis for
each of the successive weeks; this process was similar to that of the normal distribution
being added to the lognormal futures distribution (see Chapter 4).
Two sensitivities were conducted: one to inflict a carry and the other to impose an
inverse.   The carry involved a 4 cent increase in the futures price each week and a 2 cent
increase in the U.S. Gulf and PNW basis each week.   The inversion involved a 4 cent
decrease in futures each week and a 2 cent decrease in both basis values.  The results are
shorn in Table 5.3.
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The results indicate that only the River-terminal is more profitable than the base
case when the market is either in full carry or is inverted.   Both the Shuttle-loader and
Small-shipper earn negative net margins when the market is inverted or is in full carry.   In
addition, storage costs are highest for the 3 elevators when the market is in a full carry
because merchandisers are encouraged to their store grain now and wait to sell until a
favorable selling opportunity.
The River-terminal makes more money than the base case when the market is at
either extreme because it is able to adapt to market conditions more easily than the other
two; it primarily ships barge which is the cheapest of the available transportation modes
($0.61foushel).   The Shuttle-loader is committed to shuttle COTs which forces shipments
in suboptimal shipping periods.   Even though the Small-shipper isn't committed to shuttle
COTs, it ships 24-car COTs which are the most expensive of any mode ($1.71foushel).
Therefore, it can't adapt to current market conditions very easily because shipping when
storage space is exhausted requires ordering expensive 24-car COTs, and inverse market
conditions forces continuous shipping which is more suited for shuttle-COTs.
Table 5.3. Market car vs. inverse for elevators
2 Cent Carry
i ` .0('
Storage cost/bu                               $0.04
I C,.'lt [ll\.(.rsiu
:`
Net margin/bu                                 $0.95
((
I
Base Case
*l.,,,, :,Tgi,,  '`,,                                      Su.5`.,
Storage cost/bu                               $0.03
($2.84) ($0.28)
The nitmber of bushels loaded on 24-car COTs is a function of grain sales made
throughout the course of the year.   Figure 5.10 displays the number of bushels loaded on
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24-car COTs each week by the River-terminal for both a carry and an inverted market.  The
number of bushels sold/loaded is fairly constant at 200,000 bushels per week when the
market is inverted.   This is the result of shipping all grain deliveries immediately rather
than storing it for deferred shipment.  The number of bushels loaded in 24-car COTs when
a carry exists gradually increases as the year progresses in order to exploit the favorable
selling opportunities generated by a carry in the market.   The selling that takes place in the
\
first  15-20 weeks of the year_is very minimal and occurs only to free up storage space and
not exceed storage capacity.  Once soybean harvest begins around Week 37, as much
stored grain as possible is shipped; this is a result of storage capacity of the elevator being
reached and advantageous selling opportunities being realized in a carry market.
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Figure 5.10. 24-car COT loads for River-terminal while operating under different
markets
Uncertainty in Grower Deliveries
Farmer deliveries for each week were classified as either spot or forward.   Spot
deliveries were random and were represented by a lognormal distribution whereas forward
deliveries were assumed to be pre-determined and fixed.  The base case assumed that 54%
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of the total volume handled by each elevator was comprised of spot deliveries while the
remainder was forward contracted.
For each elevator, the percentage of spot deliveries was increased to  100% while
forward deliveries were set to 0.   This implies that  100% of the total deliveries made by
farmers to each elevator were random; this was thought to introduce a great deal of risk to
the firm.  After simulating these sensitivities for each of the firms, the level of demunage
increased as the percentage of spot purchases increased.   This positive relationship was
expected because if the uncertainty in grain deliveries increases, then the chance that
freight orders will either be underestimated or overestimated increases.   If a merchandiser
expects a lot of grain to be delivered in the next couple of weeks, then a large amount of
freight will be ordered to ship that grain.   However, if the grain does not get delivered as
expected, either due to crop size or harvest delays, freight will remain at the elevator until
loaded and demurrage will accrue over time.
For the River-Terminal, barge transportation saw the most signiflcant increase in
demurrage at t.he elevator when 100% of farmer deliveries were made on the spot market.
The River-terminal found barge demurrage to increase 29% when 100% of deliveries were
made on the spot market when compared to 0% delivered on the spot market.  This increase
is shorn in Figure 5.11.
The Shuttle-loader also experienced an increase in demurrage at the elevator.
Shuttle COT demurrage increased  19% when  100% of farmer deliveries were on the spot
market compared to when 0% of deliveries were on the spot market.   This is depicted in
Figure 5.12.  Notice the low level of shuttle COT demurrage during harvest (Week 40).
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Demurrage decreases dramatically here because farmer deliveries greatly increase which
means a surplus of grain is available to load shuttle COTs.  Before when shuttle COT
demurrage was accruing, not enough grain was available to load them.   Lastly, the Small-
shipper saw no change in demurrage when 100% of farmer deliveries were made on the
spot market.
Figure 5.11. Elevator barge demurrage for River-terminal
140000    r -------
I
I
I
I
0                          10                       20                       30                       40                       50
Week
-100%Spot
-0%Spot
Figure 5.12. Shuttle COT demurrage for Shuttle-loader at elevator
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Sensitivity on Logistical Variables
A sensitivity analysis was also conducted on key logistical variables such as the
freight ordering strategy employed by each country elevator, the placement of vessels, and
the placement of 24-car COTs at each elevator.   These variables greatly impacted the total
amual net margin for each elevator in the base case.  Therefore, they are significant in that
if they change even a small amount, they can greatly impact the analysis,
Freight Ordering Strategy
The freight ordering strategy for each country elevator was changed from the base
case and sensitivities were conducted to determine the optimal amount of freight and the
optimal amount of grain that should be sold to maximize net margins.  The optimal strategy
for each elevator maximized net margin, and in some instances, it was more favorable than
the base case strategy.   The results from the sensitivity analysis on alternative logistical
strategies for the 3  elevators are in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 indicates that the River-Terminal's optimal freight ordering strategy is
comprised of ordering barges only.   This strategy resulted in roughly 9.1  million bushels
being sold at $0.77/bushel which ultimately maximized net margins.   The Shuttle-Loader's
optimal strategy was to orderjust  1  shuttle COT and not utilize 24-car COTs.  This strategy
resulted in a net margin of $0.30thushel and roughly  17 million bushels being sold.
Lastly, the Small-shipper' s optimal freight ordering strategy was the base case.
This involved only ordering 24-car COTs only rather than including general tariff cars.
This strategy sold about 3.5 million bushels at $0.07/bushel to maximize annual net
margin.
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Small-Shipper
* Indicates optimal shipping
$                 45,887 413,101                   $          0.15
Strategy
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Vessel Placement
The distribution of placement on ocean vessels in the base case was a uniform
distribution with each day in the  10-day window getting an equal chance of the vessel
being placed.   Two sensitivities were conducted on this value by creating a triangular
distribution.  The first distribution resulted in the vessel being most likely placed on the
second day of the window whereas the other had the vessel being most likely placed on the
ninth day of the window.  Depending on market conditions, buyers of grain will either
place their vessels at the beginning of the window or at the end of the window (see Chapter
2).
The results indicate that when vessels are placed at the end of the  10-day window,
total vessel demurrage increased and total vessel despatch decreased for all 3 elevators.
Total demurrage for all rail units and barge had very little change once vessels were placed
at the beginning of the 10-day window when compared to the end of the window.  Figure
5.13  displays these results.
Figure 5.13 indicates that total vessel demurrage is always higher when vessels are
placed at the end of the  10-day window.   Once railcars and /or barges arrive at the export
facilities and unload, they either expire after that trip (24-car COTs and barges) or they
cycle back to the elevator (shuttle COTs).   Either way, they unload all of their grain into the
export facilities if there is enough space`   Then if vessels are placed at the end of the
window, grain can't be directly loaded onto the vessel when railcars and barges arrive.
Instead, the available grain is loaded onto the vessel from the facility and if there is not
enough grain to load the entire vessel, it has to sit idle in the port and wait for railcars
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and/or barges to return to load it.   Demurrage is incurred on the vessels the entire time it's
waiting to be filled.
Figure 5.13. Total vessel demurrage for River-terminal
Figure 5.14 indicates that despatch on vessels is higher when vessels are placed at
the beginning of the  10-day window.   This result stems from the increase in demurrage
when vessels are placed at the end of the  lo-day window.   If shippers can't consistently
meet their guaranteed load rate/week, then they have a smaller chance of earning despatch.
24-Car COT Placement
The distribution of placement on 24-car COT units was a triangular distribution
with the most likely value being 3  days in the base case.   Therefore, in the base case, 24-car
COTs were most likely to be placed on the third day of the shipping period. A sensitivity
was conducted and the most likely value was changed to  15.  This means the cars were
most likely to show up on the  15th day of the shipping period.   Twenty-four car COTs are
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guaranteed to be placed within 15 days of the want date, and if they aren't, a carrier non-
performance payment is received.   In addition, according to the triangular distribution in
the sensitivity there is a chance that the cars won't be placed until after the  15th day which
means the shipper is paid a carrier non-performance payment.   Figure 5.15  shows the
comparison of the base case to the sensitivity performed on 24-car COT placement for the
Small-shipper.
Figure 5.15 indicates that once 24-car COTs are placed toward the end of the
shipping period, shippers earn a greater amount of non-performance payments from the
railroad.   For instance, during Week 20 the base case results in the shipper earning less than
$ loo in carrier non-performance penalties, but the sensitivity resulted in the shipper
earning roughly $270 in non-performance penalties.   This sensitivity is basically treating
the 24-car COTs as general tariff cars since it is making the BNSF guarantee void and cars
are not guaranteed to show up within 15 days of the want date.
Figure 5.14. Total vessel despatch for River-terminal
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Figure 5.15. Non-performance payment incurred by Small-shipper
Even though revenue from non-performance penalties has increased, the Small-
shipper is still earning $0.07/bushel which was the net margin earned in the base case.   The
reason for this is because there was about 2% less grain shipped than there was in the base
case.   This was caused from a longer lead time for 24-car COT placement which results in
less revenue opportunities for the Small-shipper.
Summary
A stochastic simulation model was analyzed to evaluate key relationships among
merchandising and logistical variables.   The key variables analyzed were all random and
they included freight placements, transit times, farmer deliveries, and futures price spreads.
The effect of these variables on net margins was extracted from the results to ultimately
determine the optimal amount of grain to sell and optimal amount of grain to hedge.  A
base case moilel was first simulated to create a benchmark for the analysis.   Then, several
163
sensitivities were conducted on merchandising and logistical variables.   Several results
were identifiable from the base case and sensitivity analysis.
In the base case, the Shuttle-loader faced the greatest amount of risk associated with
net margin because of its logistical strategy and the manner in which grain was sold.   The
logistical strategy was comprised of 3 shuttle COTs that were fixed annually and ran
continuously throughout the year; this resulted in railcars arriving at the elevator and
needing to be loaded whether there was enough grain on-hand or not.  It is worth noting
that the BNSF guarantees at least 30 trips per shuttle COT, but the Shuttle-loader only
generated 60 trips while running its three shuttle COTs; this is indicative of an inefficient
logistical strategy.   Also, employing 3 shuttle COTs forced sales to be made based on
freight placement at the elevator rather than favorable selling opportunities.   Overall, the
Shuttle-loader was committed to too many long-term shipping mechanisms and it limited
the shipper' s flexibility, forced sales to be made based on car placement rather than market
conditions, and ultimately constrained the shipper's ability to effectively sell grain and
efficiently order freight.
Other base case results include the River-terminal generating the highest average
net margin per bushel on account of being able to utilize the cheapest mode of
transportation (i.e., barge) for the majority of its grain shipments.  Also, the Shuttle-
loader's inefficient logistical strategy generated roughly $4.5 million in demurrage at the
elevator level.   This accounted for 98% of the prototypical shipper's total elevator
demurrage.
In the market carry/inverse sensitivity, the River-terminal remained the most
profitable elevatol because it shipped barges (cheapest mode) for the bulk of its grain
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shipments and ordered them on a random or "needs" basis rather than a fixed strategy.  The
Shuttle-loader did worse while operating in a full carry and an inverted market t)ecause it
was constrained by a fixed, long-term shipping strategy which forced it to sell grain in
suboptimal shipping periods.   The Small-shipper had to continuously order the most
expensive shipping mechanism (i.e., 24-car COTs) under both market extremes in order to
take advantage of favorable selling opportunities; this caused it to do worse than the base
case.    Lastly, it was found that higher storage costs were incurred by each elevator when
the market was in full carry because storage rather than shipment was encouraged.
When 100% of total farmer deliveries were made on the spot market, demurrage
costs increased 19% for the Shuttle-loader and 29% for the River-terminal.   This positive
relationship between percent of spot deliveries and demurrage was expected because as the
amount of uncertainty in grower deliveries increases, the chance that freight orders will
either be underestimated or overestimated increases.
After sensitivities were conducted on the logistical strategy employed by each
elevator, it was found the optimal freight ordering strategy for the River-Terminal was to
order barges only and no rail freight.   In addition, about 9 million bushels of grain were
sold at $0.77foushel to maximize returns.   River-Terminals are mainly designed with focus
of loading barges rather than loading shuttle-trains.   Thus, their level of net margins
increases when more barges are utilized to ship grain.
The Shuttle-loader's optimal strategy was to order  1  shuttle COT because ordering
more than one constrained the shipper's ability to mal(e efficient logistical decisions.   This
strategy resulted in a net margin of $0.30foushel and roughly  17.4 million bushels being
sold.   Lastly, the Small-shipper's optimal freight ordering strategy was the same as the base
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case which included only ordering 24-car COTs.   This strategy sold about 3.5 million
bushels at $0.07/bushel to maximize annual net margin.   In total, the prototypical shipper's
optimal freight ordering strategy is to utilize barges and 24-car COTs when necessary and
to order  I  shuttle COT.   In addition, the optimal amount of grain to sell is roughly 30
million bushels annually which generates about $33 million in net margin.
When ocean vessel placement was changed from a uniform distribution in the base
case to a triangular distribution in the sensitivity analysis, the amount of vessel
demurrage/despatch was affected.  It was found that when vessel placement occurred at the
end of the 10-day window, total vessel demurrage increased and total vessel despatch
decreased for all 3 elevators.  This occuned because railcarsfoarges would arrive toward
the beginning of the  10-day window, dump their grain, and then the vessel wouldn't arrive
for another couple of days.   If not enough grain was available to fill the vessel, it would
have to wait at the export facility for loaded railcarsfoarges to return in order to be filled.
In addition to increasing the amount of vessel demurrage, it also decreased the amount of
despatch earned by shippers because if they can't consistently meet their guaranteed load
rate per week, they have a smaller chance of earning despatch.
The distribution for 24-car COT placement was changed to force car placement to
most likely occur on the  15th day of the shipping period; however, there was still a chance
that it could be placed after the  15th day.   This basically caused the BNSF's 24-car COT
guarantee to be void and it increased the chance that the shipper would receive a carrier
non-performance payment in return.  As a result, the number of non-performance payments
made to the Small-shipper significantly increased because 24-car COTs were rarely placed
within the  15-day window.   However, the Small-shipper still earned the same net margin as
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in the base case because there was about 2°/o less grain shipped than in the base case; this
was caused from a longer lead time for 24-car COT placement which resulted in less
revenue opportunities for the Small-shipper.
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CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The grain supply chain is comprised of several participants including producers,
merchandisers and exporters, that each function to transform grain from a raw good into a
value-added product.   In its simplest form, a supply chain consists of all the functions
enabling the production, delivery, and recycling of materials in an effort to make products
and services available to consumers (Wisner, Tan & Leong, 2008).   Therefore, key players
in the grain supply chain consist of farmers, country elevators, merchandisers, processors,
feeders and exporters.   The key player modeled in this thesis was a merchandiser.
Merchandisers are a small segment of the grain supply chain., they procure grain from
producers, store it as inventory, sell it at a favorable price, and ship it to the next mode in
the pipeline.
One aspect of the grain supply chain that moves grain from one player to another is
logistics.   Transportation of grain functions to move grain from point A to point 8 at the
most efficient way possible.   Transportation rates ultimately determine a grain
merchandiser' s net margin.  Although transaction returns from buying and selling grain
might be high, transportation costs still need to be accounted for to determine net margins.
Thus, grain shippers not only need to know how much of their grain to sell, but also how
much freight to commit to.
Grain logistics contains 4 primary modes of transportation: truck, rail, barge, and
ocean vessel.   Each is specific in terns of capabilities, speed and cost.   The mode most
utilized by grain shippers to efficiently transport grain long distances is rail.   Since
deregulation of the rail industry, railroads have had the freedom to develop differentiated
levels of service for grain shipments.   The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 allowed the new
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services offered to grain shippers to be charged at premium rates.  This resulted in the
development of innovative car allocation mechanisms.
Grain shippers choose from several different shipping mechanisms offered by the
Class I Railroads.  The mechanisms offered by the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF)
Railway were modeled in this thesis and they include general tariff cars, 24-car COTs and
shuttle COTs.  These three mechanisms offered by the BNSF differ in terms of their
duration, cost, allocation method, and how many months forward they are offered.
Merchandisers commit to these mechanisms several months forward in anticipation of
future grain deliveries during harvest.   One of the main difficulties for merchandisers
involves determining how much freight to order.   This decision depends on how much
grain is expected to be delivered by farmers and when it will be sold.   If merchandisers
overestimate or underestimate their freight requirement, they risk the possibility of
incurring demurrage and other significant costs.
Demurrage is a late penalty charged by railroads for inefficient use of their
equipment.   It is charged on a per-car basis and designed to keep the loading and unloading
of cars as efficient as possible.   Grain shippers have to factor the cost of demurrage into
their logistical decisions because it' s one of the most significant costs associated with
logistics.
In addition to costly demuITage penalties, several types of risk are present in the
grain supply chain.   Sources of risk include freight placement, transit times, farmer
deliveries, and basis/futures spreads.  Minimizing risk is difficult enough for one
merchandiser, but when several elevator origins are being considered, the risk is magnifled.
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Prototypical grain shippers operate several elevator locations and are constantly
implementing measures to reduce their exposure to risk.
In order to avoid costly demurrage penalties and suboptimal merchandising
decisions, grain shippers need to implement strategy in their merchandising and logistical
decisions.   Strategy helps to mitigate risk that is present throughout a supply chain.  This is
accomplished through the use of forward freight mechanisms, hedging, and contracting.
These strategies focus on determining when to sell grain and when to acquire freight.
Prototypical shippers in today' s grain industry need to determine when they should
sell their grain to an exporter or a domestic processor.   This decision considers storage
costs, terminal basis levels and farmer deliveries.   Once a marketing plan is created, they
next need to focus on acquiring freight in advance of a sale to assure that they can ship
their grain when needed.
Review of Objectives
The primary objective of this research is to develop a model to determine both the
optimal amount of grain that should be sold in the pipeline and the optimal amount of
freight that should be acquired by grain shippers through the use of forward shipping
mechanisms.   This primary objective was created in order to maximize net margin.
Specific objectives were..
I .    Define key strategic and uncertain variables a grain shipper is faced with.
2.    Develop a stochastic simulation model of a prototypical grain exporting
firm.
3.    Evaluate the effects on output after changing key decision variables.
4.    Interpret the results and assess the implications for grain shippers.
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Review of Procedures
The challenges confronting grain shippers in today' s industry became apparent after
a literature review was conducted to analyze the tradeoffs among the primary modes of
transportation for shipping grain, as well as the current rail industry after passage of the
Staggers Rail Act.   In addition, the forward shipping mechanisms offered by the BNSF
were researched to reveal their dynamic nature, and finally, alternative supply chain
methodologies were reviewed to develop a model representative of a grain supply chain.
A prototypical grain shipper is composed of several different points of origination,
all capable of shipping grain to export markets.  This required formulating a model with
multiple country elevator locations, each with their own specific characteristics.   The
model was designed to evaluate the merchandising and logistical decisions involved in the
management of an individual grain supply chain.
A stochastic simulation technique was chosen to model the prototypical grain
shipper in this thesis.   Stochastic simulation is a modeling technique that represents "real-
life" events by incoiporating uncertainty into the model (Winston, 2001 ).  Analytical
models are different in that they involve mathematical equations that contain input values
derived from their expected values.   Simulation models introduce randomness into
uncertain variables by representing them with a range of possible values rather than an
expected value.
The stochastic simulation software used in the model was @Risk which is an "add-
on" to Microsoft Excel (Palisade Corporation, 2002).   This software package incoxporated
randomness into certain key variables.   The model was designed in 2 steps.   The first step
involved developing the basic framework in Microsoft Excel as a means of formulating the
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costs and revenue associated with making logistical and merchandising decisions.  The
second step incorporated this spreadsheet into @Risk.   Using @Risk allowed key variables
to be stochast:c, or random, which incorporated risk into the model.   These key variables
included farmer deliveries, freight placements, transit times, basis values, and futures
spreads.
Three country elevators and 2 export markets were specified in the model.  The
country elevators included a River-teminal facility located in southern Minnesota, a
Shuttle-loading facility located in western Minnesota, and a Small-shipper located in
southeast North Dakota.   Each origin is specific in its own loading capabilities, storage
capacity and freight ordering strategies.  The 2 export markets included are the PNW and
the U.S. Gulf, and each market differs in its forward basis offered for grain and provides
shippers with two alternatives.   Each export facility is restricted by the model in what it is
capable of doing (i.e., loading and unloading capacities).
A base case was first evaluated in the model with parameters set according to
current industry conditions; this provided an accurate representation of a grain fim.  After
the results were derived, 5  sensitivities were conducted on the base case.   Key
merchandising variables, such as futures prices and spot deliveries, and logistical variables,
such as car ordering strategies and freight placements, were changed to analyze their affect
on important sources of revenue and costs.  Important sources of revenue were derived
from grain sales, efficient loading/unloading, and carrier non-performance penalties.   In
addition, important costs were included such as demunage, storage and the acquisition of
freight.
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Summary of Results
A stochastic simulation model was analyzed to evaluate key relationships among
merchandising and logistical variables.   Key variables analyzed were all random and they
included freight placements, transit times, farmer deliveries, and futures price spreads. The
effect of these variables on net margins was extracted from the results to ultimately
determine the optimal amount of grain to sell and optimal amount of grain to hedge.
A base case model was first simulated to create a benchmark for the analysis and to
evaluate key merchandising and logistical variables equal to current industry norms.  The
key output derived by the model included annual net margin, freight orders, and the actual
amount of grain sold and shipped in the pipeline.   These criteria were evaluated for each of
the 3 country elevator origins and then were aggregated across the 3  locations to
summarize for the prototypical grain shipper.  Then, several sensitivities were conducted
on merchandising and logistical variables.   Several results were identifiable from the base
case and sensitivity analysis.
Base case results indicated the Shuttle-1oader faced the greatest amount of risk
associated with net margin because of its freight ordering strategy.   This logistical strategy
was comprised of 3 shuttle COTs that were fixed annually and ran continuously throughout
the year; even if grain wasn't available, railcars still needed to be loaded.   In addition,
employing 3  Lhuttle COTs forced sales to be made based on freight placement at the
elevator rather than favorable selling opportunities.   Overall, the Shuttle-loader was
committed to too many long-term shipping mechanisms.   This limited the shipper's
flexibility, forced sales to be made based on car placement rather than market conditions,
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and ultimately constrained the shipper's ability to effectively sell grain and efficiently order
freight.
The Shuttle-loader' s inefficient logistical strategy generated roughly $4.5 million in
demurrage at the elevator level which accounted for 98% of the prototypical shipper' s total
elevator demurrage.   Other base case results include the River-terminal generating the
highest average net margin per bushel on account of being able to utilize the cheapest mode
of transportation for the majority of its grain shipments.
A sensitivity was conducted to analyze how all 3 elevators performed under a full
carry market and an inverted market.  The River-terminal earned a higher net margin than
the other 2 elevators while operating under both market extremes because it is able to adapt
to market conditions more easily than the other two; it primarily ships barge which is the
cheapest of the available transportation modes.   The Shuttle-loader is committed to shuttle
COTs which forces shipments in suboptimal shipping periods.   Even though the Small-
shipper isn't committed to shuttle COTs, it ships 24-car COTs which are the most
expensive of any mode.   Therefore, over-committing on shuttle COTs forced shipments in
suboptimal periods whereas only utilizing short-term rail freight (i.e., 24-car COTs) is
costly and less efficient.   Barge transportation proved to be the most effective mode in
extreme market conditions because they are cheaper than rail freight, have a lower
demurrage cost, and typically are placed at a shipper's facility within  I  week after they are
ordered; this provides shippers with flexibility in making timely grain sales and freight
ordering decisions.
It was found when 100% of total farmer deliveries were made on the spot market,
demurrage costs increased  19% for the Shuttle-loader and 29% for the RIver-terminal.
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This positive relationship between percent of spot deliveries and demurrage exists because
as the amount of uncertainty in grower deliveries increases, the chance that freight orders
will either be underestimated or overestimated increases.
After sensitivities were conducted on the logistical strategy employed by each
elevator, it was found the optimal freight ordering strategy for the River-terminal was to
order barges only and no rail freight because it maximized net margin.   This was expected
because river facilities are mainly designed with focus of loading barges rather than loading
shuttle-trains.   Thus, their level of net margins increases when more barges are utilized to
ship grain.   The Shuttle-loader's optimal strategy was to order  1  shuttle COT because
ordering more than one constrained the shipper's ability to make efficient logistical
decisions.   The Small-shipper's optimal freight ordering strategy was the same as the base
case which included only ordering 24-car COTs.   In total, the prototypical shipper's
optimal freight ordering strategy is to utilize barges and 24-car COTs when necessary and
to order 1  shuttle COT.   In addition, the optimal amount of grain to sell is roughly 30
million bushels annually which generates about $33 million in net margin.
The sensitivity conducted on ocean vessel placement indicated that when vessels
were placed at the end of the  10-day window, total vessel demurrage increased and total
vessel despatch decreased for all 3 elevators.   This occurred because railcarsfoarges would
arrive toward the beginning of the  10-day window, dump their grain, and then the vessel
would arrive a few days later.   If not enough grain was available to fill the vessel, it would
have to wait at the export facility for loaded railcars/barges to return in order to be filled.
In addition to increasing the amount of vessel demurrage, it also decreased the amount of
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despatch earned by shippers because if they can't consistently meet their guaranteed load
rate per week, they have a smaller chance of earning despatch.
The last sensitivity changed the distribution for 24-car COT placement to most
likely occur on the  15th day of the shipping period; however, there was still a chance that it
could be placed after the  15th day.   This basically caused the BNSF's 24-car COT guarantee
to be void and it increased the chance that the shipper would receive a carrier non-
performance payment in return.  As a result, the number of non-performance payments
made to the Small-shipper significantly increased because 24-car COTs were rarely placed
within the  15-day window.  Overall, this sensitivity caused car placement to be more
unreliable and it induced more risk for shippers.
In conclusion, annual net margin for each of the 3 country elevators was affected
the most by the type of freight ordering strategy implemented and the current market
conditions.   The type of freight ordering strategy implemented by each elevator ultimately
determines the overall sustainability of the firm; shipper's need to diversify the type of
freight they commit to because ordering too much long-term freight can reduce flexibility
and result in bad sales decisions whereas relying only on short-term freight is costly and
inefficient.
Not being able to quickly adapt to volatile market conditions can result in making
bad selling decisions and untimely freight purchases which can hinder the longevity of a
firm.  Also, it was found that as the level of uncertainty in farmer deliveries increases, the
level of demurTage also increases.   Finally, without guaranteed freight, car placement
becomes unreliable and creates a lot of risk for grain shippers.
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Limitations of the Study
The research conducted in this thesis served to analyze the merchandising and
logistical decisions made by a prototypical grain shipper.  It identified certain tradeoffs
among different car ordering strategies and merchandising strategies available to grain
shippers.   In addition, this thesis captured the relationshi|)s among random freight
placements, uncertain transit times, farmer deliveries, changing basis/futures spreads, and
annual net margins.   However, certain limitations restricted the capabilities of this research.
The greatest limitation to the study was the limited availability of data.   Data on rail
performance standards and historic car premiums/discounts were either non-existent or
very limited.  To compensate for this, the current car premiums/discounts from the
secondary rail market were obtained, and performance measures covering only a 3-week
span had to be used.    In addition, historic forward soybean basis bids were only available
for 5 months of the year.   Therefore, a lognormal distribution was created around these 5
months to generate random basis levels for the entire year.
Another limitation involved a lack of the secondary market for barges and rail
mechanisms.   In addition to this, none of the 3 country elevators in the model were allowed
to cancel a freight order because of a lack of grain.  Rather, the shipper incurred demurrage
until the freight was loaded and shipped.   In practice, shippers can anticipate when they
will be short of grain and rather than incurring demurrage, will most likely sell their freight
on the secondary market.   If they can't sell it on the secondary market, they will cancel the
upcoming trip as a last resort.
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Need for Further Research
Further research on the analysis of logistical and merchandising decisions made by
grain shippers may be conducted.  For instance, the prototypical shipper in this thesis could
be expanded to include more elevator origins, and then Distribution Requirements Planning
(DRP) could be used to aggregate the freight requirements across the entire firm.  In
addition, a secondary market for the shipper to buy and sell freight could be introduced to
more accurately represent current industry norms.
The research could also be expanded to include multiple commodities that are
handled by the shipper.   Also, a different Class I Railroad could be incorporated into the
analysis.  This would evaluate how alternative forward rail mechanisms affect a grain
shipper' s decisions and profitability in the supply chain.
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